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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
Anderson County, Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
Joey Preston and the South Carolina Retirement System, 
Defendants, 
Of whom Joey Preston is the Respondent-Petitioner and 
the South Carolina Retirement System is the Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2017-001898 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Anderson County 
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 27912 
Heard February 20, 2019 – Filed August 7, 2019 
VACATED AND REMANDED 
James Theodore Gentry and Wade S. Kolb, III, both of 
Greenville, and Alice W. Parham Casey, of Columbia, all 
of Wyche Law Firm, for Petitioner-Respondent. 
Candy M. Kern-Fuller, of Upstate Law Group, LLC, of 
Easley, and Lane W. Davis, of Nelson Mullins Riley & 
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Scarborough, LLP, of Greenville, both for Respondent-
Petitioner. 
Justin R. Werner, of Columbia, for Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: In November 2008, the Anderson County 
Council (2008 Council) approved a $1.1 million Severance Agreement for county 
administrator Joey Preston (Preston). In January 2009, a new county council (2009 
Council) was sworn in, and filed the present action in November 2009 seeking to 
invalidate the Severance Agreement. The circuit court ruled that, despite tainted 
votes, the Severance Agreement was valid and also held: (1) public policy rendered 
neither the Severance Agreement nor the vote adopting it void; (2) Preston did not 
breach a fiduciary duty because he owed no duty to disclose Council members' 
personal conflicts of interest; (3) the County failed to prove its claims for fraud, 
constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation; (4) the 2008 Council's approval 
of the Severance Agreement was neither unreasonable or capricious nor a product 
of fraud and abuse of power; (5) the County's constructive trust claim no longer 
remained viable; (6) rescission was unavailable as a remedy; (7) the County had 
unclean hands; (8) adequate remedies at law barred the County from invoking the 
court's equitable jurisdiction; (9) the County breached the covenant not to sue in the 
Severance Agreement by bringing this lawsuit; and (10) the issue concerning the 
award of attorney's fees should be held in abeyance pending the final disposition and 
filing of a petition. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals, which included then Chief Judge Few, heard 
oral argument in this case in June 2015.  In February 2016, Chief Judge Few was 
elected as a Justice of this Court.  Thereafter, on August 16, 2017, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part with a notation indicating Associate 
Justice Few as "not participating." 
This Court granted the parties' cross-petitions for writs of certiorari to review 
the Court of Appeals' published decision, wherein the Court of Appeals held: 
We affirm the circuit court's finding that Preston owed no fiduciary 
duty to inform the 2008 Council of improper votes and his conduct did 
not constitute fraud, constructive fraud, or negligent misrepresentation. 
The circuit court also properly declined the County's invitation to apply 
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the single tainted vote rule . . . . We hold the court erred, however, in 
refusing to invalidate the 2008 Council's approval of the Severance 
Agreement based upon the absence of a quorum, and accordingly, we 
reverse. Although we agree with the circuit court that rescission is not 
an available remedy because the parties cannot be returned to their 
status quo ante, we reverse the court's finding of unclean hands. We 
further reverse the court's finding that the County could not invoke its 
equitable powers because an adequate remedy at law existed. Lastly, 
we reverse the court's holding that the County breached the terms of the 
Severance Agreement by bringing the instant action. 
Anderson Cty. v. Preston, 420 S.C. 546, 583, 804 S.E.2d 282, 301 (Ct. App. 2017). 
For the reasons explained below, we now vacate the decision of the Court of 
Appeals; find the Severance Agreement invalid due to the County's lack of a 
quorum; and remand to the circuit court to determine the exact amount that Preston 
must refund the County. 
I. Factual and Procedural History1 
Prior to the approval of the Severance Agreement, the political environment 
in Anderson County involved lawsuits between sitting council members and Preston, 
both personally and as the County Administrator. 
The 2008 Council consisted of Chairman Michael Thompson (Thompson) and 
Council members Larry Greer (Greer), Ron Wilson, Gracie Floyd (Floyd), Robert 
Waldrep (Waldrep), Cindy Wilson, and Bill McAbee (McAbee). 
In June 2008, primary challengers ousted three incumbent members of the 
2008 Council:  Tommy Dunn defeated Thompson, Tom Allen defeated McAbee, 
and Eddie Moore defeated Greer.  Some of the primary victors, as well as Waldrep 
and Cindy Wilson, ran on platforms calling for examination into and possible reform 
of the financial and governance practices of the Preston administration. 
From June to December 2008, Waldrep and Cindy Wilson held a series of 
meetings with Moore, Dunn, and Allen at Waldrep's office.  During these meetings, 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
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the participants laid out an agenda for the 2009 Council that included firing the law 
firm for the County and hiring a new one; hiring a financial investigator or auditor; 
designating Moore as chairman; drafting resolutions for the first meeting; 
implementing a hiring freeze; and addressing the position of county administrator 
and various other personnel matters. 
After the primary elections, Preston retained Robert Hoskins (Preston's 
Attorney) as his counsel.  On September 25, 2008, Preston's Attorney notified the 
2008 Council of Preston's anticipatory breach of contract claim, stating the 
following: 
[I]t has come to Mr. Preston's attention that certain existing Council 
members have made statements that they and certain newly elected 
Council Members intend, after January 2009, to prevent him from 
carrying out his duties as County Administrator . . . . Preston considers 
the intent of certain members of Council and their allies to prevent him 
from performing his job as an anticipatory breach of his employment 
contract . . . . [T]he political and personal agenda of the obstructionists 
has rendered his ability to serve the people of Anderson County beyond 
January 1, 2009 impossible. 
In response, the 2008 Council referred Preston's claim to its personnel 
committee—chaired by Ron Wilson—and hired Tom Bright, an employment 
attorney, to advise the County on the matter.  Bright then interviewed all seven 
members of the 2008 Council, as well as the county attorney, to receive their input. 
On October 23, 2008, Preston's attorney delivered a letter to Bright, in which 
he alluded to a number of causes of action and tort claims Preston planned to assert 
against current and incoming Council members.  In the letter, however, he offered 
to settle Preston's anticipatory breach claim and "all claims against the County and 
the two individual Council [m]embers [he] previously mentioned." Under this 
proposed settlement, Preston would resign and execute a complete release of all 
claims against the County, Waldrep, and Cindy Wilson in exchange for the County 
paying $1,276,081 in damages:  $827,222 for the total amount of pay and benefits 
due under his employment agreement (the Employment Agreement); $356,087 to 
the South Carolina Retirement System (SCRS) to purchase seven years, seven 
months, and twenty-three days of service credits to allow him to retire immediately 
with a full pension; and $92,772 to his health reimbursement account for retiree 
health benefits. 
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After receiving the letter, Bright met with the personnel committee to discuss 
how the County should address the matter. In his notes outlining Preston's claims 
and the County's options, Bright stated Preston had no anticipatory breach or 
constructive discharge claim. Bright also advised the committee that, under this 
Court's ruling in Piedmont Public Service District v. Cowart (Cowart II), 324 S.C. 
239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996), the County had a good argument that Preston's 
Employment Agreement was voidable—and therefore had no value—because it 
purported to extend his employment beyond the term of the Council that approved 
it. Nevertheless, Bright also told the committee if the County were to lose, then it 
could face up to $2 million in litigation costs going forward. Thus, Bright advised 
the 2008 Council it could (1) do nothing, (2) leave the issue for the 2009 Council to 
decide, (3) terminate Preston and pay him nothing, or (4) settle with Preston and pay 
out his contract. As to the fourth option, Bright cautioned that citizens may go after 
former Council members for giving away their money if the 2008 Council chose to 
settle. After considering the options, the personnel committee directed Bright "to go 
and talk to Preston's Attorney and try and get the best deal you can." 
Following several weeks of negotiations, Bright emailed Preston's Attorney a 
copy of a proposed Severance Agreement and release of all claims on November 18, 
2008. That evening, the 2008 Council voted to amend the agenda to consider the 
Severance Agreement, voted for its approval, voted to approve budget transfers to 
fund it, and then voted to reapprove it on reconsideration. The 2008 Council 
approved the Severance Agreement, and the budget transfers to fund it, by a 5–2 
vote. After the votes, the 2008 Council voted to hire Michael Cunningham as the 
new county administrator and adjourned without conducting any further business. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Severance Agreement, Preston agreed to resign 
as county administrator on November 30, 2008, and release all claims against the 
County and any of its Council members regarding his employment. In exchange, 
Preston received $1,139,833—less state and federal withholdings—from the 
County. The County also agreed to contribute $359,258 to the SCRS "to pay for 
retirement service credits," paid Preston $780,575 "in the form of a severance 
benefit," and gave Preston title to the 2006 GMC Yukon he was using as a County 
vehicle. 
The newly constituted 2009 Council held its first meeting on January 6, 2009, 
during which it voted to hire a new law firm and a financial investigator to review 
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Cunningham's employment contract, investigate the manner in which he was hired, 
and review the actions taken by the 2008 Council on November 18, 2008.2 
Thereafter, the County sued Preston and named SCRS as a defendant, alleging 
causes of action for (1) violation of the State Ethics Act,3 section 2-37(g) of the 
Anderson County Code of Ordinances (the County Code), and the common law; (2) 
violation of public policy; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) fraud; (5) constructive 
fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) capriciousness, unreasonableness, and 
fraud; (8) fundamental and substantial breach of the Severance Agreement; (9) 
breach of fiduciary duties relating to back-dated documents; (10) constructive trust; 
and (11) unjust enrichment. SCRS filed an answer and cross-claim against Preston 
in response to the County's complaint. The County later amended its complaint to 
include additional factual allegations. Preston filed answers to the County's 
complaint and amended complaint, asserting counterclaims against the County and 
SCRS. The County then filed replies to Preston's counterclaims and amended 
counterclaims. 
The matter was tried without a jury from October 29, 2012, to November 5, 
2012. In its May 3, 2013 order (the Final Order), the court granted judgment in favor 
of Preston on all causes of action as well as his counterclaim against the County. 
In the Final Order, the circuit court disqualified four 2008 Council members 
for improperly participating in the votes approving the Severance Agreement. The 
court found Thompson voted in violation of section 2-37(g)(4)(e) of the County 
2 In Bradshaw v. Anderson County, this Court held South Carolina Code section 4-
9-660 (1986) of the Home Rule Act expressly authorized the 2009 Council— 
operating under a council–administrator form of government—to directly engage 
professionals "for the purpose of inquiries and investigations." 388 S.C. 257, 263, 
695 S.E.2d 842, 845 (2010). The Court found the 2009 Council had the authority to 
investigate the 2008 Council's business and financial practices, "especially 
concerning contracts related to the former and current County Administrators." Id. 
at 258, 695 S.E.2d at 842. According to the Court, it would be absurd to require the 
county administrator, "who is answerable to the council and not the electorate, to 
investigate himself." Id. at 263, 695 S.E.2d at 845. 
3 S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-700 (2009). We cite to the code section in effect at the time 
of the alleged misconduct, the amendment of which is irrelevant to the outcome of 
this case. 
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Code because he was seeking future employment from the County through Preston 
at the time of the vote. The court likewise found Ron Wilson's vote violated 
subsections 2-37(g)(4)(a) and (e) because Ron Wilson's daughter had recently 
received a substantial financial benefit from Preston after he extended her personal 
services contract with the County. Although Waldrep and Cindy Wilson voted 
against the Severance Agreement, the court found their votes violated section 2-
37(g) because both had a "financial interest greater than that of the general Anderson 
County public," and their participation created "a substantial appearance of 
impropriety." Given that "Preston agreed not to pursue any further claims against 
any County Council member," the court found Waldrep and Cindy Wilson "had a 
direct economic interest"—regardless of the vote's outcome—and should not have 
participated while Preston maintained a lawsuit against them individually. 
After disqualifying four of the seven members,4 the court—relying upon 
Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999), and section 2-
37(g)(3) of the County Code—nevertheless found "a majority of those present and 
properly voting approved Preston's Severance Agreement." The court also held: (1) 
public policy neither rendered the Severance Agreement nor the vote adopting it 
void; (2) Preston did not breach a fiduciary duty because he owed no duty to disclose 
Council members' personal conflicts of interest; (3) the County failed to prove its 
claims for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation; (4) the 2008 
Council's approval of the Severance Agreement was neither unreasonable or 
capricious nor a product of fraud and abuse of power; (5) the County's constructive 
trust claim no longer remained viable; (6) rescission was unavailable as a remedy; 
(7) the County had unclean hands; (8) adequate remedies at law barred the County 
from invoking the court's equitable jurisdiction; (9) the County breached the 
covenant not to sue in the Severance Agreement by bringing this lawsuit; and (10) 
the issue concerning the award of attorney's fees should be held in abeyance pending 
the final disposition and filing of a petition. 
In light of the circuit court's Final Order, the County filed a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment as well as a post-trial motion to amend its complaint. The 
circuit court denied both post-trial motions in an order (the Post-Trial Order) dated 
4 Neither party appealed the circuit court's disqualification of the four votes, thus it 
is the law of the case.  Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 168, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 
(1993) (stating, "[f]ailure to argue is an abandonment of the issue and precludes 
consideration on appeal"). 
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November 8, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. This 
Court granted the parties' cross-petitions for writs of certiorari. 
II. Discussion 
A. Quorum – Court of Appeals 
Preston argues this Court should vacate the decision rendered by the Court of 
Appeals because the panel lacked a quorum of three judges and, instead, issued an 
opinion authored by only two judges. 
In response, the County maintains that section 14-8-80(d) of the South 
Carolina Code (2017) allows the vote of only two judges to issue an effective 
opinion. According to the County, State v. McMillian5 simply requires that three 
judges be present during oral argument, which occurred here. 
"On a panel [of the Court of Appeals], three judges shall constitute a quorum, 
and the concurrence of a majority is necessary for the reversal of the judgment 
below." S.C. Code Ann. § 14-8-80(d) (2017). 
In McMillian, only two of three Court of Appeals judges were present at oral 
argument. State v. McMillian, 349 S.C. 17, 19, 561 S.E.2d 602, 603 (2002). 
However, "[a]rguments proceeded over the objection of counsel for McMillian . . . 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion signed by three 
judges." Id. at 20, 561 S.E.2d at 603. 
On appeal, this Court held "three judges are necessary to constitute a quorum 
of the Court of Appeals, and a concurrence of the majority is necessary for reversal 
of the judgment below."  Id. The Court added, "[t]his Court has recognized that no 
valid act can be done in the absence of a quorum." Id. at 20, 561 S.E.2d at 603–04; 
Gaskin v. Jones, 198 S.C. 508, 513, 18 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1942) (holding that the 
Governing Board of Florence County did not have power to transact business when 
members of the Board left the room during the meeting).  However, despite finding 
the Court of Appeals erred in hearing the case without a quorum, the McMillian 
Court, citing judicial economy, addressed the merits of McMillian's appeal. 
McMillian, 349 S.C. at 21, 561 S.E.2d at 604. 
5 349 S.C. 17, 561 S.E.2d 602 (2002). 
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We find section 14-8-80(d), read in conjunction with McMillian, provides 
that, in the absence of a quorum, the Court of Appeals cannot issue a valid opinion. 
See McMillian, 349 S.C. at 17, 561 S.E.2d at 602 (finding a quorum constitutes three 
judges, and no valid act can be done in the absence of a quorum).  
We take this opportunity to clarify that a quorum is required throughout the 
proceedings, including the issuance of the opinion.6 Thus, because the panel did not 
have the quorum needed to reverse the circuit court, the Court of Appeals did not 
have the authority to reverse the judgment below. As a result, we vacate the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals.  However, due to the unsettled law of McMillian at the time 
of oral argument, and in the interest of judicial economy, we proceed to the merits 
of the dispute. 
B. Severance Agreement 
The County challenges the validity of the Severance Agreement on the ground 
there was an absence of a quorum when Council voted. 
1. Issue Preservation 
Preston argues the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the County could 
raise the County quorum issue in its post-judgment motion under Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP.  According to Preston, the County failed to preserve its quorum theory of 
relief by neglecting to raise the issue before, during, or at any time during the six 
months between the circuit court's conclusion and issuance of the final judgment. 
In support of this contention, Preston maintains that the parties argued the 
validity of Cindy Wilson's and Waldrep's votes on numerous occasions during trial. 
Preston claimed at trial and now claims in his brief that his affirmative defense 
"Some or all of the claims asserted in the County's Complaint . . . are barred by the 
holding of Baird [] v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999)[,]" 
encompasses the fact that the votes of Cindy Wilson and Waldrep were challenged 
in conjunction with the votes of McAbee, Michael Thompson, and Ron Wilson and, 
as a result, the parties presented arguments that would have invalidated four votes. 
Therefore, according to Preston, the County should have raised the quorum issue 
prior to, or during, trial. 
6 This ruling shall apply prospectively. 
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In response, the County maintains that the quorum issue did not exist until the 
circuit court issued its order invalidating four votes. According to the County, the 
Rule 59(e) motion was the appropriate method to address the circuit court's grant of 
relief not sought in the pleadings, based on an issue that was never raised at trial. 
We note neither party sought relief specifically based on the absence or 
existence of a quorum.  Furthermore, the trial record is absent of either party 
mentioning the lack of a quorum, advancing an argument for or against a quorum, 
or presenting arguments explaining how any disqualification might affect a quorum. 
Thus, the question of whether a quorum existed first arose when the circuit court 
invalidated the votes of four Council members due to conflicts of interest in the Final 
Order. 
Consequently, the County's Rule 59(e) motion was the proper means by which 
to raise the argument that the Severance Agreement should be invalidated because 
the 2008 Council passed it in the absence of a quorum. See Fryer v. S.C. Law Enf't 
Div., 369 S.C. 395, 399, 631 S.E.2d 918, 920 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating, "[a] post-trial 
motion must be made when the [circuit] court either grants relief not requested or 
rules on an issue not raised at trial"). Because the circuit court, in denying the 
County's motion to reconsider, addressed the merits of the County's quorum 
argument in the alternative, the County's argument was properly raised to and ruled 
upon by the circuit court and, thus, preserved for review on appeal.  
2. Absence of a Quorum 
The County argues that, as a result of the circuit court's disqualification of 
four members, the 2008 Council was powerless to act with only three members to 
vote. 
In contrast, Preston contends that for purposes of calculating a quorum, the 
County Code does not take into account a council-member's voting capacity but, 
instead, is only concerned with the Council members' "physical presence at the 
meeting site." 
Section 2-37(g)(3) of the County Code provides, "Except where otherwise 
specified in these rules, a majority vote of those members present and voting shall 
decide all questions, motions, and other votes."  Additionally, section 2-37(d) 
defines a quorum as follows: 
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A quorum shall consist of a majority of the council. In the absence of a 
quorum, the meeting cannot be convened. Should sufficient members 
leave during a meeting, the chairperson shall immediately declare a 
recess and attempt to obtain a quorum. If, after a reasonable time, a 
quorum has not been obtained, the meeting shall be adjourned. 
Members of county council may excuse themselves briefly during a 
meeting without loss of a quorum; however, no vote may be taken 
during the temporary absence of quorum. 
In the instant case, the circuit court invalidated four of the Council member's 
votes.  After removing the improper votes, the circuit court held that a majority of 
the members present and voting passed Preston's Severance Agreement.7 
Section 2-37(d) requires that "a quorum consist of a majority of the Council" 
and in the absence of such no quorum exists. Additionally, this Court determined in 
Garris that a member disqualified due to a conflict of interest may not be counted 
for purposes of a quorum. See Garris v. Governing Bd. of S.C. Reinsurance Facility, 
333 S.C. 432, 453, 511 S.E.2d 48, 59 (1998) (stating, "[a] member who recuses 
himself or is disqualified to participate in a matter due to a conflict of interest, bias, 
or other good cause may not be counted for purposes of a quorum at the meeting 
where the board acts upon the matter"). 
Here, a majority of the seven-member Council requires four members to 
constitute a quorum. After removing the disqualified votes, however, only three of 
the Council members could count towards the quorum. Id. As such, a quorum did 
not exist.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in considering the four disqualified 
votes in its quorum calculation.  Therefore, because the Council acted without the 
quorum necessary for taking valid action, the Severance Agreement is null and void. 
C. Remedy 
The County argues the excess payments Preston received, and will receive, 
from January 1, 2009, until he turns sixty years' old (approximately $1,333,000) 
7 The vote approving the Severance Agreement passed 5–1–1, with Thompson and 
Ron Wilson voting Aye; Cindy Wilson voting Nay; Waldrep Abstaining (adjusted 
vote, passed 3–0–1).  The motion to transfer funds passed 5–2, with Thompson and 
Ron Wilson voting Aye; Waldrep and Cindy Wilson voting Nay (removing improper 
votes, passed 3–0). 
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could be redirected from Preston to the County as part of a remedy. Furthermore, 
according to the County, the purchase of service credit on Preston's behalf means 
that Preston will receive benefit amounts after age sixty that will exceed what he 
would have received without such a purchase, totaling $833,000 of additional 
benefits (with a present value at the time of trial of $180,000). Therefore, the County 
asserts a claim for unjust enrichment. 
SCRS contends that any request for relief against a retired member of the 
SCRS must be consistent with the anti-alienation provisions of section 9-1-1680 of 
the South Carolina Code (2009), which provides that retirement benefits are 
generally exempt from legal process, but may be subject to the doctrine of 
constructive trust.8 
"A party may be unjustly enriched when it has and retains benefits or money 
which in justice and equity belong to another. Unjust enrichment is an equitable 
doctrine which permits the recovery of that amount the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff." Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs.-Hilton 
Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009). 
"[S]ubject to the doctrine of constructive trust ex maleficio . . . the right of a 
person to an annuity or a retirement allowance or to the return of contributions . . . 
are exempted from levy and sale, garnishment, attachment, or any other process . . . 
." S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1680 (2009). 
Because we hold that the Severance Agreement is void, it is clear Preston 
realized a benefit that would be inequitable for him to retain in the absence of the 
agreement. Thus, we must address the appropriate remedy. 
Initially, we emphasize that Preston and the County both played a part in 
creating the toxic environment of the County Council and the contentious litigation 
that ensued. Members of the 2008 Council used FOIA requests and the media to 
create a toxic atmosphere while Preston doled out benefits to key members prior to 
the vote on the Severance Agreement. 
Additionally, we are cognizant of the fact that Preston cannot be returned to 
his position of County Administrator. Furthermore, Preston concedes that he can no 
8 SCRS takes no position on the underlying merits of the dispute. 
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longer revive his prior legal claims against the County nor claims against certain 
Council members from the 2008 Council because they are time-barred and the 
evidence (text messages and emails) he could have unearthed no longer exist. 
The value of the severance package was $1,139,833.00 (less withholdings). 
After consideration of all the variables, we hold that the $355,848.95 payment to 
SCRS is not recoverable.9 Further, we find the County shall not be entitled to a 
refund or reimbursement from SCRS for the difference.10 However, the County shall 
recover the total amount the County paid in cash to Preston pursuant to the Severance 
Agreement, plus the value of the 2006 County vehicle. Therefore, we remand to the 
circuit court to determine the amount the County is entitled to recover from Preston 
in the form of a civil judgment. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons explained above, we vacate the decision of the Court of 
Appeals; find the Severance Agreement invalid due to the County's lack of a 
quorum; and remand to the circuit court to determine the exact amount that Preston 
must refund the County.11 
9 A SCRS program director provided in an affidavit that, at the time of the affidavit, 
the County had paid a total of $355,848.95 to SCRS to purchase 7 years, 7 months, 
and 23 days of additional service credit for Preston. As of the date of the affidavit 
(September 11, 2012), SCRS had paid Preston accumulated monthly benefits 
totaling $329,561.24.  According to the director, by December 2012, SCRS would 
have paid $360,313.52 in retirement benefits to Preston since January 2009. 
10 SCRS no longer has any liability as a stakeholder to return funds to the County, 
because the full amount of the County's service purchase payment made to SCRS on 
Preston's behalf has now been exhausted through the payment of retirement benefits 
to Preston. Thus, the County is not entitled to any lump-sum distribution of the 
present value of Preston's benefits or any other special distribution from SCRS. 
11 Because our decision is dispositive, we decline to address the remaining issues. 
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 
591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 
disposition of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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VACATED AND REMANDED. 
KITTREDGE, HEARN and JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Stephanie 
McDonald, concur. 
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hearing on Felder's application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), the PCR court 
issued an order denying and dismissing Felder's application. We find the PCR court 
erred in determining trial counsel was not ineffective.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
PCR court's decision and remand this matter to the court of general sessions for a 
new trial. 
I. FACTS 
Shortly after midnight on July 18, 2008, Kayla McFadden and her cousin, 
Antrell McFadden, were walking to a gas station in Sumter. On the way, the 
McFaddens saw a car drive down the street towards them. They subsequently 
observed a man get out of the car, shoot the victim, and drive away. 
Kayla testified the shooter was driving a white car with tinted windows, but 
she did not know the type of car. Antrell also testified the car was white with tinted 
windows. Kayla described the shooter as wearing a hat, white shirt, and dark pants. 
Similarly, Antrell described the shooter as wearing a red and black hat, white shirt, 
and blue jeans.  Both McFaddens testified the victim was not wearing a hat. 
Detective William Lyons of the Sumter Police Department responded to the 911 call 
about the shooting. When he arrived at the scene, he observed a red baseball hat in 
the roadway. 
After the McFaddens provided statements at the police station, Lyons and 
another detective, Jason Potteiger, drove them home. While on the way, the officers 
noticed a white car pass them at Willow Morand Apartments. The car "caught [their] 
attention," and the "[McFaddens] made comments like, it looks like the vehicle. 
That can be the vehicle, I'm not sure." Because the officers were traveling with the 
McFaddens, they asked another officer to investigate. The officer went to Willow 
Morand Apartments and determined Felder's sister-in-law lived there. Felder's 
girlfriend was driving the vehicle (a white Buick), and it was registered to Felder's 
mother. 
When Lyons and Potteiger returned to the police station, they learned of a 
burglary that had occurred on Harry Street. Lyons testified the 911 call about the 
burglary came in at 12:37 AM, and the 911 call about the shooting came in around 
12:38 or 12:39 AM. The officers began investigating whether there was a 
connection between the two incidents. Lyons testified he never drove the distance 
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between the two locations, but he believed it would take less than a minute in a 
vehicle to get from one location to the other. 
Lyons returned to the McFaddens' home around 6:30 PM (approximately 
eighteen hours after the shooting) to show them a lineup.  Antrell indicated that he 
recognized two people, one of whom was Felder who was labeled as "No. 2." 
However, neither Kayla nor Antrell was able to identify anyone in the lineup as the 
shooter, and both testified they could not see who fired the gun. 
Fingerprint experts examined the red hat recovered from the crime scene and 
found two fingerprint images on a gold label affixed to the hat.  One of the 
fingerprints was identified as belonging to Felder. The second fingerprint could not 
be positively identified. In addition, law enforcement found Felder's DNA inside 
the hat, as well as the DNA of an unknown person. 
Police confiscated the Buick on the same day as the shooting. During trial, 
Lyons viewed photographs of the vehicle and stated it appeared tint had been 
removed from the windows.1 Lyons admitted, however, that there was no official 
report or handwritten documents stating window tint had been removed.  Lyons also 
stated the Buick in the photographs had white handles, though a third witness told 
police the shooter's car had silver handles. Furthermore, a crime scene investigator 
testified he found blood in the Buick on a receipt and the radio controls, but the blood 
belonged to Felder. Law enforcement did not find any blood or DNA evidence 
belonging to the victim in the car. 
At trial, the State moved to admit a summary of Felder's oral statement to 
police. Trial counsel expressly stated he did not object to the admission of the 
evidence. Potteiger testified he spoke with Felder at the police station and prepared 
a typed summary of Felder's oral statement. Potteiger then read the summary out 
loud, including the following portion: 
Antrell Felder began by stating he was 26 years old, that his date of 
birth was [redacted] 1982, and that he lived at [redacted]. He related 
that he was currently on bond for a lynching charge . . . . 
1 Potteiger also testified the lines across the main window in the car appeared to be 
consistent with the removal of tint. 
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Potteiger continued to read the remainder of the summary, which indicated 
Felder was hanging out at his sister-in-law's home on July 17.  Felder stated someone 
he knew called him at 11:59 PM and told him four men were in the process of 
breaking into his home. Felder, accompanied by several family members, went to 
his house to investigate, but he left the home before police arrived.  He told police 
that shoes, hats, and some clothing were taken from his home. Felder intimated he 
went back to his sister-in-law's apartment and then to visit a woman in Red Bay. 
According to Felder, he arrived in Red Bay between 12:25 and 12:35 AM, and he 
did not leave the area until 3:00 AM. 
The defense did not call any witnesses and rested immediately after the State 
rested. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Felder, and the trial court 
sentenced him to concurrent terms of forty-two years for the murder conviction and 
five years for the weapons possession conviction. On direct appeal, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed Felder's convictions and sentences. State v. Felder, Op. No. 2013-
UP-437 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 27, 2013). 
Felder subsequently filed a PCR application, alleging, inter alia, ineffective 
assistance of counsel. During the PCR hearing, Felder's attorney asked lead trial 
counsel, Shaun Kent, whether he would describe the State's evidence as strong.  Kent 
stated:  "Not really.  I mean, it was a strong circumstantial case; but it wasn't the best 
case, I thought."  Kent testified he discussed the planned stipulations with Felder, 
and that Felder "understood everything." During cross-examination, the following 
colloquy occurred: 
Q: But because he had mentioned in his oral statement to the police 
being on bond for lynching at the time as prior acts, did you make 
objection to the entrance -- including his oral statement without 
redaction -- of those particular pieces of fact based on prior acts and 
prejudicial? 
A: I don't remember but I don't think I did.  No, Tim.  And if I didn't, 
based on your question, that would be a mistake. 
Kent indicated he did not believe the outcome of the trial would have been different 
if the reference to the lynching charge had been excluded. 
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Felder's other trial counsel, Ray Chandler, also testified at the PCR hearing. 
When asked whether the lynching reference changed the outcome of the trial, 
Chandler responded:  "You could argue it in retrospect . . . . I would argue it hard in 
retrospect."  Chandler went on to explain that the defense's theory was Felder could 
not have gotten from his home to murder the victim within three minutes.  Chandler 
then added:  "So that seemed to be our theory at reasonable doubt.  Whether our 
client had a pending charge or not was not as important to me as was getting across 
to the jury that he couldn't have done it." 
The PCR court ultimately denied Felder's request for relief and dismissed his 
application with prejudice, finding: 
Trial Counsel credibly testified that he discussed this stipulation before 
the trial and Applicant did not raise this issue; Applicant understood 
and agreed with the decision to stipulate.  The statement was a 
voluntary statement given by Applicant to law enforcement, and it is 
unlikely that Applicant could have kept it out of evidence. 
This Court granted Felder's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether 
the PCR court erred in determining Felder's trial counsel was not ineffective in 
allowing the admission of the un-redacted summary of Felder's statement to police. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In a PCR case, this Court will uphold the PCR court's factual findings if there 
is any evidence of probative value in the record to support them." Thompson v. State, 
423 S.C. 235, 239, 814 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2018) (citing Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 
610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016)).  "However, this Court gives no deference to the 
PCR court's conclusions of law, and we review those conclusions de novo." Id. 
(citing Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2014)). 
III. LAW/ANALYSIS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a 
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a PCR applicant must show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, 
and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687.  To show deficient performance, an applicant must prove "counsel's 
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representation [fell] below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. To 
demonstrate prejudice, an applicant must show "'there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'" Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 565–66, 689 S.E.2d 629, 
631 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
a. Deficient Performance 
The PCR court found "it is unlikely that Applicant could have kept [the 
statement] out of evidence."  We disagree. Although the summary of Felder's oral 
statement was likely admissible, the specific mention of his lynching charge was 
wholly inadmissible under Rule 609, SCRE, which permits the admission of 
convictions—not charges.2 The reference to Felder's lynching charge was also 
inadmissible under Rule 404(b), SCRE, as improper character evidence. See Rule 
404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."). Even 
assuming the lynching charge was admissible, there is a reasonable probability that 
the trial court would have excluded it.  See Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."). 
Trial counsel had at least two opportunities to prevent the inclusion of the 
lynching charge, and he failed to object even once. First, during pre-trial motions, 
trial counsel indicated he did not have any objections under Jackson v. Denno3 to 
the validity or voluntariness of Felder's oral statement to law enforcement. Second, 
when the State moved during trial to admit the summary of Felder's oral statement, 
trial counsel expressly stated he did not object to the admission of the evidence. In 
2 The notes to Rule 609 state:  "[Subsection A] . . . allows impeachment with a 
conviction for any crime which carries a maximum sentence of death or 
imprisonment for more than one year."  Rule 609 note, SCRE (emphasis added); see 
Clark v. Cantrell, 332 S.C. 433, 450, 504 S.E.2d 605, 614 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Rule 
609(a), SCRE, does not permit mere charges to be used as impeachment evidence."). 
3 378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964) ("A defendant objecting to the admission of a confession 
is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the 
voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined."). 
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addition, when Potteiger mentioned the lynching charge, trial counsel failed to object 
and ask for a curative instruction. Because trial counsel's error fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, we conclude trial counsel's performance was 
deficient. 
b. Prejudice 
"In determining whether the applicant has proven prejudice, the PCR court 
should consider the specific impact counsel's error had on the outcome of the trial." 
Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 188, 810 S.E.2d 836, 843 (2018). The PCR court 
should also evaluate "the strength of the State's case in light of all the evidence 
presented to the jury." Id. Generally, "the stronger the evidence presented by the 
State, the less likely the PCR court will find the applicant met his burden of proving 
prejudice." Id. However, "the existence of 'overwhelming evidence' does not 
automatically preclude a finding of prejudice." Id. at 189, 810 S.E.2d at 844. 
i. Specific Impact of Counsel's Error 
Because trial counsel allowed the admission of the un-redacted summary, the 
jury learned Felder had a pending lynching charge at the time of the murder.  The 
reference to the lynching charge was indisputably propensity evidence that served 
no purpose other than to prejudice Felder. In this case, the risks associated with 
propensity evidence were heightened due to the specific crime—lynching. The word 
"lynching" is extremely problematic in itself. It immediately evokes a visceral 
reaction and a grim mental image. The lynching reference could reasonably cause 
a juror to presume Felder was a violent person and deserving of a guilty verdict. 
Because Felder did not take the stand, the summary of his oral statement (by 
way of Potteiger's testimony) was the sole means by which Felder gave his side of 
the story.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to believe the jury focused—at least to some 
extent—on the summary because it provided Felder's version of events.  Further, the 
State entered the summary into evidence as an exhibit, and the jury received a copy 
to consider during their deliberations.  Thus, it is misleading to say the lynching 
charge was merely mentioned in passing. 
Had trial counsel objected, it is almost certain the trial court would have 
excluded the reference to Felder's lynching charge under the South Carolina Rules 
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of Evidence, particularly Rule 609.4 Consequently, but for trial counsel's error, the 
jury would have never heard any mention of Felder's lynching charge. 
ii. Strength of the State's Case 
The evidence in this case was primarily circumstantial.  The State's strongest 
evidence was the red baseball hat recovered from the crime scene.  However, the hat 
contained Felder's DNA as well as the DNA of an unknown individual. Moreover, 
two fingerprints were found on the hat—one belonging to Felder and another that 
could not be positively identified.  Ultimately, the baseball hat proved only that 
Felder possessed the hat at some point in time, and it did not directly link Felder to 
the murder or crime scene.5 
Both Kayla and Antrell testified they did not see the shooter, and neither could 
identify Felder as the shooter in a lineup. See Smalls, 422 S.C. at 192, 810 S.E.2d 
at 845 ("The fact [the witness] could only narrow it down to two people in the 
photographic lineup undermines—not supports—the notion of overwhelming 
evidence.").  Here, when presented with a lineup, neither witness even so much as 
indicated that Felder might have been the shooter. 
The evidence regarding the vehicle was also circumstantial.  Neither Kayla 
nor Antrell was certain the car they saw on the way home was the shooter's car.  
Moreover, a third witness told law enforcement the car had silver handles, whereas 
the Buick had white handles. The McFaddens described the shooter's vehicle as 
having tinted windows. The Buick did not have tinted windows (though two officers 
testified the windows appeared to have had the tint removed).  Furthermore, law 
enforcement was unable to find any of the victim's blood or DNA in the Buick. 
There is no evidence in the record that conclusively links Felder to the murder. 
Accordingly, one could hardly say "overwhelming evidence" of Felder's guilt exists. 
See Smalls, 422 S.C. at 192, 810 S.E.2d at 845 ("[F]or the evidence to be 
'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice . . . [it] 
4 There was a discussion of Felder's lynching charge at the end of the trial, in which 
the trial court stated: "I don't think the lynching is admissible under . . . 609.  Prior 
convictions.  And a pending charge would not be admissible.  So the one charge that 
could be used against him would be the -- not the lynching, but the other." 
5 Felder also told police that hats were stolen from his home. 
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must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence 
demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so 
strong that the Strickland standard . . . cannot possibly be met."). 
After weighing trial counsel's error against the strength of the State's case, we 
conclude the error creates a reasonable probability that the outcome of Felder's trial 
would have been different had trial counsel acted to exclude the reference to the 
lynching charge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we find the PCR court erred in determining trial 
counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, we reverse the PCR court's decision and 
remand this matter to the court of general sessions for a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. 
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JUSTICE FEW: Section 38-77-144 of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides 
that no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) insurance coverage "is not subject to a 
setoff." This appeal requires us to consider whether section 38-77-144 prohibits an 
automobile insurance carrier from reducing its obligation to pay PIP benefits to its 
insured by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the insured received for 
medical expenses.  We hold that it does. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Wadette Cothran incurred approximately $40,000 in medical expenses from injuries 
she received in an automobile accident. Her employer's workers' compensation 
carrier paid all of her medical expenses.  She was also covered by her automobile 
insurance policy issued to her and her husband Chris by State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company.  The State Farm policy provided PIP coverage with 
a limit of $5,000. However, State Farm refused to pay her any PIP benefits for 
medical expenses based on a "Workers' Compensation Coordination" provision in 
the policy.  The "Coordination" provision states, 
Any Personal Injury Protection Coverage provided by this 
policy applies as excess over any benefits recovered under 
any workers' compensation law or any other similar law. 
The Cothrans filed this lawsuit against State Farm alleging breach of contract and 
bad faith refusal to pay insurance benefits. 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Cothrans on the breach of 
contract claim, finding the "Coordination" provision violated section 38-77-144. 
The court of appeals reversed.  Cothran v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 421 S.C. 
562, 808 S.E.2d 824 (Ct. App. 2017). We granted the Cothrans' petition for a writ 
of certiorari. We reverse the court of appeals, and reinstate the summary judgment. 
II. Section 38-77-144 
We begin with the text of section 38-77-144. 
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There is no personal injury protection (PIP) coverage 
mandated under the automobile insurance laws of this 
State.  Any reference to personal injury protection in Title 
38 or 56 or elsewhere is deleted. If an insurer sells no-
fault insurance coverage which provides personal injury 
protection, medical payment coverage, or economic loss 
coverage, the coverage shall not be assigned or subrogated 
and is not subject to a setoff. 
§ 38-77-144. 
We focus on the language "the [PIP] coverage . . . is not subject to a setoff."  The 
term "setoff" is not defined in our Insurance code.  Therefore, we apply the term's 
"usual and customary meaning." Perry v. Bullock, 409 S.C. 137, 140-41, 761 S.E.2d 
251, 253 (2014).   Merriam-Webster defines "setoff" as "something that is set off 
against another thing" and as "the discharge of a debt by setting against it a distinct 
claim in favor of the debtor." Setoff, WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (1988). The term is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY as, "A 
defendant's counterdemand against the plaintiff, arising out of a transaction 
independent of the plaintiff's claim," and, "A debtor's right to reduce the amount of 
a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor." Setoff, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). 
However, the term "setoff" is also commonly used to describe any reduction in the 
amount a defendant or insurance company would otherwise be obligated to pay on 
a claim, when the right to the reduction arises as a result of a payment from a third 
party.  Our courts have used the term for this meaning in numerous cases.  In Smith 
v. Widener, 397 S.C. 468, 724 S.E.2d 188 (Ct. App. 2012), for example, the plaintiff 
filed suit to recover funds she claimed should have been paid to her, but were 
wrongly paid to other parties.  397 S.C. at 471, 724 S.E.2d at 190. Before trial, the 
defendant who made the contested payment settled.  At the conclusion of trial, the 
jury found the defendants who received the payment had done so wrongfully, and 
they must pay the funds to the plaintiff.  Id. These defendants argued the judgment 
to be entered against them must be reduced by the amount the plaintiff received 
before trial in settlement. Id. The parties, the trial court, and the court of appeals 
framed the question as whether the non-settling defendants were entitled to a "setoff" 
because of this third-party payment. The court of appeals held that "before entering 
judgment on a jury verdict, the court must reduce the amount of the verdict to 
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account for any funds previously paid by a settling defendant, so long as the 
settlement funds were paid to compensate the same plaintiff on a claim for the same 
injury." 397 S.C. at 471-72, 724 S.E.2d at 190.  The court described this as a "setoff" 
that arises by operation of law. 397 S.C. at 472, 724 S.E.2d at 190 (citing Ellis v. 
Oliver, 335 S.C. 106, 111, 515 S.E.2d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 1999)). See also Rutland 
v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 400 S.C. 209, 217, 734 S.E.2d 142, 146 (2012) (finding the 
trial court properly reduced a jury verdict against one defendant by the amount paid 
in settlement by different defendants, and calling that a "set-off"); Huck v. Oakland 
Wings, LLC, 422 S.C. 430, 436, 813 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2018) (stating, "A 
nonsettling defendant is entitled to credit for the amount paid by another defendant 
who settles," and calling that a "setoff" (quoting Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 
312, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct. App. 2000))); Ellis, 335 S.C. at 109, 515 S.E.2d at 
270 (addressing whether a defendant was entitled to a "set-off" to reduce the 
judgment against him by the amount a third party paid the plaintiff for his medical 
expenses). 
A setoff, therefore, takes two primary forms. The first—not applicable here—is 
when person A's obligation to pay person B is reduced by the amount of B's 
obligation to A, regardless of whether the corresponding obligations arose from the 
same transaction or subject matter. See Setoff, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. The 
second—which is applicable here—is when A's (State Farm's) obligation to pay B 
(Wadette) is reduced by the amount of C's (workers' compensation carrier's) payment 
to B, where A's and C's obligations to pay did arise from the same transaction or 
subject matter. 
The Legislature obviously intended to use the term "setoff" in this second form—as 
we did in Rutland, and the court of appeals did in Huck, Smith, Welch, and Ellis— 
when it drafted section 38-77-144.1 In the context of PIP coverage, we can envision 
1 Counsel for State Farm attempted to argue at oral argument that under this 
definition of setoff—which counsel contended was overbroad and thus ambiguous— 
even a deductible would be a setoff.  We do not agree.  An insurance company's 
obligation to pay is provided under the terms of the policy. A setoff is a reduction 
in the amount of the obligation to the extent there has been a third-party payment.  If 
there is a deductible, the insurance company was never obligated to pay the amount 
of the deductible.  Rather, the reduction is provided under the terms of the policy.  A 
deductible, therefore, is not a setoff. 
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no situation in which an insured's obligation back to the insurer could reduce the 
insurer's obligation to the insured.  Rather, the only thing that could ever be set off 
against PIP coverage is a third-party payment, such as a payment from a tortfeasor 
or the workers' compensation benefits Wadette received.  Because "setoff" is not a 
situation that could arise under the first definition, the term becomes relevant in 
section 38-77-144 only under the second definition. 
This discussion allows us to frame the issue before us more precisely.  In section 38-
77-144, the Legislature intended—at least in part—to prevent an insurance company 
that sells PIP coverage from reducing the amount of PIP it is obligated to pay because 
the insured received a third-party payment for the same expenses. If State Farm's 
"Coordination" provision has this effect, it is a setoff, and it violates the section. 
Through its "Coordination" provision, State Farm attempts to designate the policy 
holder's opportunity to recover workers' compensation benefits as the policy holder's 
primary source of repayment for medical expenses.  If the workers' compensation 
benefits equal the medical expenses—as occurred here—or if the difference between 
workers' compensation benefits received and the total medical expenses is less than 
the policy limit for PIP coverage, the "Coordination" provision becomes effective.2 
In the latter example, State Farm's obligation to pay PIP benefits would be reduced, 
but not eliminated. In the former example—as occurred here—the effect of the 
provision is that State Farm pays no PIP benefits. In this case, State Farm's 
obligation to pay PIP coverage to Wadette is reduced—eliminated, in fact—by the 
amount her employer's workers' compensation carrier paid her for medical expenses.  
In other words, the "Coordination" provision is a setoff.3 
2 The following scenarios illustrate the effect of the "Coordination" provision. 
Wadette incurred approximately $40,000 in medical expenses. Her PIP benefits 
policy limit is $5,000.  If her workers' compensation benefits were less than $35,000, 
the "Coordination" provision would have no effect and State Farm would owe her 
the policy limit. If her workers' compensation benefits were $37,500, the 
"Coordination" provision would take effect and State Farm would owe her $2,500. 
In this case, her workers' compensation benefits equaled the total amount of her 
medical expenses, so the effect of the "Coordination" provision would be to 
eliminate State Farm's obligation to pay any PIP benefits. 
3 The term "setoff" is used universally to describe the reduction of PIP benefits by 
the amount of a third-party payment, including workers' compensation.  This is 
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State Farm attempts to avoid this straightforward analysis by relying on this Court's 
opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 313 S.C. 
58, 437 S.E.2d 43 (1993), and in particular our statement "the Legislature intended 
the set-off prohibition[4] . . . to apply only to the tortfeasor," 313 S.C. at 61, 437 
S.E.2d at 45. The court of appeals agreed with State Farm that Richardson is 
controlling.  Cothran, 421 S.C. at 569, 808 S.E.2d at 828.  We do not agree 
Richardson may be read as expansively as State Farm argues and the court of appeals 
held. Richardson involved a different policy provision and a different set of facts. 
If Richardson is to control this case, it must be because the reasoning is applicable 
here, not simply because the words we chose to explain our reasoning—when read 
explained in APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE. "More often than not, multiple sources of 
recovery are available to the injured insured.  As long as there is no policy or 
statutory provision limiting or restricting multiple recovery, payments may be made 
under more than one policy or plan."  6 Jeffrey E. Thomas, NEW APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 66.09[1] (2019).  The APPLEMAN subsection 
goes on to explain, "Most no-fault statutes have some sort of coordination of benefits 
language," like the "Coordination" provision in State Farm's policy purports to be. 
However, subsection 66.09[1] and the next one—subsection 66.09[2][a] entitled 
"Statutory Setoffs -- Workers' Compensation"—make it clear that when no-fault 
benefits are reduced by payments from a workers' compensation carrier, it is a 
"setoff."  Thomas, supra § 66.09[2][a]; see also 12 Steven Plitt et al., COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 171:67 (3d ed. 2018) ("[A] no-fault insurer may be entitled to setoff 
from the injured party's coverage amounts the insured has received from various 
other sources for the same injury."); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2236 (2018) 
("Ordinarily, a no-fault insurance carrier is entitled to set off insured's workers' 
compensation benefits . . . where the workers' compensation benefits are intended to 
serve the same purpose as no-fault benefits, and required to be paid." (footnotes 
omitted)). The important point here is not that the law of other jurisdictions might 
permit—or even require—a setoff under the circumstances of this case, but that the 
effect the "Coordination" provision has in this case is universally called a "setoff." 
4 When originally enacted, and at the time this Court decided Richardson, section 
38-77-144 was numbered 38-77-145. See Act No. 148, 1989 S.C. Acts 427, 470; 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-145 (Supp. 1989); Richardson, 313 S.C. at 60, 437 S.E.2d 
at 45 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-145 (Supp. 1992)). 
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out of context—might appear to restrict the effect of the statute.  As we will explain, 
the reasoning of Richardson is not applicable in this case. 
The question in Richardson was whether section 38-77-145, see supra note 4, 
invalidated a policy provision that prevented the stacking of PIP benefits from two 
automobile policies issued by the same insurer.  313 S.C. at 59, 437 S.E.2d at 44.5 
The insureds "incurred medical expenses in excess of $20,000 . . . [and] filed a claim 
for PIP benefits under two State Farm automobile insurance policies that each 
carried a $10,000 maximum." Id. State Farm paid the insureds $10,000 under one 
policy, but refused to make any PIP payment under the other policy. Id. We found 
the provision on which State Farm relied was not a "setoff." 313 S.C. at 61, 437 
S.E.2d at 45. 
Both policies at stake in Richardson were issued by State Farm, and the PIP 
coverages in each were identical.  This is important for two reasons. The first reason 
is the policy provision defined the coverage State Farm sold to its insured; it was not 
an attempt to direct how separate coverages from different insurers interact.  The 
provision in both State Farm policies stated that if there are two policies "issued by 
us to you," you may recover only the limits of one policy. On the other hand, had 
the two policies been issued by different insurers, the provision would not have 
applied. Thus, there was no setting off of one coverage against another. Rather, 
there was but one coverage, and that coverage was to be paid according to the terms 
of the State Farm policies.  For this reason, we held "the disputed language in its 
policy comprises [sic] an anti-stacking[] clause rather than a set-off."  313 S.C. at 60, 
437 S.E.2d at 44. 
5 The policy provision on which State Farm relied in Richardson stated, 
If two or more policies issued by us to you, your spouse, 
or your relatives provide vehicle Medical Payments 
Coverage and apply to these same bodily injuries 
sustained . . . the total limits of liability under all such 
policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the highest 
limit of liability. 
313 S.C. at 59, 437 S.E.2d at 44.  
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The second reason this is important is the coverages in the State Farm policies were 
identical no-fault PIP. The coverages in this case—PIP coverage and workers' 
compensation coverage—are not the same.  PIP coverage is first-party coverage a 
policy holder purchases to pay medical expenses no matter who is at fault in causing 
the accident. See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-10(4) (1989) (repealed by Act No. 148, 
1989 S.C. Acts 427, 513).  "The key concept embodied in PIP no fault coverage is 
that an injured person needs to promptly pay expenses necessarily arising out of 
injuries sustained, and needs support for himself and his family during the period of 
recuperation." Hamrick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 176, 180, 241 
S.E.2d 548, 549 (1978); see also 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2184 (2018) ("No-fault 
statutes are intended to protect persons injured in accidents involving a motor 
vehicle, by assuring that such accident victims receive compensation, reparations, or 
financial assistance, that is certain, and that is provided in a prompt and expeditious 
fashion . . . ." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).6 State Farm's contention that 
it can take insurance that is by definition primary and simply label it as "excess" in 
an attempt to make it not primary is a stretch under any circumstances.7 Under 
section 38-77-144, it is prohibited. 
Finally, we disagree with State Farm and the court of appeals that the legislative 
history we considered in Richardson supports a finding that the "Coordination" 
6 Workers' compensation insurance is also no-fault.  Nicholson v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 411 S.C. 381, 389, 769 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2015).  However, it is not first-party 
insurance like PIP, and its availability to an employee is subject to the provisions of 
the Workers' Compensation Act after potentially protracted litigation in front of the 
workers' compensation commission. But see Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 426 
S.C. 281, 285, 287, 826 S.E.2d 863, 865-66 (2019) (refocusing the commission on 
its "primary" role in avoiding "complicated and protracted litigation"). 
7 State Farm contends the "Coordination" provision does not violate section 38-77-
144 because it "is an excess clause, not a setoff."  According to State Farm, "An 
excess clause is '[a]n insurance-policy provision . . . that limits the insurer's liability 
to the amount exceeding other available coverage.  This clause essentially requires 
other insurers to pay first." (quoting Excess clause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014)). 
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provision in this case is not a setoff.8 The legislative history of section 38-77-144 
supports our reading of the plain language of the section that the "Coordination" 
provision is a setoff. 
As we stated in Richardson, the Legislature "made sweeping reforms in automobile 
insurance law" in 1989. 313 S.C. at 60, 437 S.E.2d at 45. We stated, 
In section 57 of [Act 148], the Legislature repealed the 
tortfeasor's statutory "set-off" authorized by section 38-
77-290(f). See 1989 S.C. Acts at 513.  Concurrently, in 
section 34 of Act 148, the Legislature expressly provided 
that PIP coverage was not subject to a "set-off." See 1989 
S.C. Acts at 470.   In our view, the Legislature intended 
for the "set-off" prohibition in section 34 of Act 148 to 
refer to the statute allowing reduction of a tortfeasor's 
liability which was repealed in section 57 of Act 148. 
Accordingly, we find that the "set-off" prohibited by 
section 34 of Act 148, now codified in section 38-77-145, 
is the tortfeasor's reduction in liability formerly allowed 
by section 38-77-290(f). 
Id.  
Our legislative-history focus in Richardson was the repeal of subsection 38-77-
290(f), which—prior to its repeal—required the setoff of PIP benefits in favor of a 
tortfeasor. See § 38-77-290(f) (1989) (providing PIP "benefits received or recovered 
8 Ordinarily, after concluding the plain language of a statute controls, we would not 
consider legislative history or any other indication of legislative intent. See Timmons 
v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 401, 175 S.E.2d 805, 817 (1970) ("If a 
statute is clear and explicit in its language, then there is no need to resort to statutory 
interpretation or legislative intent to determine its meaning."). We do so in this case 
solely to address the error of the court of appeals in relying on our legislative history 
analysis in Richardson. See Cothran, 421 S.C. at 570-71, 808 S.E.2d at 829 (stating 
"despite the language of section 38-77-144 appearing to prohibit any setoff of PIP 
benefits, our supreme court declared the legislative intent of that section was to 
prohibit tortfeasors from reducing their liability by the amount of PIP benefits" 
(citing Richardson, 313 S.C. at 61, 437 S.E.2d at 45)). 
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. . . must be deducted from any tort recovery, settlement, or judgment for bodily 
injury"). The fact the Legislature repealed the provision requiring a setoff against a 
tortfeasor's liability, and simultaneously prohibited any setoff against PIP coverage 
when it enacted section 38-77-145, see supra note 4, was important to us in 
understanding whether the anti-stacking provision was invalidated by the setoff 
prohibition in section 38-77-144. 
It was not necessary in Richardson for us to discuss the fact the Legislature also 
repealed former subsection 38-77-290(d) in 1989.  Subsection 38-77-290(d) required 
a setoff of workers' compensation benefits received by an insured against an insurer's 
obligation to pay PIP benefits. See § 38-77-290(d) (1989) (repealed by Act No. 148, 
1989 S.C. Acts at 513) ("Benefits payable [under the PIP statute9] must be reduced 
to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under workers' compensation 
laws . . . ."). Thus, former subsection 38-77-290(d) required by law precisely what 
State Farm seeks to obtain in this case by policy provision. The Legislature, 
however, repealed the subsection. If the repeal of subsection 38-77-290(f) was 
useful to us in Richardson to understand whether an anti-stacking provision violated 
section 38-77-144, then the repeal of subsection 38-77-290(d) is even more 
important to us in understanding whether State Farm's "Coordination" provision is 
prohibited. In other words, the fact the Legislature repealed the legal requirement 
that workers' compensation benefits be set off against PIP, and simultaneously 
provided PIP coverage "is not subject to a setoff," is forceful proof that the 
Legislature intended the setoff prohibition must apply to workers' compensation 
benefits. 
III. Conclusion 
When an insurer seeks to reduce its obligation to pay benefits based on a third party's 
previous payment for the same claim, it is a setoff.  Because that is the precise effect 
of State Farm's "Coordination" provision, section 38-77-144 prohibits the provision 
from reducing State Farm's obligation to pay PIP benefits to the Cothrans.  We 
reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the summary judgment in their favor. 
9 Here, former subsection 38-77-290(d) referred to former section 38-77-240 of the 
South Carolina Code (1989) (repealed by Act No. 148, 1989 S.C. Acts at 513), which 
is the section that required PIP coverage. 
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REVERSED. 
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and JAMES, JJ., concur. 
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JUSTICE HEARN: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) matter, we examine South 
Carolina's longstanding good character charge as we determine whether the PCR 
court erred when it found appellate counsel for Respondent Vladimir Pantovich 
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ineffective for failing to raise a meritorious issue on direct appeal. The PCR court 
granted relief based on appellate counsel's failure to argue that the trial court erred 
by refusing to give such a charge, which counsel had requested at trial. While we 
agree that a portion of the charge Pantovich requested is improper, we nonetheless 
affirm because of the retrospective nature of PCR review. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Pantovich killed his former girlfriend, Sheila McPherson, with a baseball bat 
during an argument in his home.  He hit her with the bat more than ten times, 
breaking ribs, damaging internal organs, and causing lacerations on her head that 
exposed her bare skull. Pantovich wrapped her dead body in a blanket, tied it with 
a rope, obscured her head with a garbage bag, and put the body and the bat in the 
trunk of his car. He then left his home in Georgetown County and drove toward his 
son's home in Taylorsville, North Carolina. On the way, he called his son to reveal 
what he had done. The son alerted law enforcement, and an officer stopped 
Pantovich as he approached Taylorsville. McPherson's body was still in the trunk in 
the same condition. 
The State charged Pantovich with murder. At trial in 2008, he admitted he 
beat McPherson to death, but claimed he did so in self-defense. Pantovich explained 
McPherson physically abused him throughout their years-long relationship. Four 
days before he killed her, he and McPherson got into an argument and she left him. 
Two days later, Pantovich talked to her on the phone and told her he no longer 
wished to see her.  He testified that on the evening of the killing, he came home from 
work around 6:00 p.m. to find McPherson in his house. She had drugs in her 
possession, and the toxicology report later showed she had several in her system. 
Pantovich told her to leave, but McPherson refused and unplugged the phone so he 
could not call the police. Thereafter, McPherson grabbed a fireplace poker and 
stabbed a hole in Pantovich's dinner tray while he sat in a reclining chair eating. 
McPherson then attacked him with the poker. Pantovich stated he was scared and 
tried to protect himself, so he backed toward the door to his garage and grabbed one 
of two baseball bats he kept there. He recalled blocking McPherson with one hand 
and using the other to hit her with the bat. 
After Pantovich testified, he presented five character witnesses: Andy Seifert, 
a friend and former employer; Christine McCune, a friend of more than ten years; 
Maureen Moans, a friend of almost ten years; Debbie Crisman, Pantovich's ex-
girlfriend; and Tammy Eschman, his former next-door neighbor.  They generally 
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testified he was kind, caring, and good with children.  Several also reported 
witnessing McPherson act violently towards Pantovich, but they never saw him react 
in kind. 
Pantovich submitted a written request for the trial court to charge the jury as 
to how it may interpret and use evidence of his good character. The written charge 
request stated: 
An accused, when charged with a crime, has the right of proving his 
general good character. He may introduce evidence of his good 
character which is inconsistent with the crime charged against him. 
Evidence of the general good character of the accused is for the purpose 
of showing the improbability that the defendant would have committed 
the crime charged. The good character of the accused is like all other 
evidence in the case and is entitled to such effect and weight as you, the 
jury, may determine. 
Good character evidence alone may create a reasonable doubt as to the 
commission of the crime charged.1 Thus, under some circumstances, a 
person might be entitled to a verdict of not guilty when his good 
reputation is taken into consideration even though a verdict of guilty 
might be authorized without the evidence of good character. 
In response, the State requested a "more balanced" charge that would allow 
the jury to decide whether evidence constituted good character. After all evidence 
had been presented, the trial court provided a copy of its proposed jury charge, which 
made no mention whatsoever of good character. Pantovich reiterated his request, 
but the trial court denied it. The jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense 
of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in 
prison. 
Appellate counsel filed a brief with the court of appeals pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams, 305 S.C. 116, 406 S.E.2d 
357 (1991). Appellate counsel did not mention the trial court's denial of Pantovich's 
request to charge the jury on good character. The court of appeals dismissed the 
appeal. State v. Pantovich, Op. No. 2011-UP-275 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 8, 2011). 
1 We refer to this portion of the instruction as the "good character alone" charge. 
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Pantovich subsequently filed this PCR action alleging appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to brief the trial court's refusal to give the requested jury 
charge. The PCR court initially found Pantovich failed to prove prejudice because 
he alleged no irregularity in the court of appeals' Anders procedure. We reversed, 
finding that to demonstrate prejudice "the applicant must show . . . but for appellate 
counsel's errors, the result of the appeal would have been different." Pantovich v. 
State, Op. No. 2015-MO-052 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 26, 2015). 
On remand, the PCR court found appellate counsel ineffective and granted 
Pantovich a new trial. The court found that, because Pantovich presented evidence 
of his good character, controlling precedent required the trial court to give the "good 
character alone" charge to the jury. The PCR court determined the error prejudiced 
Pantovich because there was a reasonable probability the charge would have 
impacted the jury's consideration of whether he was without fault in bringing on the 
difficulty and rejected the State's arguments regarding harmless error. We granted 
the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court affords deference to a PCR court's findings of fact, but reviews 
questions of law de novo. Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 
(2018). We will reverse if the PCR court's ruling is controlled by an error of law. 
Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013). 
To prove appellate counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must first show 
counsel's performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  The 
petitioner must then show prejudice by demonstrating that, but for counsel's 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability the result of the appeal 
would have been different. Id. at 694. A Strickland inquiry is retrospective, seeking 
to determine whether counsel was ineffective at the time of the alleged error.  Id. at 
689. 
DISCUSSION 
Pantovich argues the PCR court's decision should be affirmed because the trial 
court was and is required to give the charge he requested when a defendant presents 
evidence of his good character.  The State argues the "good character alone" charge 
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is an unconstitutional comment on the facts, the charge given adequately covered 
the law, and any error was harmless. 
The law in effect during the relevant time period—2011 and a short time 
thereafter—supported the PCR court's decision.  In State v. Green, 278 S.C. 239, 
294 S.E.2d 335 (1982), we stated, "[g]enerally, where requested and there is 
evidence of good character, a defendant is entitled to an instruction to the effect that 
evidence of good character and good reputation may in and of itself create a doubt 
as to guilt . . . ." 278 S.C. at 240, 294 S.E.2d at 335 (citing State v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 
87, 92, 41 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1947)). In State v. Lee-Grigg, 387 S.C. 310, 692 S.E.2d 
895 (2010), we cited Green and reversed the defendant's conviction, stating "the trial 
court erred when it refused to give such a charge." 387 S.C. at 317, 692 S.E.2d at 
898. The court of appeals had also reversed a defendant's conviction based on the 
trial court's refusal to charge the jury that "evidence of good character . . . may in 
and of itself create a doubt as to the guilt that should be considered by you . . . ." 
State v. Harrison, 343 S.C. 165, 170, 539 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The modern trend, however, has cast doubt upon the validity of charges 
instructing juries on how to interpret and use evidence. See State v. Belcher, 385 
S.C. 597, 600, 685 S.E.2d 802, 803 (2009) (placing significant restrictions on "the 
[longstanding] practice for trial courts in South Carolina . . . to charge juries in any 
murder prosecution that the jury may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon"). 
Since Belcher, we have found error in charging the jury that "actual knowledge of 
the presence of drugs is strong evidence of intent to control its disposition or use" 
because doing so "is improper as an expression of the judge's view of the weight of 
certain evidence," State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 328-29, 737 S.E.2d 480, 484 
(2013); we have eliminated charging the jury that a sexual assault victim's testimony 
need not be corroborated, State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 499-500, 787 S.E.2d 480, 
483 (2016); we have held "the trial court shall not provide a limiting instruction or 
otherwise comment to the jury" on how it should interpret and use evidence of a 
defendant's suicide attempt, State v. Cartwright, 425 S.C. 81, 93, 819 S.E.2d 756, 
762 (2018); and we have extended Belcher to eliminate from all trials any charge 
that the jury may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon, State v. Burdette, 
Op. No. 27910 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 31, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 31 at 8). 
The State asks us to hold the "good character alone" charge is similarly 
impermissible because it is an unconstitutional comment on the facts.  While we 
agree that this charge is improper, we do not reverse given this case's procedural 
posture.  Fundamentally, a collateral review proceeding is ill-suited for announcing 
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a new rule of substantive law pertaining to an underlying trial; appellate courts are 
to do so only in the rarest of circumstances.2 This is especially true in a retrospective 
PCR analysis under Strickland, which seeks to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective at the time of the alleged error. Just as we do not require attorneys to be 
clairvoyant in anticipating changes to the law,3 we do not hold the PCR court erred 
in the face of what was—at the relevant time—clear and binding authority as 
expressed in Lee-Grigg and Green: a jury instruction on good character was 
warranted when a defendant introduced evidence thereof at trial.  We cannot expect 
our circuit courts to divine future refinements in appellate jurisdiction—only to 
apply the prevailing law to the facts of a case before them. 
The dissent contends, however, that the real inquiry is prejudice.  We agree 
that there has been a trend to prohibit jury charges instructing juries on how to 
interpret and use evidence, beginning with Belcher in 2009 and developing in 
Cheeks, Stukes, and Cartwright. However, the overwhelming weight of the 
precedent facing the appellate court on this issue in 2011 provided that failure to 
give the "good character alone" charge was reversible error. We do not agree with 
the dissent's conclusion that Pantovich fails to show prejudice because the appellate 
court would have extended the Belcher principle to good character charges at that 
time, especially given that this Court had upheld the precise charge just one year 
earlier in Lee-Grigg—a post-Belcher decision. Likewise, we are unable to presume 
that a hypothetically-granted petition for certiorari in 2013 would have resulted in 
the opinion envisioned by the dissent, as the "trend" at that time consisted of Belcher, 
a contrary decision in an on-point case in Lee-Grigg, and Cheeks. 
The dissent posits that affirmance produces a strange result: we are granting 
Pantovich relief, yet for all intents and purposes, the "good character alone" charge 
is dead in South Carolina.  However, this ignores that the State actually agreed to a 
general charge on good character.  While trial counsel requested the now-
problematic "good character alone" charge, the State suggested a "more balanced 
2 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) ("[H]abeas corpus cannot be used 
as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those 
rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review . . . .") 
(emphasis in original). 
3 Teamer v. State, 416 S.C. 171, 183, 786 S.E.2d 109, 115 (2016). 
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charge" that would allow the jury to consider whether evidence constituted good 
character. Despite the State's acquiescence, the trial court did not mention good 
character at all in its charge, which would have made appellate counsel's chances of 
success on this issue even more probable. On remand, we believe Pantovich is 
entitled to a non-offending good character charge—for example, the first two 
paragraphs of the one he originally requested—if he introduces the requisite 
evidence. See United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that, instead of a requested "good character alone" charge, the trial court properly 
instructed the jury: "The defendant has introduced evidence of his character. More 
specifically, the defendant has introduced reputation and/or opinion evidence about 
his truthfulness, honesty and law-abidingness. You should consider character 
evidence with and in the same manner as all the other evidence in the case."). 
Finally, we disagree with the State's contentions regarding the adequacy of 
the charge given and harmless error.  The instruction included nothing regarding 
good character, despite the "good character alone" charge being warranted at the 
time of trial when a defendant produced such evidence.  As to harmlessness, we 
agree with the PCR court that there was a reasonable probability of success on appeal 
because the jury could have considered evidence of Pantovich's peaceable character 
in deciding whether he brought on the difficulty of the incident.  While the State 
argues a good character charge is inappropriate where a defendant admits to having 
killed a victim, if the defendant was acting in self-defense—and therefore, legally 
justified in his actions—we fail to see how a jury should be precluded from 
information that they can consider such evidence in deciding whether he did. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the propriety of the PCR court's decision based on the state of the 
law during the relevant timeframe—not as it has evolved today—we AFFIRM. 
AFFIRMED 
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, J., and Acting Justice Aphrodite K. Konduros, 
concur.  FEW, J., dissenting in a separate opinion. 
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JUSTICE FEW: I wholeheartedly agree with the majority's holding the "good 
character evidence alone" charge is improper and must never be given.  I join 
the majority's directive that this charge must not be given in South Carolina 
courts in the future. 
I disagree with the majority on two points.  My disagreement would require us 
to reverse the PCR court, and thus I dissent.  First, I would not remand for a 
new trial in which Pantovich will not get the good character evidence alone 
charge, the denial of which was the sole basis of the PCR court's decision.  The 
majority makes a compelling argument the PCR court was correct under our 
precedent at the time the decision was made.  However, it is my belief that if a 
direct appeal on the validity of the "good character evidence alone" charge had 
progressed to this Court on a petition for certiorari from the State, the case 
would have come to this Court during the timeframe in which the "trend" the 
majority acknowledges was in full swing.  In my opinion, even if the court of 
appeals had reversed the conviction as the PCR court found reasonably likely, 
this Court would not have allowed that ruling to stand.  I also believe 
remanding for a new trial—under the circumstance that Pantovich will not get 
on remand the charge for which he gets the remand—is, as the majority 
understates, "a strange result." For these two reasons, I would hold Pantovich 
suffered no prejudice. 
Second, I do not believe a trial judge should give any guidance to a jury on 
how to use evidence of good character. Rather, I would hold that trial lawyers 
should be given the sole authority to suggest to the jury how the jury should 
use the evidence.  I disagree with the majority's statement, "Pantovich is 
entitled to a non-offending good character charge—for example, the first two 
paragraphs of the one he originally requested." In my opinion, the trial judge 
correctly refused to give any of the charge Pantovich requested. 
Pantovich received a fair trial, and even though the majority disagrees with me 
on the question of whether the trial court should give any guidance on how a 
jury should use evidence of good character, I would find Pantovich suffered no 
prejudice. 
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To the majority's explanation that the "good character evidence alone" charge 
is improper, I respectfully add these thoughts: 
In State v. Green, 278 S.C. 239, 294 S.E.2d 335 (1982), we stated, "Generally, 
where requested and there is evidence of good character, a defendant is entitled 
to an instruction to the effect that evidence of good character and good 
reputation may in and of itself create a doubt as to guilt . . . ." 278 S.C. at 240, 
294 S.E.2d at 335 (citing State v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 87, 92, 41 S.E.2d 625, 627 
(1947)).  We affirmed the defendant's conviction, however, because we found 
"the error, if any," was harmless.  278 S.C. at 240, 294 S.E.2d at 335.  In State 
v. Lee-Grigg, 387 S.C. 310, 692 S.E.2d 895 (2010), we quoted the statement 
from Green and reversed the defendant's conviction, stating "the trial court 
erred when it refused to give such a charge." 387 S.C. at 317, 692 S.E.2d at 
898.  The court of appeals has also reversed a defendant's conviction based on 
the trial court's refusal to charge the jury that "evidence of good character . . . 
may in and of itself create a doubt as to the guilt that should be considered by 
you." State v. Harrison, 343 S.C. 165, 170, 539 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ct. App. 2000). 
On the face of these cases, it appears the trial court erred in this case by refusing 
Pantovich's requested charge, and therefore, appellate counsel's failure to brief 
the issue was prejudicial and deficient performance.  However, upon closer 
examination of these cases and the line of decisions upon which they are based, 
I would conclude our statement in Green was not then and is not now a correct 
statement of law.  In light of that conclusion, I would find Pantovich failed to 
prove prejudice, and the PCR court erred by granting him a new trial. See 
Garren v. State, 423 S.C. 1, 12, 813 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2018) (to obtain PCR, 
the applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient, and the deficient 
performance prejudiced him) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)). 
The applicable line of decisions begins in 1886 with State v. Barth, 25 S.C. 
175 (1886).  In Barth, the trial court charged the jury that character evidence 
is useful "only in doubtful cases." 25 S.C. at 177.  We held "it was misleading 
and erroneous to charge the jury . . . 'the law . . . limit[s] the effect of good 
character to doubtful cases.'" 25 S.C. at 181.  We stated, 
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it is the privilege of the accused, in all cases where 
character is admissible, to put in evidence his good 
character without regard to the other proofs in the case, 
and it is for the jury to consider it in connection with 
the other evidence, and determine what force and 
effect it should have. 
25 S.C. at 177. Barth sets forth the rule that trial courts may not charge the 
jury in such a way as to limit the jury's interpretation or use of evidence of the 
defendant's good character.  We made no suggestion in Barth the trial court 
should charge the jury that it may use "good character evidence alone" as a 
basis for finding reasonable doubt. 
In 1924 in State v. Hill, 129 S.C. 166, 123 S.E. 817 (1924), the defendant 
appealed his conviction on the ground the trial court improperly charged the 
jury to limit its use of evidence of his good character.  129 S.C. at 170, 123 
S.E. at 818.  We found the charge did not impose such a limit.  We stated, 
Evidence of the defendant's good reputation for peace 
and good order is strongly persuasive of his good 
character in that respect, and is offered for the very 
purpose stated by the Circuit Judge, to show the 
improbability that the defendant would have 
committed or did commit the crime charged. 
Id. (citing 30 C.J. 170).  We did not hold, however, this language should be 
charged to the jury.  There is certainly no support in Hill for the trial court to 
charge the jury "good character evidence alone" may give rise to reasonable 
doubt. 
In 1947 in Lyles, relying on Barth and Hill, we addressed the defendant's claim 
the trial court should have explained to the jury it may consider evidence of his 
good character.  We stated, 
There can be no doubt of the right of appellant to put 
in evidence his good character and it was "for the jury 
to consider it in connection with the other evidence, 
52 
and determine what force and effect it should have." 
The good reputation of the accused, if proved, may be 
taken into consideration by the jury in determining 
whether or not he committed the crime charged. 
Lyles, 210 S.C. at 92, 41 S.E.2d at 627 (first quoting Barth, 25 S.C. at 177; 
then citing Hill, 129 S.C. at 170, 123 S.E. at 818).  Under Lyles—if it were not 
clear from Barth and Hill—it is clear a jury may consider evidence of a 
defendant's good character in all cases, not just "doubtful cases." However, 
there is nothing in Lyles suggesting this language should be charged to the jury. 
Certainly Lyles gives no support for a jury charge that "good character 
evidence alone" may give rise to reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, in Green in 1982, relying on Lyles, this Court made the statement 
that "a defendant is entitled to an instruction to the effect that evidence of good 
character and good reputation may in and of itself create a doubt." 278 S.C. at 
240, 294 S.E.2d at 335.  We did not reverse the conviction, however, finding 
"the error, if any, could not reasonably have affected the result and is properly 
regarded as harmless." 278 S.C. at 240, 294 S.E.2d at 335. 
The first time any South Carolina court reversed a conviction on the basis of 
the trial court's refusal to give the "good character evidence alone" charge was 
the court of appeals' decision in Harrison in 2000.  In Harrison, the defendant 
was convicted of simple possession of cocaine.  343 S.C. at 167, 539 S.E.2d at 
72.  Defense counsel "argu[ed] the court failed to issue a requested charge that 
evidence of good character and good reputation may in and of itself create a 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt." 343 S.C. at 169, 539 S.E.2d at 73.  The court 
of appeals analyzed the same line of cases we discussed above—from Barth to 
Hill to Lyles to Green—343 S.C. at 170-73, 539 S.E.2d at 73-75, and held 
"[t]he trial court erred in failing to give the requested charge." 343 S.C. at 173, 
539 S.E.2d at 75. 
In Lee-Grigg, this Court also found "the trial court erred when it refused to 
give such a charge," and affirmed the court of appeals' decision to grant the 
defendant a new trial.  387 S.C. at 317, 692 S.E.2d at 898. 
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In this case, our prejudice analysis should focus on whether Pantovich has 
proven that but for appellate counsel's deficiency, "the result of [his] appeal 
would have been different." Ezell v. State, 345 S.C. 312, 314, 548 S.E.2d 852, 
853 (2001).  This requires us to reconsider whether the "good character 
evidence alone" portion of the requested charge should ever be given to the 
jury. See State v. Marin, 404 S.C. 615, 620, 745 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Ct. App. 
2013) ("[T]here is no error of law in refusing to give a specific request to 
charge where . . . the charge requested is an incorrect statement of law . . . ."), 
aff'd as modified on other grounds, 415 S.C. 475, 783 S.E.2d 808 (2016). 
To begin this reconsideration, there is no underlying constitutional or statutory 
principle of law that requires the "good character evidence alone" charge. 
Other than the decisions discussed above, there is no basis in law for charging 
a jury that "good character evidence alone" may form the basis for reasonable 
doubt.  If anything, charges like this—instructing juries on how to interpret and 
use facts—run afoul of our constitutional prohibition against circuit courts 
charging juries on the facts. "Judges shall not charge juries in respect to 
matters of fact, but shall declare the law." S.C. CONST. art. V, § 21. 
There are, of course, many jury charges that are valid—despite no 
constitutional or statutory basis—because they are based on a sound 
interpretation of applicable case law.  However, as demonstrated in the 
discussion above, the "good character evidence alone" jury charge requested 
in this case is actually based on a misinterpretation of law.  Neither Barth, Hill, 
nor Lyles say anything about giving such a charge to the jury.  Nevertheless, in 
Green, this Court mistakenly relied on Lyles, which in turn relied on Barth and 
Hill, in making the statement "evidence of good character . . . may in and of 
itself create a doubt" must be charged.  278 S.C. at 240, 294 S.E.2d at 335. 
The court of appeals then misinterpreted all of the cases when it reversed the 
defendant's conviction in Harrison.  343 S.C. at 173, 539 S.E.2d at 75. By the 
time this Court decided Lee-Grigg, our misstatement in Green had been 
repeated so many times we apparently accepted it without a meaningful 
inquiry. Cf. State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 119, 631 S.E.2d 244, 251 (2006) 
(Pleicones, J., dissenting in part) ("Some principles of law, however, are not to 
be charged to a jury."), majority opinion overruled by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 
493, 499, 787 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2016) (holding the jury charge then Associate 
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Justice Pleicones objected to being given should no longer be given because 
"it is not within the province of the court to express an opinion to the jury on 
its view of the facts"); see also State v. Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 407, 272 S.E.2d 
169, 171 (1980) ("The impression is sometimes gained that any language from 
an appellate court opinion is appropriate for a charge to any jury, but this is not 
always true."). 
The "good character evidence alone" charge has been addressed in other states 
and in federal courts.  Many of these courts once required the charge to be 
given, relying on an 1896 opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 17 S. Ct. 72, 41 L. Ed. 467 (1896), 
and other nineteenth century state cases.4 In Edgington, as in Barth, the 
defendant challenged the trial court's limitation on the jury's use of evidence of 
the defendant's good character.  164 U.S. at 365, 17 S. Ct. at 73, 41 L. Ed. at 
471.  The trial court charged, "If your mind hesitates on any point as to the 
guilt of this defendant, then you have the right and should consider the 
testimony given as to his good character." 164 U.S. at 364-65, 17 S. Ct. at 73, 
41 L. Ed. at 471.  Counsel objected, "We except to that part of the charge in 
stating the effect of good character, the defendant claiming that it should not 
be forced only in doubtful cases." 164 U.S. at 365, 17 S. Ct. at 73, 41 L. Ed. 
at 471.  Like this Court did in Barth ten years earlier, the Supreme Court of the 
United States found it was error to limit the jury's consideration of evidence of 
the defendant's good character. The Supreme Court stated, 
Whatever may have been said in some of the earlier 
cases, to the effect that evidence of the good character 
of the defendant is not to be considered unless the 
other evidence leaves the mind in doubt, the decided 
4 See, e.g., Jupitz v. People, 34 Ill. 516, 521 (1864) (holding that "in all criminal 
cases whether the case is doubtful or not, evidence of good character is admissible 
on the part of the prisoner"); People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 24, 27 (1868) (finding 
the trial court's limitation on the jury's use of evidence of the defendant's good 
character was error because it "surround[ed] the jury with arbitrary rules as to the 
weight they shall allow to evidence which has properly been placed before them"). 
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weight of authority now is that good character, when 
considered in connection with the other evidence in 
the case, may generate a reasonable doubt. 
164 U.S. at 366, 17 S. Ct. at 73-74, 41 L. Ed. at 471.  The Supreme Court was 
not saying, however, this should be charged to the jury. Rather, the Court was 
saying—as we said in Barth—the trial court should not restrict the jury's use 
of evidence of the defendant's good character to "doubtful cases." See Barth, 
25 S.C. at 181; see also United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 
1985) ("The [Edgington] Court was trying to put an end to instructions that had 
disfavored character evidence by telling the jury not to consider the evidence 
unless it first found the case close."). 
To this day, some courts hold the "good character evidence alone" charge must 
be given if requested and supported by the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Hobbs, 
705 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. 2010) (relying on a line of decisions traceable to 
Jupitz, and holding a trial court must "explain how good character evidence 
could generate reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit"); People v. Lyles, 905 
N.W.2d 199, 204 (Mich. 2017) (relying on a standard jury instruction derived 
from Garbutt, and finding the trial court erred in not charging, "Evidence of 
good character alone may sometimes create a reasonable doubt").  
Respectfully, those decisions are based on a misinterpretation of nineteenth 
century cases—like Edgington and Barth—that were intended to prohibit trial 
courts from limiting the jury's use of evidence of good character, not to enable 
the jury to find reasonable doubt based on "good character evidence alone." 
In Burke, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered what it conceded was its 
misinterpretation of Edgington, and eliminated the requirement of the "good 
character evidence alone" jury charge, overruling United States v. Donnelly, 
179 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1950).  The Burke court's explanation of how the 
Donnelly court misinterpreted Edgington is particularly useful in explaining 
that the "good character evidence alone" charge must not be given.  Referring 
to the Edgington Court's statement, "The circumstances may be such that an 
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established reputation for good character . . . would alone create a reasonable 
doubt,"5 781 F.2d at 1240, the Burke court stated, 
It is a mistake to lift language out of a passage such as 
this and insert it in a jury instruction.  Language in 
judicial opinions is not meant to be given undigested 
to a jury.  Legal terms are hard enough for lawyers to 
understand; ripped from their context and presented to 
lay deciders, passages from opinions may do nothing 
but confound.  It is always necessary for the judge to 
put the thought in language that those who see the 
inside of a court only once in a lifetime can 
understand. 
781 F.2d at 1240.  The court continued, 
Edgington did not suggest that the instruction should 
say that character evidence be considered in a special 
way by the jury; to the contrary it quoted at length 
from and cited cases holding that character evidence 
should simply be considered with other evidence.  
Edgington told the federal courts to eliminate 
differences in the treatment of character and other 
evidence, not to create new differences. 
781 F.2d at 1241. The Seventh Circuit went on to explain that every federal 
circuit has repudiated the "good character evidence alone" charge, stating, 
"Every other court of appeals that has spoken on the question has concluded 
that such an instruction gives undue weight to character evidence. . . .  Today 
we join the other courts of appeals.  We overrule Donnelly and affirm the 
conviction." 781 F.2d at 1237; see also 781 F.2d at 1241 n.3 ("collect[ing] 
illustrative cases [from every circuit] in a note"). 
5 Edgington, 164 U.S. at 366, 17 S. Ct. at 74, 41 L. Ed. at 471. 
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In Barth, Hill, and Lyles, we clarified the jury must consider evidence of a 
defendant's good character in all cases, not just those where the State's proof is 
otherwise "doubtful." The clear consequence of these holdings is that—in 
some cases—evidence of a defendant's good character alone may legitimately 
cause the jury to find reasonable doubt and acquit. It is correct under the law, 
therefore, that good character evidence alone may give rise to reasonable 
doubt.  However, the mere fact a statement is correct under the law does not 
require it to be charged to the jury.  This statement is applicable to this case 
because it addresses a point of fact.  The applicable principle of law is simply 
that the jury must consider all the evidence in all cases.  It is up to the trial 
lawyer—not the trial court—to address the point of fact: whether good 
character evidence alone gives rise to reasonable doubt in any given case. See 
Marin, 404 S.C. at 623, 745 S.E.2d at 153 ("The role of the trial court is to 
charge the jury correctly based on the evidence presented at trial.  The lawyers 
bear the responsibility to argue how a point of law affects the jury's 
interpretation of the evidence." (citation omitted)). 
As the majority explains, this Court began in 2009 what has become a clear 
trend to forbid jury charges that instruct juries on how to interpret and use 
evidence. I am pleased we now extend that trend to evidence of a defendant's 
good character, and I join the majority's prohibition that trial courts must not 
charge the jury that "good character evidence alone" may give rise to 
reasonable doubt. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Rules of the Board of Law Examiners - Appendix 
A, SCACR 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001607 
ORDER 
The Board of Law Examiners requests the Court approve its proposed amendments 
to the Rules of the Board of Law Examiners found at Appendix A to Part IV of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. Pursuant to Rule 402(k)(3), this Court 
approves the Board of Law Examiners' proposed amendments to the Rules of the 
Board of Law Examiners.  Appendix A to Part IV, SCACR, shall state as follows: 
RULES OF THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS 
(Promulgated Pursuant to Rule 402(k)(3) of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR)) 
SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DISABLED 
APPLICANTS. 
1. Policy. It is the policy of the Board of Law Examiners (the 
Board) of the State of South Carolina to provide reasonable 
accommodations for disabled applicants including persons with 
learning disabilities and persons with health impairments. The bar 
examination will be administered to all eligible applicants in a manner 
that does not discriminate against those applicants with disabilities. 
2. Application Procedure. 
(a) Persons needing special accommodations on 
examinations should make a written request to the Board to obtain the 
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necessary information, procedures and written forms. Appropriate 
current documentation is required by the Board. 
(b) Upon written request to the Board, the manner in which 
the examination is administered to an applicant may be modified 
while maintaining the security and integrity of the examination. 
(c) An applicant must submit a written request for special 
testing accommodations on forms prescribed by the Board no later 
than November 1st for the February examination and April 1st for the 
July examination. 
(d) Applicants must submit a current medical verification 
prepared by a licensed professional qualified to diagnose such 
disability who can describe the nature and extent of the disability. 
Applicants must submit all medical information to be considered by 
the Board with their written request. 
(e) The Board may require the applicant to provide 
additional information in support of the applicant's request. This 
information may include, but is not limited to, information concerning 
special accommodations provided during the applicant's law school 
education including certification from official representatives of the 
school where such accommodations were provided. The Board may 
also require the applicant to undergo a physical/psychological 
examination to be conducted by a licensed professional designated by 
the Board verifying the nature and extent of the impairment. The 
Board may also appoint an expert to analyze the documentation 
submitted by the applicant and to make a recommendation to the 
Board concerning appropriate accommodations. 
(f) In addition, an applicant seeking special testing 
accommodations due to a learning disability or attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder must provide appropriate documentation 
provided by a licensed professional qualified to diagnose such 
disability including, but not limited to, a licensed physician, learning 
disability specialist or psychologist. Learning disability and attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder evaluations must meet all requirements 
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stated on the Board's written forms and should be completed or 
updated within the past three (3) years. An updated evaluation does 
not necessarily need to be a full, comprehensive diagnostic evaluation, 
but must provide information concerning relevant treatment, course of 
condition, current impairment, and rationale for current 
accommodation requests. The previous comprehensive diagnostic 
evaluation must be submitted with the updated evaluation. It is the 
applicant's responsibility to insure the Board is provided with a 
complete record fully demonstrating the existence and extent of 
impairment. 
3. General Standards and Procedures. 
(a) Depending on the nature and extent of an applicant's 
disability, the exam may be administered to the applicant in a separate 
room. Applicants assigned to a separate testing room will be 
monitored by a proctor approved by the Secretary of the Board. 
(b) At the request of a blind or sight impaired applicant, the 
Board may provide the examination in braille or in large print; 
provided, the request is made no later than November 1st for the 
February exam and April 1st for the July exam. 
(c) The Board may allow the applicant to use the services of 
a special assistant. This person may not provide substantive assistance 
to the applicant, but may read the Multistate Performance 
Examination (MPT), Multistate Essay Examination (MEE) and/or the 
Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) questions to the applicant. The 
special assistant may type or write the applicant's answers to the MPT 
and MEE questions and fill in the MBE answer sheet at the applicant's 
direction. If the applicant chooses to use a special assistant, the 
applicant must provide background information regarding the special 
assistant to the Board. The special assistant shall not have any legal 
related employment or education. The Secretary of the Board must 
approve the special assistant. 
(d) The Board may allow a disabled applicant additional 
time to complete the MPT, MEE, and MBE portions of the 
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examination. The additional time on each section of the examination 
shall not exceed one and one half (1 1/2) times the normal time 
allotted for the section. In addition, longer rest and/or lunch breaks 
may be permitted; however, in no event shall the entire examination 
extend beyond two (2) additional days. 
(e) The Board shall determine the measures necessary to 
ensure that any special accommodations approved under this policy 
do not compromise the security or integrity of the examination or the 
integrity of the applicant's answers. 
(f) The Board will notify the applicant of its decision on the 
request for special accommodations in writing at least thirty (30) days 
prior to the scheduled examination. 
(g) An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board 
may appeal to the Supreme Court within ten (10) days after service of 
the written decision of the Board. This appeal is to be made by filing a 
motion with the Clerk of the Supreme Court in compliance with Rule 
240, SCACR.  The record in this appeal will be limited to the forms 
and other documents considered by the Board prior to making its 
decision. 
(h) The Secretary of the Board shall serve as the Americans 
with Disabilities Act coordinator for the Board and shall ensure that 
the provisions of this Rule are fully implemented. 
These amendments shall take effect ninety (90) days from the date of this order. 
See Rule 402(k)(3), SCACR. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty C.J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
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s/ George C. James, Jr. J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 1, 2019 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
The State, Respondent, 
v. 
John Calvin Sledge, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-000641 
Appeal From Greenville County 
D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5672 
Heard October 1, 2018 – Filed August 7, 2019 
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART 
Laura Ruth Baer, of Collins & Lacy, PC, of Columbia, 
for Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy 
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and 
Assistant Attorney General Caroline M. Scrantom, all of 
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of 
Greenville, for Respondent. 
HUFF, J.: John Calvin Sledge appeals from his convictions and sentences for 
murder, unlawful conduct toward a child, and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Sledge raises three issues: (1) whether 
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the trial court erred in admitting portions of a 911 call because they amounted to 
inadmissible hearsay and were more prejudicial than probative; (2) whether the 
trial court erred in admitting his statements to police because they were not freely 
and voluntarily given; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing a five-year 
sentence for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime 
because he was given a life sentence for the murder charge and section 16-23-490 
of the South Carolina Code expressly prohibits such.  We affirm the convictions 
but vacate the sentence imposed for the weapon possession. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On the night of January 29, 2014, Kimberly Sledge (Victim) was killed by a single 
gunshot to the back of her head.  After receiving two hang-up calls at 10:15 and 
10:16 p.m. that night, 911 communications received a third call from Victim's ten-
year-old son, M.W., at 10:17 p.m.  In the 911 call, M.W. reported that his mother 
had been shot and stated that his mother was married to John Sledge.  When the 
dispatcher asked who shot Victim, M.W. replied, "John Sledge."  Asked when this 
occurred, M.W. replied, "Just a minute ago."  M.W. told the dispatcher he thought 
his "dad just ran off."  The dispatcher asked M.W. if Victim and Sledge were 
arguing, and M.W. stated that they were. M.W. provided a description of Sledge's 
vehicle to the dispatcher.  The young boy can be heard crying often and expressing 
shock, disbelief, and fear during the twenty-two-minute call. 
Officers arrived at the incident location at 10:34 p.m.  Once in the home, they 
found M.W. on the phone in the living room and Victim deceased in the bathroom. 
After a "be on the lookout" was dispatched for Sledge, Deputies Robert May and 
John Williams observed a car matching the description of Sledge's and activated 
their blue lights and stopped Sledge.  Because they were responding to an incident 
involving a gunshot victim, the deputies drew their firearms and ordered Sledge to 
show his hands and get out of his car and on the ground.  Deputy May 
acknowledged repeatedly using profane language with Sledge while instructing 
Sledge to put his hands out the window of his car. The deputies placed Sledge in 
handcuffs and escorted him to Deputy May's vehicle, placing him inside it. 
Though Deputy May was holding on to Sledge, he testified Sledge was "able to 
walk just fine."  Deputy May then read Sledge his Miranda1 rights.  Deputy May 
testified Sledge appeared to be intoxicated, and he noted Sledge had a strong odor 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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of alcoholic beverage coming from his person.2 However, he testified Sledge was 
not "fall-down drunk," and he appeared to understand what was being said and was 
able to carry on a conversation.  Review of Deputy May's in-car video reveals very 
clear Miranda warnings were given and Sledge responded "Yes, sir" when asked if 
he understood his rights. Further, Sledge appeared to get on the ground without 
difficulty when instructed to do so, and he did not stumble or falter when walking 
to the deputy's car. When asked if he would like to speak to the deputies, Sledge 
said he would and asked "what's going on?"  Deputy May informed Sledge he was 
being detained because there was a crime scene at his house. Sledge asked the 
deputy "why" and indicated he did not know why there would be a crime scene. 
Deputy May then asked Sledge what he was doing before he left the house, and 
Sledge described some of his activities and indicated he left the house after getting 
into an argument with his wife. During the drive, Sledge questioned what was 
happening and Deputy May responded, "Well you and your wife got in a fight, 
right?" Sledge asked what was wrong with his wife and what was wrong with his 
family.  The deputy responded he was going to let someone else tell Sledge about 
it, but told him that his child was fine. 
While Deputy May was transporting Sledge to the Law Enforcement Center 
(LEC), the deputy was instructed to stop and meet with a forensic officer.  Deputy 
May stopped at a business where the forensic technician, Iona Ooten, swabbed 
Sledge's hands for gunshot residue. Review of the in-car video reveals as follows: 
During this time—at around forty-nine minutes into the video—Sledge asked to 
use the bathroom, but the officers told him it was too cold.  Deputy May buckled 
Sledge back in the vehicle, and Sledge again asked to use the bathroom.  Ooten 
again stated that it was too cold, and Deputy May told Sledge he could use the 
bathroom downtown once they arrived there.  About a minute after he first asked, 
Sledge asked to use the bathroom a third time and received the same response. 
They arrived at the LEC at about one hour and eighteen minutes into the video, or 
twenty-nine minutes after Sledged first requested to use the bathroom. 
Once at the LEC, Sledge encountered Sergeant Ramon Rivera before being 
brought into an interview room, at which time Sledge asked if he could use the 
restroom.  Sergeant Rivera was in the process of obtaining search warrants related 
2 Deputy Williams found a 12-pack of beer in the passenger seat of Sledge's truck 
and noticed a few beers were missing. 
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to the matter at that time and told Sledge he would be back in five minutes.  When 
Sergeant Rivera returned and asked Sledge if he still needed to use the restroom, 
Sledge stated he did not.  Before Sledge was interviewed, a search warrant was 
served on him. While Sergeant Rivera stepped away to retrieve something, Sledge 
was escorted into the interview room where the search warrant was served on him, 
and he was stripped naked, processed for DNA, and photographed by Ooten. 
When Sergeant Rivera returned a few minutes later he was informed Sledge may 
have urinated on himself, and he noticed the chair Sledge had been sitting in was 
wet, and there was something wet on the floor.  Sergeant Rivera and Investigator 
Tracy King then interviewed Sledge for two and a half hours after Sledge waived 
his Miranda rights.  In the interview room, Sergeant Rivera asked Sledge whether 
he had been drinking.  Sledge stated he had.  The sergeant then asked Sledge if he 
was under the influence of alcohol, and Sledge replied that he was not, stating he 
drank two beers three or four hours ago.  During the interview, Sledge claimed he 
and Victim only bickered that night and did not fight.  He denied that he left the 
home after shooting his gun, denied knowing what happened to Victim, denied 
M.W. came out of the room during their bickering to see him sitting or lying on top 
of Victim as described by M.W., and adamantly denied shooting or harming 
Victim that night. 
Meanwhile, Sergeant Ragan Marling, who at that time worked in criminal 
investigation involving crimes against children, met with M.W. at her office.  She 
testified M.W. was visibly upset, asking a lot of questions concerning Victim. 
When Sergeant Marling informed him that his mother did not survive, M.W. broke 
down, started crying, and kept asking over and over, "Why would he do this?"  On 
cross-examination, the defense elicited the following from Sergeant Marling: 
M.W. told her he heard arguing and yelling throughout the day; M.W. went into 
the den to see what was happening; he said Victim's shoulder appeared to be 
injured; at one time when he came out of his room, Victim and Sledge were in a 
physical altercation—with Sledge on top of Victim on the floor in front of the 
fireplace—and M.W. tried unsuccessfully to push Sledge off of Victim; M.W. then 
went back into his bedroom; before entering his bedroom, he stood at the doorway 
to his bedroom talking to Victim, who was in the bathroom near his bedroom, and 
Sledge stated something about taking Victim to the hospital; M.W. turned around 
and went into his bedroom and, thereafter, heard a loud bang; when he came out of 
his bedroom about ten minutes after hearing the bang, he did not see Sledge in the 
house.  Notably, defense counsel asked the sergeant if M.W. went to bed after he 
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tried to push Sledge off Victim, and she stated M.W. went back to his room at that 
time, but she did not believe he went to bed at that time. 
M.W. testified at trial concerning the events of that day.  He stated they did not 
have any visitors.  He ate dinner in his room that evening and spent most of his 
time in his bedroom once he came back into the house.  At some point, Victim 
entered M.W.'s room trying to get away from Sledge.  Before Victim entered his 
room, M.W. heard Victim and Sledge arguing.  Victim left M.W.'s room and, 
thereafter, M.W. went out of his room to check on Victim because Victim and 
Sledge were being loud and M.W. was trying to go to sleep.  When he exited his 
room, he saw Sledge sitting on Victim in a squatting position as Victim was on her 
back.  M.W. pushed Sledge off Victim and Victim told M.W. to "just go," so M.W. 
went to his room.  Victim followed M.W. back into his room. M.W. thought 
Victim had a broken collarbone, and he asked her about her shoulder.  Victim 
stated to M.W. that Sledge was really mad and might kill her, which scared M.W. 
Victim then left M.W.'s room.  M.W. estimated the time of this incident was 8:30 
or 9:00 because that was his normal bedtime, he was in his pajamas, and he was 
"trying to go to sleep."  He was not able to relax, though, as he heard arguing while 
he was in his bedroom.  M.W. did not emerge from his room again until after he 
heard a loud bang and he felt the house shake and smelled gun smoke.  M.W. 
waited about five minutes before he came out of his room. He found his mother 
face down on the floor between the hall and the bathroom, and Sledge was no 
longer there.  M.W. found a phone in the bathroom and called 911. 
Law enforcement did not find evidence of a robbery or burglary. Additionally, the 
evidence did not support that the crime involved a home invasion. Investigation 
into the lives of Victim and Sledge did not reveal any other individuals who had a 
problem with either of them.  After the 10:15 and 10:16 p.m. hang-up calls, the 
third 911 call from M.W. started at 10:17 p.m.  Review of surveillance video from 
a convenience store—identified by Sledge as the place he had driven to that night 
to purchase beer after he left his home—showed Sledge was at the location at 
10:27 p.m.  The drive from Sledge's house to the store took approximately nine 
minutes.  One of the investigators testified he found a fairly large quantity of long, 
blond hair consistent with Victim's in the bathroom but found no hairbrushes in the 
room, which indicated some type of altercation occurred there. Victim sustained a 
single gunshot to the back of her head, which would have resulted in a very quick 
demise. The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound to the head, 
and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. 
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After the matter was submitted to the jury, it found Sledge guilty of murder, 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and unlawful 
conduct toward a child.  The trial court sentenced Sledge to life on the murder 
charge, five years for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime, and ten years for unlawful conduct toward a child. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by the 
trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). The admission or exclusion 
of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 
583, 698 S.E.2d 596, 601 (2010).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 
court's conclusions either lack evidentiary support or they are controlled by an 
error of law. Id. "Our role when reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning the 
admissibility of a statement upon proof of its voluntariness is not to reevaluate the 
facts based on our view of the preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Breeze, 
379 S.C. 538, 543, 665 S.E.2d 247, 250 (Ct. App. 2008). "Rather, our standard of 
review is limited to determining whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any 
evidence." Id. "Thus, on appeal the trial court's findings as to the voluntariness of 
a statement will not be reversed unless they are so erroneous as to show an abuse 
of discretion." Id. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. 911 Call 
Sledge made a pre-trial motion to exclude portions of M.W.'s 911 call.  The trial 
court ruled the evidence admissible and allowed the tape to be played for the jury 
over Sledge's objection. On appeal, Sledge contends the trial court erred in 
admitting the portions of the 911 call in which M.W. stated (1) Victim and Sledge 
were fighting earlier in the evening and (2) Sledge shot Victim. He argues the 
statements were inadmissible hearsay for which no exception applies, and they 
were more prejudicial than probative.  We disagree. 
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Rule 803 of our evidentiary rules affords an excited utterance exception to the rule 
against hearsay.  It provides, even though the declarant is available as a witness, 
"[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant 
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition" is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule. Rule 803(2), SCRE. 
Three elements must be met for a statement to be an 
excited utterance: (1) the statement must relate to a 
startling event or condition; (2) the statement must have 
been made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement; and (3) the stress of excitement must be 
caused by the startling event or condition. 
State v. Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. 609, 623, 690 S.E.2d 565, 573 (2010). "In 
determining whether a statement falls within the excited utterance exception, a 
court must consider the totality of the circumstances." State v. Sims, 348 S.C. 16, 
20, 558 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2002). "Additionally, such a determination is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at 21, 558 S.E.2d at 521. "The passage of 
time between the startling event and the statement is one factor to consider, but it is 
not the dispositive factor." Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. at 623, 690 S.E.2d at 573.  
"Other factors useful in determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited 
utterance include the declarant's demeanor, the declarant's age, and the severity of 
the startling event." Id. (quoting Sims, 348 S.C. at 22, 558 S.E.2d at 521).  "The 
excited utterance exception is based on the rationale that 'the startling event 
suspends the declarant's process of reflective thought, reducing the likelihood of 
fabrication.'" State v. Ladner, 373 S.C. 103, 116, 644 S.E.2d 684, 691 (2007) 
(quoting State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 284, 523 S.E.2d 173, 177 (1999)). The 
determination of whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance exception "is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Sims, 348 S.C. at 21, 558 S.E.2d at 
521. The burden of establishing facts that would qualify a statement as an excited 
utterance is upon the proponent of the evidence. State v. Davis, 371 S.C. 170, 178-
79, 638 S.E.2d 57, 62 (2006). 
Sledge cites Davis in support of his argument that, because M.W. did not witness 
the shooting, the excited utterance exception does not apply. We find Davis 
distinguishable and the Sims case more applicable to the excited utterance 
exception under the facts of this case. 
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Davis involved the admissibility of testimony from the State's key witness, Shawn 
Hicks, regarding statements made to him by Greg Hill. 371 S.C. at 173, 638 
S.E.2d at 59.  Hicks testified he heard Davis, Reggie Stevens, and the victim 
arguing, after which he heard a gunshot and saw three individuals running through 
the victim's backyard. Id. After hearing the gunshot, Hicks sold drugs to Stevens 
and Hill, and Stevens and Hill returned a short time later with Davis.  Davis then 
bought drugs from Hicks, during which time Davis had a shotgun. Id. Hicks 
testified Davis offered to sell him the shotgun. Id. Over defense counsel's 
objection, Hicks testified Hill told him not to purchase the gun. Id. at 174, 638 
S.E.2d at 59.  Thereafter, Hicks testified Hill told him that Davis and Stevens went 
into the house and further advised Hicks not to get the shotgun because the victim 
had been shot with it. Id. 
This court affirmed Davis' murder and armed robbery convictions, and Davis filed 
a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing the statement made by Hill to Hicks—that 
the shotgun had been used to murder the victim—was erroneously admitted 
hearsay. Id. at 177, 638 S.E.2d at 61.  Our supreme court agreed with Davis, 
finding this court erred in determining Hill's statement was admissible under the 
excited utterance exception.  Id. at 178, 638 S.E.2d at 61-62.  The court noted, 
"statements which are not based on firsthand information, such as [when] the 
declarant was not an actual witness to the event, are not admissible under the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 179, 638 S.E.2d at 62.  It 
concluded there was insufficient evidence that Hill's statement was an excited 
utterance because (1) no evidence was elicited by the State that Hill was still under 
the stress or excitement of the victim's shooting when the alleged statement was 
made and, therefore, the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a foundation 
for the excited utterance and (2) there was no evidence in the record to support the 
conclusion that Hill witnessed the shooting.  Id. at 180, 638 S.E.2d at 62-63. 
In Sims, police were dispatched to a location one morning where a five-year-old 
boy had been found upset and crying outside the apartment of his mother.  348 
S.C. at 18, 558 S.E.2d at 520.  The child's mother—the victim—was found inside 
the apartment in a pool of blood, and she remained in a coma until her death.  Id. at 
18-19, 558 S.E.2d at 520. At trial, the child, who was then six years old, initially 
answered the solicitor's questions and stated someone else was in the home besides 
him and his mother and he saw his mother getting hurt. Id. at 19, 558 S.E.2d at 
520. However, the child would not identify the person who was in the apartment 
that night. Id. Thereafter, the solicitor elicited testimony from the responding 
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officer that the child appeared withdrawn and answered questions vaguely while 
keeping his head down. Id. at 20, 558 S.E.2d at 520.  Over defense counsel's 
hearsay objection, the officer testified the child had indicated the appellant was in 
the apartment the night of his mother's death. Id. The trial court found the 
statement was hearsay but ruled it was admissible under the circumstances, noting 
the age of the child and the fact the child made the statement after he discovered 
his mother under traumatic circumstances. Id. 
Our supreme court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
child's statement to the officer because it fell under the excited utterance exception 
to the hearsay rule. Id. at 23, 558 S.E.2d at 522.  In so ruling, the court found it 
met the first element required for an excited utterance exception because the 
statement related to the startling event of the child "seeing his mother after she was 
attacked and possibly while she was being attacked."  Id. at 21, 558 S.E.2d at 521. 
It further found, if the child was under the stress of excitement—the second 
element—"then that stress was caused by the startling event of seeing his mother 
being attacked and not being able to wake her." Id. The court ultimately 
determined the child was under the stress of the excitement. Id. at 21-23, 558 
S.E.2d at 521-22. It acknowledged a possible time period of twelve hours between 
the time of the attack and the time of the child's statement but observed, "[e]ven 
statements after extended periods of time can be considered an excited utterance as 
long as they were made under continuing stress."  Id. at 21-22, 558 S.E.2d at 521. 
It further noted: 
In this case, a five-year-old child possibly saw his mother 
being attacked and, at the very least, was left alone with 
his severely injured mother whom he could not wake, 
until he made his way outside to be found by a neighbor. 
Under these circumstances, we find the stress of 
excitement from those events lasts a longer period of 
time than would be likely to occur if the son had been an 
adult. 
Id. at 22, 558 S.E.2d at 521.  Finding the declarant's demeanor and age and the 
severity of the startling event are other factors useful in determining whether a 
statement qualifies as an excited utterance—and the child's age and the severity of 
the startling event clearly weighed in favor of finding his statement to be an 
excited utterance—the court then looked at the child's demeanor. Id. It concluded, 
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although the child "was not crying or acting 'excited' in the sense of being animated 
when he made the statement," his demeanor could be characterized as someone 
who was under the "stress of excitement." Id. at 22, 558 S.E.2d at 522. 
Accordingly, it held "[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, we find the [child] 
was under the continuing stress of excitement when he told [the officer] appellant 
was in the home the night of the attack."  Id. at 23, 558 S.E.2d at 522. 
Like Sims, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting M.W.'s 
statements to the officer concerning who shot Victim and that Victim and Sledge 
had been arguing because these statements fall under the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule. See Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. at 623, 690 S.E.2d at 573 
("Three elements must be met for a statement to be an excited utterance: (1) the 
statement must relate to a startling event or condition; (2) the statement must have 
been made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement; and (3) the 
stress of excitement must be caused by the startling event or condition.").  First, 
M.W.'s statements that Sledge shot his mother and that Sledge and his mother had 
been arguing undoubtedly relate to a startling event.  Second, the statements were 
made while M.W. was under the continuing stress of the excitement.  M.W. 
testified only about five minutes passed after he heard the gunshot before he 
emerged from his room to find Victim and call 911. Additionally, though there is 
an indication that at least some of the arguing was more removed in time, we 
nonetheless find M.W. was under continuing stress despite the lapse in time. See 
Sims, 348 S.C. at 21-22, 558 S.E.2d at 521 ("While the passage of time between 
the startling event and the statement is one factor to consider, it is not the 
dispositive factor. Even statements after extended periods of time can be 
considered an excited utterance as long as they were made under continuing 
stress.").  Although the 911 recording reflects M.W. tried to remain calm and assist 
the dispatcher in providing important information during the call, M.W. can be 
heard crying at times, and he expressed shock, disbelief, and fear during the 
twenty-two-minute call.  Third, it is clear the stress of the excitement was caused 
by the startling event.  Notably, M.W.'s demeanor, his age, and the severity of the 
startling event also weigh in favor of finding the statements complained of were 
excited utterances.  See id.at 22, 558 S.E.2d at 521 ("Other factors useful in 
determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance include the 
declarant's demeanor, the declarant's age, and the severity of the startling event.").  
73 
Accordingly, we find the statements were properly admitted under the excited 
utterance exception.3 
We acknowledge that Davis clearly provides that in situations in which the 
declarant does not have firsthand knowledge because he did not witness an event, 
statements made by the declarant concerning the event are not admissible under the 
excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.  Nonetheless, we find this 
situation is distinguishable from Davis because, while the evidence suggests M.W. 
did not visually observe Sledge shoot Victim, he perceived Sledge shot her based 
upon his witnessing of the argument and physical altercation between Sledge and 
Victim prior to the shooting, his auditory and sensory perception of the shooting, 
and his discovery of Victim's body in a pool of blood and the fact that Sledge had 
left the house.  Under the totality of the circumstances, in particular the sequence 
of events here, we find the startling event was such as to suspend M.W.'s process 
of reflective thought, thereby reducing the likelihood he fabricated the statements 
in issue. See Ladner, 373 S.C. at 116, 644 S.E.2d at 691 ("The excited utterance 
exception is based on the rationale that 'the startling event suspends the declarant's 
process of reflective thought, reducing the likelihood of fabrication.'" (quoting 
Dennis, 337 S.C. at 284, 523 S.E.2d at 177)). 
We also disagree with Sledge's assertion the statements should have been excluded 
because they were more prejudicial than probative.  All relevant evidence is 
generally admissible.  Rule 402, SCRE. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Rule 401, SCRE. "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
Rule 403, SCRE. "Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision 
3 Based upon this determination, we need not reach Sledge's argument that the 
statements were also not admissible under the present sense impression exception 
to the rule against hearsay. See Rule 803(1), SCRE ("The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . 
. (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or 
immediately thereafter."). 
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on an improper basis." State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 
(2009). Rule 403, SCRE, has sometimes been misstated, incorrectly providing that 
for evidence to be admissible under a Rule 403 analysis the probative value of 
evidence must substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, whereas "[t]he correct test is the opposite: whether the probative value 
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
State v. King, 424 S.C. 188, 200 n.6, 818 S.E.2d 204, 210 n.6 (2018).  The 
misstated test "incorrectly places the burden on the proponent of the evidence to 
establish admissibility, while the proper test places the burden on the opponent of 
the evidence to establish inadmissibility" under Rule 403. Id. An appellate court 
reviews a trial court's Rule 403, SCRE ruling pursuant to an abuse of discretion 
standard and gives great deference to the trial court's determination. State v. 
Collins, 409 S.C. 524, 534, 763 S.E.2d 22, 28 (2014). "A trial [court's] decision 
regarding the comparative probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence 
should be reversed only in exceptional circumstances." Id. (quoting State v. 
Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 378, 580 S.E.2d 785, 794 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
Here, the statements at issue were clearly relevant as to motive, opportunity and 
identity.  Further, while we acknowledge the prejudicial effect is great— 
particularly as to M.W.'s statement that Sledge shot his mother—the child's trial 
testimony provides additional damaging details not included in the 911 call, 
including that he witnessed a physical altercation between Sledge and Victim prior 
to the shooting and, during this time, Victim told M.W. that Sledge was really mad 
at her and might kill her.  His trial testimony also established a scenario that 
explains why M.W. would have perceived Sledge was the person who shot his 
mother.  Accordingly, we cannot say the probative value of the evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and we find no abuse 
of discretion in the trial court's determination the evidence was admissible under 
Rule 403. 
II. Statements to Police 
Sledge contends the trial court erred in admitting both his statements in the patrol 
car and those made during the interrogation at the LEC because, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, they were not freely and voluntarily made.  He 
maintains the trial court's ruling reveals it looked at the facts and circumstances in 
a piecemeal fashion rather than focusing on the totality of the circumstances.  He 
points to the following: the long duration of police custody prior to his arrest; the 
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circumstances surrounding him being pulled over with the officers' guns drawn, 
them yelling obscenities, and him being handcuffed on the pavement despite his 
compliance; the fact that he was intoxicated; Sledge's repeated requests for an 
explanation; the fact that he was driven to a parking lot where his hands were 
swabbed for gunshot residue and he requested to use the bathroom and was assured 
he would be given the opportunity when they reached the LEC; the fact that he 
remained handcuffed at the LEC and he was not given access to a bathroom in 
spite of another request; the fact that he was stripped naked in the presence of 
several officers—including a female officer who photographed him; and the fact 
that he was in an orange jumpsuit and was handcuffed to a belt, where he remained 
until 4:14 a.m.  Sledge argues, while none of these facts alone undermined the 
voluntariness of his statements, they had the cumulative effect of rendering his 
waiver involuntary. Accordingly, he contends the State failed to meet its burden of 
proving either of his waivers of rights were voluntary. We disagree. 
First, we agree with the State that the issue concerning admission of the LEC 
interview recording is not preserved for our review.  Defense counsel made a 
pretrial motion to exclude his statements made during the interview and again 
sought exclusion of the entire recording during the trial.  However, following 
redaction of the recording, and after presentation of testimony from a witness on an 
unrelated matter, defense counsel stated he had no objection to admission of the 
redacted recording. See State v. Wannamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 499, 552 S.E.2d 284, 
286 (2001) (holding appellant's assertion that the trial court erred by refusing to 
suppress a custodial statement was unpreserved because trial counsel failed to 
make a contemporaneous objection to the statement being read into evidence); 
State v. Dicapua, 373 S.C. 452, 455, 646 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
the defendant's statement that he had no objection to a videotape coming into 
evidence "amounted to a waiver of any issue" the defendant had with the 
videotape); Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 55, 710 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 
2011) ("When a party states to the trial court that it has no objection to the 
introduction of evidence, even though the party previously made a motion to 
exclude the evidence, the issue raised in the previous motion is not preserved for 
appellate review."). Nonetheless, even if the issue were properly preserved, we 
find no error in the admission of either the statements made in the patrol car or 
those made during the interrogation at the LEC. 
In the video from Deputy May's car, when Sledge was initially pulled over he 
immediately complied with the officers' instructions, appeared to get on the ground 
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without difficulty, and he did not stumble or falter when walking to the deputy's 
car. Thereafter, a very clear Miranda warning was given, and Sledge responded 
"Yes, sir" when asked if he understood his rights. Though the officers were unable 
to accommodate Sledge's request to use the bathroom while in the parking lot, 
nothing of substance to this case was discussed by Sledge until arrival at the LEC. 
Once at the LEC, Sledge again asked to use the bathroom, and Sergeant Rivera 
told him he would be back in five minutes.  When Sergeant Rivera returned and 
asked Sledge if he still needed to use the restroom, Sledge stated he did not.  While 
Sergeant Rivera went to retrieve something, Sledge was escorted into the interview 
room for processing. When Sergeant Rivera returned, he was informed Sledge 
may have urinated on himself.  Sergeant Rivera testified he was gone for just a few 
minutes during this time.  Sledge changed into a jumpsuit before the interview 
began at the LEC.  During the LEC interview, the recording shows a thorough 
recitation and explanation of Sledge's rights.  Sledge was alert, coherent and 
attentive, and he requested an explanation when he desired.  He stated he 
understood his rights and wished to speak to the officers.  Sledge initialed each of 
the rights read to him and signed below the Waiver of Rights language 
emphatically stating, "I have nothing to hide, sir." 
Though Deputy May testified Sledge appeared intoxicated when he pulled him 
over, and Sledge stated in his LEC interview he had two beers to drink, we find 
nothing to indicate intoxication to the level that Sledge did not realize what he was 
saying.  See State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973) ("The 
fact that one is intoxicated at the time a confession is made does not necessarily 
render him incapable of comprehending the meaning and effect of his words. 
Therefore, proof that an accused was intoxicated at the time he made a confession 
does not render the statement inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the accused's 
intoxication was such that he did not realize what he was saying.").  Additionally, 
though surely a source of embarrassment when he urinated on himself, the only 
evidence is that this occurred before the LEC interview began, Sledge was not 
made to remain in soiled clothes but changed into a jumpsuit after the incident, he 
was not denied any comfort requests during his interview, and no statements of 
substance were made by him between the time of his initial request to use the 
bathroom and him relieving himself.  Further, Sledge appeared relaxed and 
forthcoming with details in the recording of this interview, and we detect no 
coercive forces or anything to indicate Sledge's will was overborne. See State v. 
Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The test of 
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voluntariness [of a statement] is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.").     
Based upon the content of the videos and the testimony presented, the trial court 
thoughtfully considered the fact that Sledge was Mirandized twice; his rights were 
clearly and carefully explained; Sledge paid close attention to the rights explained 
to him and acknowledged his waiver of rights in writing; and the atmosphere in the 
interview room was not hostile and there was no evidence of coercion or pressure 
to the extent his will was overborne.  It further recognized there was evidence of 
Sledge's intoxication and his denied use of the bathroom but determined these 
circumstances did not take away his ability to understand, process information and 
make rational decisions nor interfere with the voluntariness of the statement or his 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda.  We hold the trial 
court's determination on this matter is supported by evidence and find no abuse of 
discretion in the admission of Sledge's statements. See State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 
136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("The trial court's factual conclusions as to the 
voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly 
erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."); id. ("When reviewing a trial court's 
ruling concerning voluntariness, [the appellate court] does not reevaluate the facts 
based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines 
whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence."). 
III. Sentence on Weapon Charge 
Finally, Sledge contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to five years of 
incarceration for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime 
because he was sentenced to life for his murder conviction, and statutory law 
prohibits such a sentence when a life sentence without parole is imposed for a 
violent crime. Accordingly, he argues this sentence should be vacated.  Though he 
acknowledges defense counsel did not raise an objection to the improper 
imposition of this sentence, Sledge argues this court should nonetheless review the 
issue in the interest of judicial economy. The State acknowledges that Sledge's 
weapon possession sentence should be vacated because it was issued in violation 
of the statute and further concedes Sledge is entitled to the proper sentence 
regardless of issue preservation.  We agree and vacate the five-year sentence for 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2015) (providing the five-year sentence for possession of a 
weapon during the commission of a violent crime "does not apply in cases where 
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the death penalty or a life sentence without parole is imposed for the violent 
crime"); State v. Bonner, 400 S.C. 561, 564, 735 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(noting, though a challenge to sentencing must be raised at trial to be preserved for 
appellate review, an exception to the rule authorizes the appellate court to consider 
an unpreserved issue in the interest of judicial economy under appropriate 
circumstances); State v. Johnston, 333 S.C. 459, 463-64, 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 
(1999) (remanding for resentencing in a case which "present[ed] the exceptional 
circumstance in which the State has conceded in its briefs and oral argument that 
the trial court committed error by imposing an excessive sentence"); State v. Vick, 
384 S.C. 189, 202-03, 682 S.E.2d 275, 281-82 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding, under 
circumstances in which the State conceded it was error for the trial court to 
sentence a defendant for the kidnapping of a victim whom he was also convicted of 
murdering and that any such sentence for kidnapping should be vacated, it was 
appropriate to vacate the sentence for kidnapping even though the defendant failed 
to challenge the sentence when it was imposed). 
Based on the above, we find no error in the admission of the portions of the 911 
call or Sledge's statements and therefore confirm Sledge's convictions.  However, 
we find the trial court erred in imposing the five-year sentence on the weapon 
charge and, accordingly, vacate that sentence. 
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. 
SHORT and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.: Cricket Store 17 d/b/a Taboo (Taboo) appeals the order of the 
circuit court affirming the decision of the City of Columbia Board of Zoning 
Appeals (the Board) in denying Taboo the right to request a special exception from 
a city ordinance limiting the operation of sexually-oriented shops within the limits 
of the City of Columbia (the City). We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Taboo applied for a license to operate the City's only licensed adult 
business.  The City issued the license on December 5, 2011.  On December 19, 
2011, the City hired Scott Bergthold, a Tennessee attorney who specializes in 
handling adult businesses regulation/zoning.  The City passed a licensing 
ordinance to regulate adult businesses. Subsequently, Bergthold drafted a zoning 
ordinance to regulate adult business locations for the City. This ordinance, 
sections 17-371 to -376 of the City of Columbia Code of Ordinances, (the 
ordinance) was enacted in November of 2012. 
Section 17-374(a) of the ordinance provides: "No variance from any of the 
provisions of this section may be granted by the zoning board of adjustment.  No 
special exception regarding any of the requirements of this section may be granted 
by the zoning board of adjustments."  Taboo brought constitutional challenges 
against the ordinance in federal court and lost. See Cricket Store 17, LLC v. City of 
Columbia, 97 F. Supp. 3d 737 (D.S.C. 2015) (granting the City's motion for 
summary judgment), aff'd, 676 Fed. Appx. 162 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 116 (2017). 
After Taboo's federal claims failed, Taboo applied to the Board for a special 
exception.  However, the Zoning Administrator rejected and returned Taboo's 
application for special exception by letter dated February 26, 2016, stating the 
ordinance prohibited Taboo from filing an application for special exception. 
Meanwhile, the City threatened criminal prosecution against Taboo for violating 
the ordinance.  On January 28, 2016, the Zoning Administrator delivered a written 
notice of violation letter to Taboo. Taboo then filed two appeals with the Board— 
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one appealing the Zoning Administrator's decision to issue citations and a second 
one appealing the Board's refusal to accept its application for special exception. 
The Board accepted both appeals. 
The City scheduled both administrative hearings for April 12, 2016. After the 
hearings were conducted, the Board affirmed the Zoning Administrator's decision 
on both counts.  Taboo appealed these rulings to the circuit court which affirmed. 
This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court reviews appeals from a local zoning board pursuant to the standards 
proscribed in section 6-29-840 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018).  Austin v. 
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 362 S.C. 29, 35, 606 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Findings of fact will not be disturbed unless the record contains no evidence to 
reasonably support them. Id.  However, "[i]ssues involving the construction of 
ordinances are reviewed as a matter of law under a broader standard of review than 
is applied in reviewing issues of fact." Eagle Container Co. v. Cty. of Newberry, 
379 S.C. 564, 568, 666 S.E.2d 892, 894 (2008). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Res Judicata 
As an initial matter, the City argues res judicata bars Taboo's claims in this case, 
and therefore, the circuit court's order should be affirmed.  The City maintains it 
defeated Taboo's challenges to the ordinance in federal court and those decisions 
prohibit relitigation of any issues that were, or could have been, raised therein. We 
disagree. 
Res judicata bars subsequent actions by the same parties 
when the claims arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence that was the subject of a prior action between 
those parties. Under the doctrine of res judicata, [a] 
litigant is barred from raising any issues which were 
adjudicated in the former suit and any issues which might 
have been raised in the former suit. 
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Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, 172, 712 S.E.2d 408, 414 (2011) (quoting Plum Creek 
Dev. Co. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 34, 512 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1999) 
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)). 
In this case, the circuit court held "the federal court rejected Taboo's challenges to 
the City's application of its ordinance to Taboo, and the Fourth Circuit has recently 
affirmed that ruling. That final judgement in federal court is res judicata to 
Taboo's claims against the City's enforcement of the ordinance against its sexual 
device shop."  The circuit court went on to affirm the rejection of Taboo's 
application for special exception and the issuance of citations in January 2016 on 
the merits. 
We conclude res judicata does not apply to the matters on appeal in the present 
case. The federal litigation affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance 
generally and as applied to Taboo.  While Taboo is still attempting to postpone its 
demise in its current location, it is not alleging the ordinance is unconstitutional or 
cannot be applied to it on a substantive basis.  Therefore, the issues raised in this 
appeal were not litigated in the federal action nor could they have been.  First, the 
citations were issued in 2016, after the district court's opinion.  Likewise, Taboo 
did not apply for a special exception until 2016. Both issues involve the 
interpretation and procedural implementation of the ordinance as opposed to its 
constitutional validity or general application to Taboo. Because we conclude res 
judicata does not bar Taboo's arguments, we will address them in turn. 
II. Statutory Construction 
Section 17-374(a) of the ordinance provides: "No variance from any of the 
provisions of this section may be granted by the [Board].  No special exception 
regarding any of the requirements of this section may be granted by the [Board]." 
Taboo contends use of the word "may" means the Board had the discretion to grant 
its request for a special exception.  Consequently, the circuit court's conclusion the 
Board could not at least consider its application is erroneous. We disagree. 
"The primary rule of statutory construction is that the [c]ourt must ascertain the 
intention of the legislature." Kerr v. State, 345 S.C. 183, 188, 547 S.E.2d 494, 496 
(2001).  "In interpreting a statute, 'the court must give the words their plain and 
ordinary meaning without resorting to a tortured construction which limits or 
expands the statute's operation.'" State v. Bull, 350 S.C. 58, 61, 564 S.E.2d 351, 
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353 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dickerson, 339 S.C. 194, 199, 528 S.E.2d 
675, 677 (Ct. App. 2000)). "Furthermore, 'a statute as a whole must receive a 
practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, 
and policy of the lawmakers.'" Id. (quoting State v. Baker, 310 S.C. 510, 512, 427 
S.E.2d 670, 672 (1993)). "As with statutes, the lawmakers' intent embodied in an 
ordinance 'must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used.'" 
Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Myrtle Beach, 360 S.C. 459, 466, 602 S.E.2d 76, 
79 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Charleston Cty. Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. 
Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995)). 
"The use of the word 'may' signifies permission and generally means that the action 
spoken of is optional or discretionary unless it appears to require that it be given 
any other meaning . . . ." Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 352-53, 549 
S.E.2d 243, 250 (2001).  "[W]hen the question arises whether 'may' is to be 
interpreted as mandatory or permissive in a particular statute, legislative intent is 
controlling."  Robertson v. State, 276 S.C. 356, 358, 278 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1981).  
"'[W]here other words are used in connection with "shall," "must," "may[,]" or 
"might," which clearly indicate mandatory or directory construction, as the case 
may be, we have never ignored the force of the descriptive or qualifying language.' 
. . . Courts that have construed legislative use of the phrase 'may not' have 
consistently held that the phrase is mandatory and not permissive or discretionary." 
Stringer v. Realty Unlimited, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Clark 
v. Riehl, 230 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1950)); see also In re Denial of Application 
for Issuance of One Original (New) On-Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, 
883 P.2d 833, 836 (Mont. 1994) (holding the phrase "may not consider" precludes 
consideration). 
In the ordinance at issue, use of the term "no" at the beginning reveals the intent 
that variances or special exceptions to the ordinance not be allowed.  South 
Carolina case law has recognized the term "may" does not exclusively connote 
discretionary conduct when construing it so would violate legislative intent. 
Furthermore, the rules of construction indicate the court is not to give words a 
tortured meaning.  To construe this ordinance as discretionary requires one to read 
out the word "no" in a way that contorts its plain meaning and renders it 
superfluous.  Consequently, we affirm the circuit court's finding the ordinance did 
not permit the Board discretion to grant Taboo's request for special exception. 
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III. Conflict with Statute 
Next, Taboo argues the circuit court erred in not finding section 17-374(a) of the 
ordinance conflicts with the enabling legislation that creates local zoning boards of 
appeal, section 6-29-800 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018).  We disagree. 
Subsection (B) of the enabling statute states, "Appeals to the [B]oard may be taken 
by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the 
municipality or county."  Taboo maintains it is an aggrieved person and must 
therefore be permitted to make its appeal for a special exception.  The City argues 
the ordinance prohibits the granting of a variance in this case and the "any 
aggrieved person" language in subsection (B) of the enabling statute is proscribed 
by the subject matter limitations set forth in subsection (A). Section 6-29-
800(A)(2) provides the Board has the power "to hear and decide appeals for 
variance from the requirements of the zoning ordinance when strict application of 
the provisions of the ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship."  Further, 
"[a] local governing body by ordinance may permit or preclude the granting of a 
variance for a use of land, a building, or a structure that is prohibited in a given 
district . . . ."  § 6-29-800(A)(2)(d)(i). 
Under a prior version of this enabling legislation, our supreme court found an 
ordinance flatly prohibiting variances conflicted with the enabling legislation at 
issue. The disputed ordinance in Bostic v. City of W. Columbia, 268 S.C. 386, 389, 
234 S.E.2d 224, 225 (1977), provided "under no circumstances shall the Board of 
Adjustment grant a variance to permit a use not generally or by specific exception 
permitted in the district involved."  The court found the challenged ordinance 
conflicted with the enabling statute which permitted zoning boards to grant 
variances. Id. at 389-90, 234 S.E.2d at 226. In contrast, the current enabling 
legislation specifically authorizes local governing bodies to "preclude the granting 
of a variance for a use of land, a building, or a structure that is prohibited in a 
given district." 6-29-800(A)(2)(d)(i). Furthermore, section 6-29-800(A)(3) 
enables governing bodies "to permit uses by special exception subject to the terms 
and conditions for the uses set forth for such uses in the zoning ordinance." Id. 
(emphasis added). Because local governing bodies are now permitted to pass a 
prohibitory ordinance like 17-374(a), we conclude the current statute and 
challenged ordinance do not conflict even in light of the "any aggrieved person" 
language in subsection (B).  As the City maintains, the designation of who may 
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appeal for a variance is circumscribed by the parameters set forth in subsection 
(A). Therefore, we affirm as to this issue. 
IV. Remaining Issues 
Additionally, Taboo asserts (1) it was not afforded the opportunity for a 
presubmission meeting with the City, (2) its claims should have been referred for 
mediation, and (3) the circuit court erred in admitting Bergthold pro hac vice.  We 
conclude these issues are either unpreserved for appellate review or have been 
abandoned based on a lack of citation to supporting law. See Wilder Corp. v. 
Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled 
upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."); Mulherin-Howell 
v. Cobb, 362 S.C. 588, 600, 608 S.E.2d 587, 593-94 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting when 
an appellant fails to cite any supporting authority for his position and makes 
conclusory arguments, the appellant abandons the issue on appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on all of the foregoing, the order of the circuit court is 
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur. 
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WILLIAMS, J.: In this criminal appeal, Brandon Rashad Marshall, Jr. appeals 
his convictions for murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
violent crime. On appeal, Marshall argues the circuit court erred in denying him 
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immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act), S.C. Code 
Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015).  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Marshall was indicted for murder and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime after he shot and killed Anthony Williams (Victim) 
on May 22, 2014.  Prior to trial, Marshall sought immunity from prosecution 
pursuant to the Act, and on April 4, 2016, the circuit court conducted an immunity 
hearing pursuant to State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 709 S.E.2d 662 (2011). At the 
immunity hearing, the circuit court admitted the video recording of Detective 
Burckhardt interviewing Marshall on the night of the incident (the recorded 
interview). 
During the immunity hearing, Marshall testified he met Victim approximately 
three months prior to the shooting, and the two began a sexual relationship about 
one month later.  At the time of the incident, Victim was also in a relationship with 
Ashley Butler.  Victim and Butler resided together, but Victim was not on Butler's 
lease and was on trespass notice for Butler's apartment (the apartment). On the 
night of the shooting, Marshall was invited to visit Butler and Victim at the 
apartment. Marshall stated he took his gun into the apartment because he argued 
with Butler's neighbor before, and he previously witnessed the neighbor severely 
assault another man. Marshall testified that while he was at the apartment, Victim 
and Butler got into an argument, so he left the room.  Marshall stated he returned 
to the room when he heard Butler yelling, "Get off of me, you are always putting 
your hands on me." He also indicated he heard Butler say she could not breathe. 
Marshall stated he saw Victim on top of Butler with one hand around her neck and 
the other hand positioned to strike her face.  Marshall testified he grabbed his gun 
off the table, inserted the clip, and told Victim he needed to stop and needed to 
leave. Victim left the apartment, and Marshall followed him. 
Marshall stated he returned to the back door to gather his belongings, but Butler 
did not want to open the back door, so she put his bag on the front porch.  Marshall 
testified that after he put his bag, but not his gun, in his car, he saw Victim go back 
to the apartment, and he thought Victim was trying to kick in the door.  Marshall 
stated he approached Victim in an attempt to calm Victim down and encourage 
him to leave because he feared Victim would get in trouble for violating the 
trespass notice.  Marshall also testified he was afraid Victim would attempt to kill 
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Butler if Victim was successful in kicking in the door. Marshall stated Victim 
shoved him to the ground, and Marshall was fairly certain his glasses fell off. 
Marshall testified he approached Victim again and tried to grab Victim's wrist, but 
Victim pulled away and resumed kicking and punching the door. When Marshall 
attempted to grab Victim's hand, Victim turned around and shoved him twice, 
knocking him into a tree. Marshall indicated he had a hard time getting up, and 
when he finally got up, Victim pushed him against the tree again, causing Marshall 
to fall.  Marshall indicated Victim got on top of him and hit his face at least once 
while Marshall repeatedly told Victim to get off of him.  According to Marshall, he 
was not physically able to get Victim off of him because he was overweight and 
suffered from prior injuries stemming from automobile accidents.  Marshall 
testified he was pretty sure he was on the ground when he turned over, threw back 
his hand, and fired the gun until it stopped firing. Marshall then ran to his car and 
drove away, but he quickly returned to the scene after police arrived. Marshall 
testified he believed Victim was trying to kill him and Butler and that Victim 
would have killed him had he not defended himself.  According to Marshall, he did 
not make a definite decision to shoot Victim.  
Marshall acknowledged his testimony during the immunity hearing differed from 
what he told Detective Burckhardt in the recorded interview, but he indicated his 
memory was much better at the immunity hearing than it was "immediately after 
the traumatizing incident."  The recorded interview differed from the immunity 
hearing testimony as to the distance between Marshall and Victim when Marshall 
fired the gun and as to whether Marshall (1) had his glasses on when he shot 
Victim, (2) was standing or lying on the ground when he shot Victim, (3) put the 
clip in the gun during Victim and Butler's argument or after Victim shoved him, 
and (4) fired the gun continuously or stopped firing but resumed firing after Victim 
tried to get back up. 
At the immunity hearing, Butler's testimony differed from Marshall's account of 
the events. Butler testified that on the night of the incident, an argument ensued 
between her and Victim.  Butler stated she spit at Victim, and Victim grabbed her 
and held her down on the couch.  Butler testified that although she could not 
breathe when Victim held her down on the couch, she believed it was because of 
the position she was in not because Victim was choking her.  Butler averred Victim 
did not choke her.  She further testified Victim did not hit her, she never told 
Victim to stop hitting her, and she never believed Victim was going to kill her or 
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seriously hurt her. She stated that throughout their relationship, Victim never hit or 
assaulted her.  
According to Butler, Victim left when Marshall grabbed Victim while he was on 
top of her on the couch and told Victim to leave.  After Marshall and Victim left, 
Butler locked the back door. She testified Marshall knocked on the back door to 
get his things, she put them on the front porch, and she asked him to leave.  Butler 
indicated Victim then knocked on the back door to get some clothes. Butler 
testified Victim knocked louder than Marshall, but she did not think he was trying 
to kick in the door, and she did not fear he was going to hurt her.  Butler stated she 
did not let Victim in, but she yelled through the door that she would get Victim's 
clothes from upstairs.  Butler testified she did not let Victim in because she feared 
she would get kicked out of her apartment as a result of the trespass notice, not 
because she was afraid.  As she was coming down the stairs with Victim's clothes, 
Butler stated she heard gunshots. A photograph admitted into evidence by the 
State showed that the police found Victim's clothes near the front door. 
Butler's neighbor also testified at the immunity hearing.  She stated she awoke to 
the sound of gunshots, and then she heard a male voice yell "you are messing with 
the wrong [person]." She testified she heard no pause in the gunshots. 
Dr. Nicholas Batalis conducted Victim's autopsy, which showed four bullet 
wounds.  He testified he did not observe any stippling or soot on Victim's injuries.  
Dr. Batalis explained soot will not travel further than six to twelve inches from the 
location where the gun was shot, and stippling will not travel more than two to four 
feet.  This indicated Marshall was not within close range when he shot Victim. 
At the close of the immunity hearing, the circuit court denied Marshall's request for 
immunity under the Act, finding Marshall failed to show the elements of 
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the court noted the 
inconsistencies (1) within Marshall's testimony at the hearing, (2) between the 
recorded statement and Marshall's testimony, (3) between Marshall's testimony and 
Butler's testimony, and (4) between the scientific evidence and Marshall's theory of 
the case. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and Marshall was convicted of murder 
and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The circuit 
court sentenced Marshall to concurrent sentences of forty years' imprisonment for 
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murder and five years' imprisonment for the possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime.  This appeal followed.1 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the circuit court err by denying Marshall immunity from prosecution pursuant 
to the Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Circuit courts utilize pretrial hearings to determine whether a defendant is entitled 
to immunity under the Act, employing a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
State v. Manning, 418 S.C. 38, 43, 791 S.E.2d 148, 150 (2016).  Appellate courts 
review an immunity determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 45, 791 S.E.2d at 
151.  A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an error of 
law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. State 
v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Marshall argues the circuit court erred in denying him immunity from prosecution 
under the Act.  Specifically, Marshall contends he established by a preponderance 
of the evidence the elements required for immunity under the Act and the requisite 
elements of self-defense because (1) he was without fault in bringing on the 
difficulty because Victim was the initial aggressor, (2) he believed he was in 
imminent danger and a reasonably prudent person would have held the same belief, 
(3) he was not engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the fatal altercation with 
Victim, and (4) he had no duty to retreat because the altercation occurred in a 
public area of Butler's apartment complex. We disagree. 
Subsection 16-11-450(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides, "A person 
who uses deadly force as permitted by the provisions of this article or another 
1 Marshall's counsel initially filed a motion to be relieved and a brief pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which raised another issue on appeal. 
By order filed November 13, 2017, this court denied the motion to be relieved as 
counsel and ordered the parties to fully brief the issue of whether Marshall was 
entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to the Act. 
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applicable provision of law is justified in using deadly force and is immune from 
criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly force . . . ." Subsection 
16-11-440(C) provides: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity 
and who is attacked in another place where he has a 
right to be, including, but not limited to, his place of 
business, has no duty to retreat and has the right to 
stand his ground and meet force with force, including 
deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is necessary 
to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or 
another person or to prevent the commission of a 
violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (2015). 
To warrant immunity under the Act, there must be a pretrial determination where 
the accused must demonstrate the elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat, 
to the satisfaction of the circuit court by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. 
Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370–71, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013).  The accused must 
show (1) he was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) he actually believed 
he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or 
he actually was in such imminent danger; and (3) if his defense was based upon his 
belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and 
courage would have held the same belief, or if he actually was in imminent danger, 
the circumstances "would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and 
courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm 
or losing his own life." Id. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4. 
We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in holding Marshall was not 
entitled to immunity because he failed to prove the elements of self-defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence due to inconsistencies in the record. In recent 
precedent, our supreme court has clarified when inconsistent evidence warrants a 
denial of immunity from prosecution under the Act. See State v. Cervantes-Pavon, 
426 S.C. 442, 448–451, 827 S.E.2d 564, 567–69 (2019); State v. Andrews, Op. 
27894 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 19, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 25 at 9–12). 
"[J]ust because conflicting evidence as to an immunity issue exists does not 
automatically require the court to deny immunity; the court must sit as the fact-
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finder at this hearing, weigh the evidence presented, and reach a conclusion under 
the Act." Cervantes-Pavon, 426 S.C. at 451, 827 S.E.2d at 569.  "Thus, the 
relevant inquiry is not merely whether there is a conflict in the evidence but, rather, 
whether the accused has proved an entitlement to immunity under the Act by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Andrews, Op. 27894 at 11–12. 
Marshall points to State v. Douglas to support his contention that immunity should 
have been granted.  411 S.C. 307, 768 S.E.2d 232 (Ct. App. 2014).  In Douglas, 
this court held the accused proved he acted in self-defense by a preponderance of 
the evidence when he shot the victim after the victim assaulted him and refused to 
leave the accused's house. Id. at 314, 319, 768 S.E.2d at 236, 240.  However, this 
case differs from Douglas because the physical evidence presented in Douglas was 
consistent with the accused's testimony. Id. at 319–20, 768 S.E.2d at 239–40.  In 
the instant case, the circuit court found numerous inconsistencies called Marshall's 
credibility into question and resulted in Marshall failing to establish entitlement to 
immunity by the preponderance of the evidence. Such inconsistencies included the 
sequence of events leading up to the shooting, whether Marshall was standing and 
whether he was wearing his glasses when he fired the shots towards Victim, 
whether the shots were continuous, when Marshall put the clip in the gun, and the 
distance between Marshall and Victim when Marshall fired the gun. The court 
also noted inconsistencies between Marshall's testimony and Butler's testimony, 
including what led to the initial argument between Butler and Victim, whether 
Victim was choking and hitting Butler, and the intensity with which Victim was 
knocking on the back door. Based on these inconsistencies, the circuit court found 
Marshall's testimony was unreliable and prevented the court from finding he 
established the relevant elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The circuit court specifically noted Marshall did not establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he was without fault in bringing about the difficulty. See 
Curry, 406 S.C. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4 (explaining to establish self-
defense, the accused must show he was without fault in bringing on the difficulty); 
State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 278, 87 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1955) ("[O]ne cannot 
through his own fault bring on a difficulty and then claim the right of self-defense . 
. . ."); State v. Wigington, 375 S.C. 25, 32, 649 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ct. App. 2007) 
("[O]ne who provokes or initiates an assault cannot escape criminal liability by 
invoking self[-]defense . . . ." (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bryant, 
336 S.C. 340, 345, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1999))).  In State v. Slater, our supreme 
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court noted it could be reasonably calculated that the accused brought on the 
difficulty when he approached an altercation that was already underway with a 
loaded weapon by his side. 373 S.C. 66, 70, 644 S.E.2d 50, 52 (2007).  In the 
instant case, following the argument between Victim and Butler, the parties 
separated before Marshall, who was aware Victim was angry, approached Victim 
at the back door of the apartment and inserted himself—and his gun—into Victim's 
interactions with Butler.  Marshall repeatedly grabbed Victim's wrist and hand, 
causing Victim to become aggravated and shove Marshall.  Based on Marshall's 
actions, the circuit court found Marshall did not establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he was without fault in bringing about the difficulty. 
Based upon our review of the record, we find the circuit court properly weighed 
the evidence presented and did not abuse its discretion in denying immunity under 
the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the circuit court's denial of immunity is 
AFFIRMED.2 
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur. 
2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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WILLIAMS, J.: In this domestic relations matter, Jessica Pares (Wife) appeals 
the family court's Order from Rule to Show Cause/Motion, arguing the family 
court erred in (1) granting Robert Thompson's (Husband) Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP 
motion; (2) refusing to give Wife another opportunity to refinance the former 
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marital home (the Home); (3) failing to make Husband solely responsible for the 
lien with Palmetto Coastal Investments, LLC (the Palmetto Lien); and (4) 
awarding attorney's fees to Husband and not awarding attorney's fees to Wife.  We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Husband and Wife married on October 13, 2002.  During the marriage, the parties 
owned and operated Palmetto Tree Service, LLC (Palmetto Tree).  Wife managed 
the accounting and clerical tasks, and Husband worked at various job sites 
planting, removing, and fertilizing trees. 
Husband and Wife separated around April 15, 2010, and they were divorced on 
July 26, 2011.  After the parties separated, but prior to their divorce, Husband and 
Wife entered into a written final settlement agreement (the Agreement) resolving 
all issues arising out of their marriage except for the matter of divorce.  On 
October 8, 2010, the family court issued a final order (the Final Order), which 
approved the Agreement, incorporated the Agreement, and indicated the 
Agreement was issued as the enforceable order of the court.1 
The Final Order provided "[a]s soon as she is able, Wife shall assume or re-finance 
all loans on [the Home] in her own name. . . . Wife must place [the Home] on the 
market for sale on or before June 1, 2025." The Final Order also provided 
Husband and Wife would each be responsible for their own debts, indemnify each 
other against liability for those debts, and pay all accounts and obligations in a 
timely manner so as to not harm the other party's credit.  The Final Order made 
Husband responsible for all debts associated with Palmetto Tree and indemnified 
Wife from Palmetto Tree's debts.  Finally, the Final Order provided: 
It is the intent of the parties that the provisions of [the 
Final Order] shall govern all rights and obligations of the 
parties as well as all rights of modification; and, further, 
that the terms and conditions of [the Final Order] . . . 
shall not be modifiable by the parties or any court 
without the written consent of Husband and Wife . . . . 
1 Hereinafter, the Agreement is referred to as the Final Order because the 
Agreement was incorporated into the Final Order. 
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Neither the Family Courts of the State of South Carolina 
nor any other court shall have jurisdiction to modify, 
supplement, terminate, or amend [the Final Order] or the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties hereunder. 
In August 2011, Wife, on the advice of her counsel—individually and on behalf of 
Palmetto Tree—consented to the entry of the Palmetto Lien in the amount of 
$42,500.  The Palmetto lien resolved a lawsuit initiated by Palmetto Coastal 
Investments, LLC, on December 29, 2009, after payments were not made pursuant 
to a January 31, 2008 commercial lease that was signed by Wife personally and on 
behalf of Palmetto Tree.2 
After entry of the Final Order, Wife paid the mortgages on the Home from 
accounts held by Palmetto Tree.  Husband resided in the Home without Wife from 
October 2012 until November 2013.  During that time, Wife continued to pay the 
mortgages through June 2013,3 but no further mortgage payments were made 
following the June 2013 payment until February 2015. Wife testified she believed 
Husband would pay the mortgages while he resided in the Home.  She stated she 
presented Husband with a lease that required Husband to pay rent, but Husband 
refused to sign the lease.  Husband testified Wife did not provide him with a 
proposed lease, and there was no agreement for him to pay the mortgages because 
Wife paid all of the bills out of the Palmetto Tree account.  Husband also noted the 
court did not order him to pay the mortgages. Husband testified that at some point, 
he became aware he would have to start paying the mortgages after he and Wife 
argued about the payments.  However, Husband indicated he could not pay the 
mortgages because Wife interfered with his business by withholding checks and 
insurance information, opening a competing business, and disconnecting his 
business phone.  Husband and Wife each included the Home's mortgage payments 
on their individual financial declarations in 2013. 
2 Wife indicated she and Husband agreed to consent to the Palmetto Lien. 
Husband stated he was personally served with notice of the lawsuit, but he lacked 
knowledge of any further proceedings and of the Palmetto Lien. 
3 The June 2013 payment was a partial payment. 
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Wife testified she attempted to make partial payments on the mortgages after 
Husband vacated the Home in November 2013. However, Wife indicated the bank 
would only allow her to make the payments in full. Wife said she utilized the 
Home as a rental property and received approximately $70,000 in rental income. 
She stated she did not attempt to make further payments on the mortgages because 
she had to utilize the money to fix damage Husband caused to the Home4 and the 
bank would not accept partial payments. 
In October 2014, Wells Fargo Bank filed an action to foreclose on the Home 
because the first mortgage was not paid.5 Wells Fargo's complaint indicated that as 
of June 1, 2013, the principal sum of $269,135.73, with an interest rate of 5.875%, 
advances, late charges, and costs and disbursements of the action, including 
attorney's fees, were due. On January 2, 2015, Wife e-mailed Husband to inform 
him of the scheduled foreclosure. She indicated she did not intend to lose the 
Home but stated it "is in my best interest to prolong the process as long as 
possible."  Wife indicated that although her credit was damaged, her new husband 
had good credit, so she would not be affected if the Home went into foreclosure. 
Wife wrote, "I'm assuming you are trying to repair your credit so that you can 
purchase a home for yourself and do not want a foreclosure on your credit history." 
Wife gave Husband four options for the Home: (1) do nothing and have the Home 
go into foreclosure; (2) sign a quit claim deed; (3) allow Wife to sell the Home to 
her new husband's parents; or (4) sign a quit claim deed so Wife's father could buy 
Husband's right to the equity in the Home for $60,000.  Wife's e-mail provided, 
"These are the only options available.  There is no negotiating. You can either 
have good credit and be able to buy a new home for yourself now or have bad 
credit indefinitely.  Either way I'm in the [Home] until 2025." In February 2015, 
Wife paid around $67,000 to prevent foreclosure. 
4 Wife testified there were plumbing and flooring issues and that the appliances 
were broken. However, a woman who rented the home in November 2013, shortly 
after Husband moved out, indicated the home was in fine condition, but it needed 
cleaning and upkeep. 
5 While the record indicates neither of the mortgages were paid from June 2013 to 
February 2015, there is no indication that the second mortgage was foreclosed on. 
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Wife indicated she made multiple attempts to refinance the Home, but those 
attempts were frustrated by liens on the Home6 and the foreclosure action, for 
which she blamed Husband.  Wife executed a deed giving her new husband an 
interest in the Home.  She testified Nationstar Mortgage indicated if she made six 
months of payments, used her new husband's credit and ownership interest in the 
Home, and had her new husband co-sign for her, she would likely qualify to 
refinance the Home. 
On March 10, 2015, Husband filed a rule to show cause and motion for relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP.  Husband argued Wife was in contempt for 
failing to pay the mortgages and for failing to refinance the Home.  In the 
alternative, Husband argued under Rule 60(b)(5), it was inequitable for the Final 
Order to have prospective application concerning the ownership rights and 
obligations associated with the Home due to Wife's unilateral destruction of 
Husband's credit and Wife's failure to abide by the family court's order to resolve 
the matter in an equitable fashion.  Husband asserted ownership and possession of 
the Home should be transferred to him and Wife should be responsible for all of 
the lien judgments attached to the Home, including the Palmetto Lien. 
Alternatively, Husband contended the family court should immediately list the 
Home for sale and have the proceeds divided pursuant to the Final Order. 
The family court held hearings on the Rule 60(b)(5) motion on January 13, 2016, 
and April 6, 2016. 
In response to Husband's rule to show cause, the family court did not find Wife in 
contempt of court for her failure to pay or timely pay the mortgages or her failure 
to refinance the Home.  However, the family court granted Husband's Rule 
60(b)(5) motion, ordering that the Home be immediately listed for sale because the 
family court found "it is no longer equitable for [the Final Order], as applied to [the 
6 Wife hired someone to determine if there were any liens with joint liability 
between the parties, joint liability between Wife and Palmetto Tree, or liability 
exclusively related to Husband or Palmetto Tree.  This search found multiple liens 
against Husband, a judgment filed by the parties' neighborhood against Husband 
and Wife jointly, and the Palmetto Lien.  Testimony indicated Ford Motor 
Company had a lien against Wife, and Wife's attorney indicated there may be other 
judgments against Wife. 
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Home], [to] have prospective application . . . the circumstances have changed so 
materially and significantly between these parties that maintaining a financial 
entanglement between them creates a clearly onerous, unforeseen, and oppressive 
hardship on both parties." The family court ordered Husband and Wife to each pay 
50% of the Palmetto Lien from the proceeds of the sale of the Home. The family 
court ordered Wife to pay all of Husband's attorney's fees and costs.  
Wife filed a motion to reconsider on July 21, 2016.  The family court denied Wife's 
motion on July 27, 2016.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court reviews decisions of the family court de novo. Stoney v. 
Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) (per curiam). De novo 
review allows the appellate court to make its own findings of fact, but the appellate 
court is not required to ignore the family court's superior position to make 
credibility determinations. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384–85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 
651–52 (2011). "Consistent with this de novo review, the appellant retains the 
burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed." Ashburn 
v. Rogers, 420 S.C. 411, 416, 803 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ct. App. 2017). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP 
Wife first argues the family court erred by granting Husband's Rule 60(b)(5), 
SCRCP motion.  We agree because we find the family court did not have 
jurisdiction to modify the Final Order to require Wife to immediately sell the 
Home.7 
7 Although Wife does not specifically contest the family court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to modify the Final Order, we address this issue on appeal because 
"[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and should be taken notice 
of by [the appellate court] on its own motion." Eichor v. Eichor, 290 S.C. 484, 
487, 351 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP, provides, "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [if] it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." 
Generally, the family court has the authority to modify any order issued by the 
family court.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(25) (2010) (stating the family court 
has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or vacate any order issued by the family 
court).  However, subsection 20-3-620(C) of the South Carolina Code (2014) 
provides, "The [family] court's order as it affects distribution of marital property 
shall be a final order not subject to modification except by appeal or remand 
following proper appeal." This court has found "the law in South Carolina is 
exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the authority to modify 
court[-]ordered property divisions." Simpson v. Simpson, 404 S.C. 563, 571, 746 
S.E.2d 54, 58–59 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Green v. Green, 327 S.C. 577, 581, 491 
S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1997)); see also Roy T. Stuckey, Marital Litigation in 
South Carolina 375–77 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing exceptions to the family court's 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify an order issued by it). This court has specified "it 
is beyond the equitable powers of the family court to reopen and modify court[-] 
ordered property divisions."  Simpson, 404 S.C. at 573, 746 S.E.2d at 59; see also 
Green, 327 S.C. at 581, 491 S.E.2d at 262 (holding the family court erred by 
concluding it was within its equitable powers to reopen and modify portions of a 
property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree). However, an 
order of the family court may be modified if "jurisdiction was specifically reserved 
in the decree or if allowed by statute." Hayes v. Hayes, 312 S.C. 141, 144, 439 
S.E.2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, "[e]xcept for those matters over which a 
court retains continuing jurisdiction, terms of a final property settlement 
agreement, once approved, are binding on the parties and the court." Clark v. 
Clark, 423 SC 596, 610, 815 S.E.2d 772, 779 (Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Price v. 
Price, 325 S.C. 379, 382, 480 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
This court has found the family court has jurisdiction to reconsider an otherwise 
un-modifiable property division in order to correct clerical errors and in 
exceptional circumstances. See Clark, 423 S.C. at 608–10, 815 S.E.2d at 779–80; 
Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414–15, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); Johnson 
v. Johnson, 310 S.C. 44, 47, 425 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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In Clark, this court allowed for the modification of a court-ordered property 
division using Rule 60(a), SCRCP,8 to correct a clerical error that accounted for 
the same trailer twice in the court order approving the parties' settlement agreement 
regarding the equitable division of property. Clark, 423 S.C. at 608–10, 815 
S.E.2d at 779–80.  However, this court emphasized "[t]he family court's correction 
of clerical errors may not extend to 'chang[ing] the scope of the judgment.'" Id. at 
610, 815 S.E.2d at 779 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 
392 S.C. 615, 622, 709 S.E.2d 679, 683 (Ct. App. 2011)).  No such clerical errors 
are present in this case to establish subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Final 
Order. 
In Simmons, our supreme court found the family court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to revisit a court-approved divorce settlement agreement when the 
alimony portion of the agreement was declared void on appeal. 392 S.C. at 414– 
15, 709 S.E.2d at 667. The court recognized the parties' intended agreement 
regarding alimony was "inextricably connected to the agreed upon division of 
marital property, and vice versa" and noted in that context, "and in view of Rule 
60(b)(5), SCRCP, basic principles of equity suggest that all issues should be 
revisited by the family court." Id. at 415–16, 709 S.E.2d at 668. Such exceptional 
circumstances are not found in the instant case, as none of the provisions of the 
Final Order have been voided. Thus, we do not believe the court's use of Rule 
60(b)(5) in Simmons may be applied to the instant case. 
Husband cites Johnson9 in support of his argument that Rule 60(b)(5) may be used 
to modify an otherwise un-modifiable agreement.  However, we find the facts in 
that case are distinguishable as Johnson involved exceptional circumstances.  In 
Johnson, this Court used Rule 60(b)(5) to find that if justice so requires, the court 
may relieve a party of a final consent order if it was based on a vacated final 
consent order in a related case. Id. at 47, 425 S.E.2d at 48.  The Final Order in this 
case was the result of a single agreement that was incorporated into the Final 
Order, and it was not based on a separate order that was subsequently vacated. 
8 "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, 
as the court orders."  Rule 60(a), SCRCP. 
9 310 S.C. 44, 425 S.E.2d 46. 
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Thus, we do not believe the court's use of Rule 60(b)(5) in Johnson may be applied 
to the instant case. 
Furthermore, since Johnson, this Court has indicated "[a] family court order can be 
modified only when jurisdiction was specifically reserved in the decree or if 
allowed by statute." Hayes, 312 S.C. at 144, 439 S.E.2d at 307.  When this Court 
decided Hayes, Rule 60(b)(5) was already in effect. See Evans v. Gunter, 294 S.C. 
525, 529, 366 S.E.2d 44, 47 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding Rule 60(b)(5) is based on the 
historical power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of subsequent 
conditions).  Despite the existence of Rule 60(b)(5), this court indicated "[t]here is 
no statutory authority for modifying an order of equitable distribution." Hayes, 
312 S.C. at 144, 439 S.E.2d at 307. 
Such exceptional circumstances were not found in Green. 327 S.C. 577, 491 
S.E.2d 260.  In that case, the husband and his expert fraudulently concealed and 
withheld evidence that a building that was divided in the parties' court-approved 
property agreement needed approximately $36,500 in repairs. Id. at 578–79, 491 
S.E.2d at 261.  The family court ordered the husband to pay the wife for repairs to 
the building, finding it was within its equitable powers to adjust the value of the 
building. Id. at 579–80, 491 S.E.2d at 261–62. This court reversed the family 
court's modification, finding the family court erred in concluding it had equitable 
powers to reopen and modify the parties' agreement because "the law in South 
Carolina is exceedingly clear that the family court does not have the authority to 
modify court[-]ordered property divisions." Id. at 581, 491 S.E.2d at 262. 
In this case, there were no clerical errors to be corrected, and we find there were no 
exceptional circumstances to warrant modification of the property agreement. 
Accordingly, we reverse the family court's decision to grant Husband's 60(b)(5), 
SCRCP motion because the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
modify the Final Order.10 
10 We decline to address the family court's refusal to grant Wife another 
opportunity to refinance the home or the family court's requirement that Husband 
and Wife each pay fifty percent of the Palmetto Lien from the proceeds of the 
marital home because our decision on the foregoing issue is dispositive.  See Futch 
v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when 
the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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II. Attorney's Fees 
Wife argues the family court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Husband and not 
awarding attorney's fees to Wife.  Because we find the family court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to grant Husband's Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP motion and we 
reverse on that issue, we remand the issue of attorney's fees for reconsideration by 
the family court. See Rogers v. Rogers, 343 S.C. 329, 334, 540 S.E.2d 840, 842 
(2001) (holding that because "the beneficial result obtained by counsel is a factor 
in awarding attorney's fees, when that result is reversed on appeal, the attorney's 
fee award must also be reconsidered"). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the family court's order is 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.: Appellant H. Marshall Hoyler challenges an order of the 
Master-in-Equity denying his request pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-220 
(2008) to declare that Hoyler holds title to 95.27 acres of tidelands along the Beaufort 
River and abutting the Town of Port Royal.1 Hoyler argues that this property is 
readily identifiable from the plat incorporated into the deed to his predecessor in title 
and, therefore, the master improperly considered extrinsic evidence. Hoyler also 
argues the master erred by (1) allowing adjacent property owners to intervene in the 
action; (2) concluding the adjacent property owners had standing; (3) keeping the 
1 Section 48-39-220(A) provides, 
Any person claiming an interest in tidelands[,] which, for 
the purpose of this section, means all lands except beaches 
in the Coastal zone between the mean high-water mark and 
the mean low-water mark of navigable waters without 
regard to the degree of salinity of such waters, may 
institute an action against the State of South Carolina for 
the purpose of determining the existence of any right, title 
or interest of such person in and to such tidelands as 
against the State. 
(emphases added). The statute was amended in 2014, after Hoyler filed this action 
in November 2007, to reflect a change in the entity to receive service of process. 
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record open to allow Respondent Merry Land Properties, LLC (Merry Land) to 
submit additional testimony; and (4) declining to hear post-trial motions in a timely 
manner.  We affirm.2 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2006, Merry Land purchased two tracts of land in the Town of Port Royal 
for the purpose of constructing a mixed-use development, including condominiums, 
with deep water access to the Beaufort River. One of the tracts consists of eight 
acres with access to the Beaufort River via tidelands within which Hoyler claims 
ownership of 95.27 acres (the disputed marsh).3 Merry Land paid $4.5 million for 
2 We decline to address Merry Land's additional sustaining ground. See I'On, L.L.C. 
v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("It is within 
the appellate court's discretion whether to address any additional sustaining 
grounds.").  
3 The statute authorizing this action, section 48-39-220, is a part of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, Title 48, Chapter 39 of the South Carolina Code (2008 & Supp. 
2018). We interpret the provisions of the Act to mean that "marshes" are a subset of 
"tidelands," which are generally defined in the Act at S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10(G) 
(Supp. 2018) but are also given a distinct definition for purposes of section 
48-39-220.  The general definition of tidelands in § 48-39-10(G) is, in pertinent part: 
all areas which are at or below mean high tide and coastal 
wetlands, mudflats, and similar areas that are contiguous 
or adjacent to coastal waters and are an integral part of the 
estuarine systems involved. Coastal wetlands include 
marshes, mudflats, and shallows and means those areas 
periodically inundated by saline waters whether or not the 
saline waters reach the area naturally or through artificial 
water courses and those areas that are normally 
characterized by the prevalence of saline water vegetation 
capable of growth and reproduction. Provided, however, 
nothing in this definition shall apply to wetland areas that 
are not an integral part of an estuarine system. 
(emphases added).  The distinct definition of tidelands for purposes of section 
48-39-220 is:  "all lands except beaches in the Coastal zone between the mean 
high-water mark and the mean low-water mark of navigable waters without regard 
to the degree of salinity of such waters." (emphasis added). 
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this tract.  The other tract, for which Merry Land paid $1.5 million, consists of 10 
acres and borders Johnny Morrall Circle and Ribaut Road.  Prior to closing on the 
purchase of these tracts, Merry Land obtained state and federal permits authorizing 
construction of a community marina.  
After Merry Land closed on the purchase of these tracts, it refinanced the loan 
secured by the property.  During the refinancing process, the appraiser employed by 
Merry Land's lender discovered a notation in the Beaufort County GIS System 
indicating a tax parcel in the marsh where Merry Land planned to launch the marina.4 
As a result, Merry Land sent a letter to Hoyler, a Rhode Island resident, offering to 
purchase this property. Rather than accepting the offer, Hoyler filed this action on 
November 8, 2007, against Respondent State of South Carolina to obtain a 
declaration that he owned the disputed marsh. 
In his complaint, Hoyler asserted the existence of an 1891 deed to his 
predecessor in title, J.M. Crofut, from former Governor Benjamin R. Tillman for 
95.27 acres of marshland located on the Beaufort River.  The complaint also asserted 
that the deed was accompanied by a plat depicting a tract "bounded on the South by 
lands of Moss, on the West by miscellaneous individuals, on the North by Seal Island 
Chemical Works[,] and on the East by the Beaufort River." An heir of Crofut, 
Elizabeth Waterhouse, devised a share of her putative interest in the property to 
Hoyler in 1968, and in 1979, the remaining heirs conveyed their respective putative 
interests to Hoyler for $10.  
In its answer to the complaint, the State asserted that it held prima facie title 
to the disputed marsh in trust for the public and Hoyler lacked the power to exclude 
the public from the marsh.  Merry Land filed a motion to intervene in this action as 
well as an "Answer and Counterclaim" asserting that Hoyler was barred from 
preventing construction of the planned marina by the doctrines of estoppel and 
laches. On February 22, 2008, the master, with the consent of counsel for all parties, 
executed an order granting Merry Land's motion to intervene.5 
The master conducted a hearing on January 31, 2011, in which he denied 
Hoyler's subsequent and contrarian motion to dismiss Merry Land from this action 
and ruled, sua sponte, that several additional owners of property adjacent to the 
4 Beaufort County assigned a market value of $1,000 to this parcel. 
5 Curiously, the order referring this action to the master was not executed until 
September 13, 2010. 
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disputed marsh would be joined as defendants.6 In his written order, the master 
concluded the adjacent property owners were being joined pursuant to Rule 20(a), 
SCRCP,7 because they could lose their right of access to the Beaufort River upon a 
declaration that Hoyler held title to the disputed marsh. Hoyler filed a motion for 
reconsideration and a Notice of Appeal.  The motion for reconsideration remained 
unresolved until after this court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and our 
supreme court denied certiorari.  On remand, the master denied Hoyler's motion for 
reconsideration and granted a motion to intervene filed by Nancy Deering Carey. 
Hoyler appealed these rulings, and this court also dismissed the appeal as 
interlocutory. 
Subsequently, Hoyler served all of the adjoining property owners with notice 
of this action, and the master conducted a hearing on November 19, 2015. The 
master allowed the record to stay open for 45 days after the hearing to allow Merry 
Land to obtain the deposition testimony of a surveyor who had worked with Merry 
Land's civil engineering expert.  After the master reviewed this deposition testimony, 
he sent an e-mail to counsel for the parties requesting a proposed order from counsel 
for Respondents.  In response, Hoyler filed a motion challenging the findings in the 
master's e-mail pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP.  The master denied this motion in a 
Form 4 order. 
On May 27, 2016, the master issued a written order concluding that the 
conveyance to Crofut was a valid exercise of the State's authority under the law as it 
6 The disputed marsh is contiguous to the Spanish Point subdivision in Port Royal. 
7 Rule 20(a) states, in pertinent part, 
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if 
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out 
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or 
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A 
plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining 
or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment 
may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according 
to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more 
defendants according to their respective liabilities. 
(emphasis added). 
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existed at the time of the conveyance but the property could not be accurately located 
and, therefore, Hoyler was not entitled to a declaration that he held title to the 
disputed marsh. On June 19, 2016, Hoyler filed a second Rule 59(e) motion in 
response to the written order, and the master denied this motion. This appeal 
followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the master err by concluding Hoyler was not entitled to a declaration that 
he held title to 95.27 acres of marshland as against the State? 
2. Did the master err by allowing adjacent property owners to intervene in this 
action? 
3. Did the master err by concluding the adjacent property owners had standing? 
4. Did the master abuse his discretion by keeping the record open to allow Merry 
Land to submit additional testimony? 
5. Did the master err by declining to hear post-trial motions in a timely manner? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Declaratory Judgment 
"A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable, but is 
determined by the nature of the underlying issue." Query v. Burgess, 371 S.C. 407, 
410, 639 S.E.2d 455, 456 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Felts v. Richland Cty., 303 S.C. 
354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991)).  "To make this determination [the appellate 
court] look[s] to the main purpose of the action as determined by the complaint." Id. 
(quoting Estate of Revis v. Revis, 326 S.C. 470, 476, 484 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ct. App. 
1997)). When the complaint's main purpose "concerns the determination of title to 
real property, it is an action at law."  Id. 
"In an action at law, '[the appellate court] will affirm the master's factual 
findings if there is any evidence in the record [that] reasonably supports them.'" Id. 
(quoting Lowcountry Open Land Tr. v. State, 347 S.C. 96, 101–02, 552 S.E.2d 778, 
781 (Ct. App. 2001)). Further, "[the appellate c]ourt reviews all questions of law de 
novo." Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 302, 683 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2009); 
see also Clardy v. Bodolosky, 383 S.C. 418, 425, 679 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Ct. App. 
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2009) ("Questions of law may be decided with no particular deference to the trial 
court." (quoting S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. M & T Enters. of Mt. Pleasant, LLC, 379 
S.C. 645, 654, 667 S.E.2d 7, 12 (Ct. App. 2008))). 
Deed Interpretation 
"In construing a deed, 'the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and 
effectuated, unless that intention contravenes some well settled rule of law or public 
policy.'" Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2009) 
(quoting Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41, 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977)). "In 
determining the grantor's intent, the deed must be construed as a whole and effect 
given to every part if it can be done consistently with the law." Id. at 201, 672 S.E.2d 
at 583 (quoting Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 25, 358 S.E.2d 390, 391–92 
(1987)). "The intention of the grantor must be found within the four corners of the 
deed." Id. (quoting Gardner, 293 S.C. at 25, 358 S.E.2d at 392). 
However, "[w]here a deed describes land as it is shown on a certain plat, such 
plat becomes part of the deed for the purpose of showing the boundaries, metes, 
courses[,] and distances of the property conveyed."  Hobonny Club, Inc. v. 
McEachern, 272 S.C. 392, 397, 252 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1979). "[B]oundaries govern 
acreage and inaccuracies relating to the area of a tract are generally immaterial." 
Brownlee v. Miller, 208 S.C. 252, 260, 37 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1946).  Further, "[i]f this 
[c]ourt decides that the language in a deed is ambiguous, the determination of the 
grantor's intent then becomes a question of fact" and evidence may be admitted to 
show the intent of the parties. Santoro v. Schulthess, 384 S.C. 250, 272, 681 S.E.2d 
897, 908 (Ct. App. 2009); see also S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 
345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 303 (2001) (applying rules of contract 
construction to a restrictive covenant in a deed); id. at 623, 302–03 ("A contract is 
ambiguous when the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible of more than 
one interpretation. It is a question of law for the court whether the language of a 
contract is ambiguous. Once the court decides the language is ambiguous, evidence 
may be admitted to show the intent of the parties.  The determination of the parties' 
intent is then a question of fact." (citations omitted)). 
Moreover, "[a] deed or grant by [the State] is construed strictly in favor of the 
State and general public and against the grantee." Query, 371 S.C. at 411, 639 S.E.2d 
at 456–57 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 
539, 193 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1972)); accord Estate of Tenney v. S.C. Dep't of Health 
& Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 100, 106, 712 S.E.2d 395, 398 (2011) ("In areas subject 
to the public trust doctrine, presumption of State ownership 'may be overcome only 
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by showing a specific grant from the sovereign[,] which is strictly construed against 
the grantee.'" (quoting McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149 n.6, 580 
S.E.2d 116, 119 n.6 (2003))); Grant v. State, 395 S.C. 225, 229, 717 S.E.2d 96, 98 
(Ct. App. 2011). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Determination of Title 
Hoyler argues that the 95.27 acres is readily identifiable from the plat 
incorporated into the deed to Crofut and, therefore, the master improperly considered 
extrinsic evidence. On the other hand, Merry Land contends the intent underlying 
the deed's incorporation of the plat was to show the boundaries, metes, courses, and 
distances of the property conveyed but the plat's information was insufficient to 
identify those features.  Likewise, the State maintains the plat provided insufficient 
guidance.  We agree with Merry Land and the State. 
We begin our analysis with the foundation on which the determination of 
property rights in tidelands rests, South Carolina's public trust doctrine. The public 
trust doctrine provides that lands below the high water mark are presumptively 
owned by the State and held in trust for the benefit of the public, and it has been a 
vital part of the jurisprudence of South Carolina and many other states for centuries, 
even pre-dating the beginning of our republic.8 The doctrine rightfully forbids the 
State from permitting activity substantially impairing the public interest in marine 
life, water quality, or public access.9 
The underlying premise of the Public Trust Doctrine is that 
some things are considered too important to society to be 
owned by one person. Traditionally, these things have 
included natural resources such as air, water (including 
waterborne activities such as navigation and fishing), and 
8 See McQueen, 354 S.C. at 149–50, 580 S.E.2d at 119–20; Grant, 395 S.C. at 230– 
31, 717 S.E.2d at 99–100; Query, 371 S.C. at 410–11, 639 S.E.2d at 456; see also 
State v. Pac. Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 55–56 (1884); Commonwealth v. City of 
Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451, 478–79 (1857); Melissa K. Scanlan, Shifting Sands: A 
Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private Property Along the Coast, 65 S.C. L. 
Rev. 295, 307–13 (2013); William A. Clineburg and John E. Krahmer, The Law 
Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South Carolina, 23 S.C. L. Rev. 7, 10–24 (1971). 
9 McQueen, 354 S.C. at 149–50, 580 S.E.2d at 119–20. 
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land (including but not limited to seabed and riverbed 
soils). Under this Doctrine, everyone has the inalienable 
right to breathe clean air; to drink safe water; to fish and 
sail, and recreate upon the high seas, territorial seas and 
navigable waters; as well as to land on the seashores and 
riverbanks. 
Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 127–28, 456 S.E.2d 397, 402 
(1995) (quoting Greg L. Spyridon and Sam A. LeBlanc, III, The Overriding Public 
Interest in Privately Owned Natural Resources: Fashioning a Cause of Action, 6 
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 287, 291 (1993)). In more recent years, our supreme court captured 
the essence of the doctrine as it applies to tidelands:  "Our State's tidelands are a 
precious public resource held in trust for the people of South Carolina."10 
It is through this lens that we examine the claim of a private individual to an 
ownership interest in tidelands, an interest that would allow him to exclude the 
public.  Because the law, as a zealous guardian of the public interest, bestows 
presumptive ownership of tidelands on the State for the benefit of the public, any 
deed from the State purporting to convey tidelands to a private individual must be 
strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the public.11 In State v. Pacific 
Guano Company, our supreme court explained, 
In all grants from the government to the subject, the terms 
of the grant are to be taken most strongly against the 
grantee, and in favor of the grantor, reversing the rule as 
between individuals, on the ground that the grant is 
supposed to be made at the solicitation of the grantee, and 
the form and terms of the particular instrument of grant 
proposed by him and submitted to the government for its 
allowance. But this rule applies a fortiori to a case where 
such grant by a government to individual proprietors is 
claimed to be not merely a conveyance of title to land[] 
10 Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 
22, 766 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2014). 
11 Query, 371 S.C. at 411, 639 S.E.2d at 456–57; accord Estate of Tenney, 393 S.C. 
at 106, 712 S.E.2d at 398 ("In areas subject to the public trust doctrine, presumption 
of State ownership 'may be overcome only by showing a specific grant from the 
sovereign[,] which is strictly construed against the grantee.'" (quoting McQueen, 354 
S.C. at 149 n.6, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.6)); Grant, 395 S.C. at 229, 717 S.E.2d at 98. 
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but also a portion of that public domain [that] the 
government held in a fiduciary relation[] for general and 
public use. 
22 S.C. 50, 86 (1884). 
For this reason, "the party asserting a transfer of title bears the burden of 
proving its own good title,"12 and one claiming an interest in tidelands pursuant to 
section 48-39-220(A) must convince the court that the State intended to include the 
tidelands within the boundaries expressed in the deed.13 Necessarily, the claimant 
must show that the language of the conveyance is specific enough to determine a 
reasonably precise location of its boundaries so that members of the public will not 
be excluded from property rightfully belonging to them.14 
In Query v. Burgess, this court affirmed the master's finding that the plat 
accompanying a 1786 deed to the disputed property near the Folly River was "not 
sufficiently detailed to rebut the State's presumption of title to land below the high 
water mark."  371 S.C. at 412, 639 S.E.2d at 457.  The court noted that the plat 
"contain[ed] the bare bones of a survey and [was] neither precise nor detailed."  Id. 
The court also concluded that the master "reasonably determined the 1786 grant and 
accompanying plat did not demonstrate the State's intent to grant title to the 
marshlands" based on "the absence of terms consonant with granting property below 
the high water mark, such as 'marsh,' 'marshland,' 'high-water mark,' or 'low-water 
mark.'" Id. 
12 Lowcountry, 347 S.C. at 103, 552 S.E.2d at 782; see also State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 
748, 752, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1979) ("[I]t is well settled that the State comes into 
court with a presumption of title, and, if an individual is to prevail, he must recover 
upon the strength of his own title, of which he must make proof." (emphasis added)). 
13 See Hobonny Club, 272 S.C. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 136–37; Query, 371 S.C. at 
411, 639 S.E.2d at 456 ("To establish ownership of tidelands or marshlands, a 
claimant must show (1) the claimant's predecessors in title possessed a valid grant, 
and (2) the grant's language was sufficient to convey title to land below the high 
water mark."). 
14 See Hobonny Club, 272 S.C. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 136–37; Grant, 395 S.C. at 
235–36, 717 S.E.2d at 102 (contrasting the plat to the disputed property with the 
precise plats in Hobonny Club and highlighting expert testimony stating that the plat 
was "poorly drawn and not capable of being relocated on the ground"); Query, 371 
S.C. at 411–12, 639 S.E.2d at 456–57. 
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In contrast, in Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, our supreme court upheld 
the circuit court's conclusion that the plaintiff had valid title to certain tidelands 
"embraced within the boundaries of the plats attached to the royal grants . . . ." 272 
S.C. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 137. The court observed, "the failure of the grantor to use 
'low water line' in describing the property conveyed was not significant in that the 
attached plats precisely showed the boundaries of the land granted without the 
necessity of resorting to words."  Id. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 136.  The court added, 
[T]he plats in question speak with a precision not usually 
attainable by mere words, and they compel the conclusion 
that the grantor intended to include the tidelands 
encompassed within the perimeters of the plats. It is 
difficult to imagine how more precisely to express intent 
as to the location of boundaries than to incorporate an 
accurate plat in the description. The plats incorporated in 
the two grants to [the plaintiff's predecessor in title] are 
exceptional. They are not mere maps on which boundary 
waterways are drawn in free-hand to represent directions 
and conformations of boundaries. These plats are 
carefully scaled and platted so as to delineate the 
boundaries of the tracts granted with mathematical 
precision. It is undisputed that the boundaries are 
accurately relocatable on the ground by contemporary 
engineering methods. The specificity of the attached plats 
outweigh, in our judgment, the general terms of the 
descriptions in the grants in determining the intent of the 
grantor. We conclude that it was the clear intent of the 
grants in question to convey title to all tidelands lying 
within the perimeter lines of the plats accompanying the 
grants to [the plaintiff's] predecessor in title[]. 
Id. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 136–37 (emphases added); see also Brownlee, 208 S.C. at 
261, 37 S.E.2d at 662 (affirming the trial court's order dismissing a petition to set 
aside a judicial sale and adopting the language of the order, which relied, in part, on 
the sufficiency of the property description "to enable a person of ordinary prudence 
acting in good faith and making inquiries suggested by the description to enable him 
to identify the land"); id. at 260, 37 S.E.2d at 661 ("[B]oundaries govern acreage and 
inaccuracies relating to the area of a tract are generally immaterial."). 
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In Grant v. State, this court once again addressed the plat examined in Query 
and specifically noted that "in contrast to the plats in Hobonny Club, Grant's expert 
land surveyor . . . testified the 1786 plat is poorly drawn and not capable of being 
relocated on the ground."  395 S.C. at 236, 717 S.E.2d at 102 (emphasis added). 
The court concluded that the claimant failed to rebut the State's presumptive title, 
implicitly acknowledging the claimant's obligation to show the language of the 
conveyance is specific enough to determine a reasonably precise location of its 
boundaries. Id. at 236, 717 S.E.2d at 102. 
While a property description need not be perfect, it must allow one examining 
it to identify the property conveyed; otherwise, the conveyance is void. See Blake 
v. Doherty, 18 U.S. 359, 362 (1820) ("It is undoubtedly essential to the validity of a 
grant, that there should be a thing granted, which must be so described as to be 
capable of being distinguished from other things of the same kind." (emphasis 
added)). 
"A deed is not void for uncertainty, because there may be 
errors or an inconsistency, in some of the 
particulars. . . . Generally the rule may be stated to be, 
that the deed will be sustained, if it is possible from the 
whole description, to ascertain and identify the land 
intended to be conveyed." In a note to that section it is 
said: "As that is certain which can be made certain, the 
description, if it will enable a person of ordinary prudence 
acting in good faith and making inquiries, which the 
description would suggest to him to identify the land, is 
sufficient." 
Brownlee, 208 S.C. at 261, 37 S.E.2d at 662 (emphases added) (alteration in original) 
(quoting McNair v. Johnson, 95 S.C. 176, 179, 178 S.E. 892 (1913)); see also Lord 
v. Holland, 655 S.E.2d 602, 603–04 (Ga. 2008) ("One essential of a deed is that the 
description of the premises sought to be thereby conveyed must be sufficiently full 
and definite to afford means of identification." (quoting Crawford v. Verner, 50 S.E. 
958, 959 (Ga. 1905)); Katz v. Daughtrey, 151 S.E. 879, 880 (N.C. 1930) ("If the land 
intended to be conveyed cannot be identified from the description contained in the 
deed, it follows as a necessary corollary that as the deed is, for this reason, 
inoperative, it is equally inoperative as color of title.").  
In identifying the land intended to be conveyed, it is permissible to rely on 
extrinsic evidence if it is necessary to clarify a property description. See Blake, 18 
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U.S. at 362 ("[I]t is not necessary that the grant itself should contain such a 
description as, without the aid of extrinsic testimony, to ascertain precisely what is 
conveyed." (emphasis added)); Lord, 655 S.E.2d at 604 ("While it is not necessary 
that the instrument should embody a minute or perfectly accurate description of the 
land, yet it must furnish the key to the identification of the land intended to be 
conveyed by the grantor." (quoting Crawford, 50 S.E. at 959)). However, if it is 
impossible to locate a key identifier referenced in the deed, the grant is void. Blake, 
18 U.S. at 362–63.  In Blake, the plaintiff, who claimed title to certain land through 
a grant from the State of Tennessee, filed an ejectment action against the defendants, 
who claimed the land under a patent from the State of North Carolina. Id. at 360. 
The property description in the North Carolina patent designated a hickory tree as 
the beginning of a survey. Id. Using the hickory to illustrate the degree of certainty 
required in a property description, the Court explained, 
Almost all grants of land call for natural objects which 
must be proved by testimony consistent with the grant, but 
not found in it. Cane Creek, and its wes[t] fork, are to be 
proved by witnesses. So the hiccory which is to constitute 
the beginning of a survey of a tract of land to lie on the 
west fork of Cane Creek. If, in the nature of things, it be 
impossible to find this hiccory, all will admit the grant 
must be void. But if it is not impossible, if we can imagine 
testimony which will show any particular hiccory to be 
that which is called for in the grant, then it is not absolutely 
void for uncertainty, whatever difficulty may attend the 
location of it. 
Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Governor's deed to Hoyler's predecessor in title, J.M. Crofut, 
employed the terms high water mark and low water mark, but it also incorporated 
the 1891 plat in conveying "A Plantation or Tract of Vacant Land, situate in Beaufort 
[illegible] of Beaufort County and State aforesaid containing ninety-five [and] 
27/100 (95 27/100) acres, more or less, [b]eing a parcel or tract of land on the 
Beaufort River in County and State aforesaid and lying between high and low water 
mark[s] on [the] river above mentioned[,] having such shape, form[,] and marks as 
are represented by a Plat of said land on file in the office of the Secretary of State in 
Book 2 of Public Land Plats, Page 16." (emphasis added).15 See Hobonny Club, 272 
15 The State reserved mineral and phosphate rights to itself. 
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S.C. at 397, 252 S.E.2d at 136 ("Where a deed describes land as it is shown on a 
certain plat, such plat becomes part of the deed for the purpose of showing the 
boundaries, metes, courses[,] and distances of the property conveyed."). The 
incorporated plat designates specific bearings and distances, some of which are 
illegible, for the boundary lines. 
The plat's illegibility effectively made the deed ambiguous as to the precise 
location of the 95.27 acres in dispute. Therefore, the master properly considered 
extrinsic evidence. See Santoro, 384 S.C. at 272, 681 S.E.2d at 908 ("If this [c]ourt 
decides that the language in a deed is ambiguous, the determination of the grantor's 
intent then becomes a question of fact."); see also McClellanville, 345 S.C. at 623, 
550 S.E.2d at 303 (applying rules of contract construction to a restrictive covenant 
in a deed); id. at 623, 302–03 ("A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the 
contract are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. It is a question 
of law for the court whether the language of a contract is ambiguous. Once the court 
decides the language is ambiguous, evidence may be admitted to show the intent of 
the parties.  The determination of the parties' intent is then a question of fact." 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
This extrinsic evidence consisted of expert testimony presented at the final 
merits hearing.  First, Hoyler presented the testimony of his expert in land surveying, 
Lorick Fanning, who provided his opinion regarding identification of the area 
referenced in the deed to Crofut.  Fanning recreated the boundaries of the parcel, 
relying on field work as well as an 1882 plat that purportedly encompassed the parcel 
conveyed to Crofut.  He established the eastern and western boundaries of the parcel 
by using the current location of the mean high water and mean low water marks. 
Merry Land's land surveying expert, Donald Cook, testified that he examined 
the 1882 plat and the 1891 plat and noticed the absence of a "scale" and a "point of 
beginning" or "point of commencement." Cf. Lord, 655 S.E.2d at 604 ("The 
description set forth in plaintiff's deed did not include a beginning point or other 
specifications enabling one to definitively locate the property to be conveyed. It 
follows that plaintiff's deed was invalid . . . ." (citations omitted)); Katz, 151 S.E. at 
880 (holding that a deed purporting to convey twenty-five acres of a fifty-acre tract 
"without fixing the beginning point or any of the boundaries of the twenty-five acres" 
was void for vagueness and uncertainty of description because it failed to describe 
with certainty the property sought to be conveyed, and it contained no reference to 
"anything extrinsic, which by recourse thereto [wa]s capable of making the 
description certain"). Cook explained, "without a point of beginning[,] you 
have . . . no point to start to locate the parcel on the ground. Without a scale[,] you 
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can't . . . tell . . . what measurement of units they were using. So, therefore, scaling 
it, you don't know really how big the parcel is or potentially how big it is." See 
Brownlee, 208 S.C. at 260, 37 S.E.2d at 661 (holding that boundaries govern 
acreage); cf. Hobonny Club, 272 S.C. at 394, 252 S.E.2d at 134 (noting the plat 
annexed to the deed was drawn to a scale of one inch to twenty chains); State v. 
Holston Land Co., 272 S.C. 65, 67, 248 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1978) (same). 
Merry Land also presented the deposition testimony of a second surveyor, Jim 
Gardner.  Gardner analyzed the 1882 and 1891 plats with the assistance of a 
computer assisted drafting (CAD) technician in entering the plats' bearings and 
distances into the CAD program.  He concluded the bearings and distances that they 
could discern had shortcomings creating a degree of uncertainty exceeding the 
allowed tolerance for error, and there were certain bearings and distances that were 
illegible.  In particular, Gardner explained one of the standards for professional 
surveyors that requires "mathematical closure of surveys," i.e., making the boundary 
lines "come back together," and described the tolerance for error in the following 
manner:  "anything less than a 1-to-10,000 closure should be dismissed." 
Gardner also explained, "if you have a break in the survey, it's not going to 
close mathematically to any effect, which means . . . it's kind of floating out there." 
He continued, 
the plat not closing, not coming back together, in other 
words, if you started at a point, you're supposed to come 
around and end at the starting point.  This survey, if it 
didn't do that, then everything could be shifted one way or 
the other.  And you wouldn't know where these corners 
were, truly, without . . . other surveys specifying adjoining 
corners or adjacent boundaries. 
Cook's testimony concerning the failure to close was consistent with Gardner's 
testimony:  "It means that the points are just kind of hanging out there in space." As 
to the intent of the surveyor who created the 1882 and 1891 plats, Gardner stated 
that the absence of the terms "mean high water" or "mean low water" indicated that 
the surveyor's intent was to designate the acreage by bearings and distances on the 
plat.  
In reaching his determination that the property could not be accurately located, 
the master concluded that Hoyler's "efforts to recreate the 1882 plat and the 
conveyance to Crofut [were] unreliable."  Whereas Hoyler relied on natural 
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monuments "utilizing mean high and mean low water to reflect high and low water 
as stated in the [deed]," the plats did not "rely on natural monuments and instead 
articulate[d] specific directions in express bearings and distances."  The master 
found that the deed's "express reference to the 1891 plat" and the plat's specificity 
overrode the use of mean high water and mean low water to fix the location of 
Hoyler's property. 
The master also concluded, "Since the plat references a surveyed boundary, 
replication of the plat should, in the first instance, be based on the surveyed boundary 
instead of a natural boundary."  The master noted that Fanning erred in replicating 
the 1891 plat "by relying on 'Mean High Water' and 'Mean Low Water' when the 
[deed] only refer[red] to 'high' and 'low' water" and did not identify high and low 
water as the parcel's boundaries. We agree with the master's assessment of Fanning's 
testimony as having negligible probative value because he did not use the plat's 
bearings and distances for all of the boundary lines—rather, he "relied on [the] mean 
high and mean low water mark[s] for the eastern and western boundaries[] and 
extrapolated the north-westerly property corner." See Fletcher v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 
390 S.C. 458, 463, 702 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The probative value of 
expert testimony stands or falls upon an evidentiary showing of the facts upon which 
the opinion is, or must logically be, predicated." (quoting Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 
547, 563, 351 S.E.2d 867, 876 (Ct. App. 1986))); see also Blake, 18 U.S. at 364, 367 
(reversing a judgment for the defendants on the ground that the trial court improperly 
instructed the jurors they could use a private survey "made by direction of a party 
interested under the grant" for the purpose of "ascertaining the land contained in the 
grant under which the defendants claimed"). 
We consider all of this evidence within the confines of a narrow scope of 
review, an obligation to defer to the fact finder's assessment of witness credibility, 
and longstanding precedent requiring construction of the State's purported 
conveyance of tidelands against the grantee. Query, 371 S.C. at 411, 639 S.E.2d at 
456–57 ("A deed or grant by [the State] is construed strictly in favor of the State and 
general public and against the grantee." (quoting Hardee, 259 S.C. at 539, 193 
S.E.2d at 499)); see also Lollis v. Dutton, 421 S.C. 467, 483, 807 S.E.2d 723, 731 
(Ct. App. 2017) ("[T]he credibility of testimony is a matter for the finder of fact to 
judge." (quoting S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Forrester, 282 S.C. 512, 516, 320 S.E.2d 
39, 42 (Ct. App. 1984)); id. ("In a bench trial, the judge, as the finder of fact, may 
believe all, some, or none of the testimony, even when it is not contradicted."); id. 
("Because the appellate court lacks the opportunity for direct observation of the 
witnesses, it should accord great deference to [circuit] court findings where matters 
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of credibility are involved." (alteration in original) (quoting Forrester, 282 S.C. at 
516, 320 S.E.2d at 42)). 
We cannot ignore the testimony of Donald Cook and Jim Gardner supporting 
the master's finding that the deed to Crofut and the 1891 plat it incorporated were 
insufficient to convey title to a defined location of marsh bordering the Beaufort 
River. See Blake, 18 U.S. at 362 ("It is undoubtedly essential to the validity of a 
grant, that there should be a thing granted, which must be so described as to be 
capable of being distinguished from other things of the same kind." (emphasis 
added)); Brownlee, 208 S.C. at 261, 37 S.E.2d at 662 (holding a deed will be 
sustained if "it is possible from the whole description, to ascertain and identify the 
land intended to be conveyed"); cf. id. (noting that the surveyors in that case had no 
trouble in locating the land). 
Therefore, we are compelled to affirm the master's finding. See Query, 371 
S.C. at 410, 639 S.E.2d at 456 ("In an action at law, '[the appellate court] will affirm 
the master's factual findings if there is any evidence in the record [that] reasonably 
supports them.'" (quoting Lowcountry, 347 S.C. at 101–02, 552 S.E.2d at 781)). 
II. Intervention and Joinder 
Hoyler also argues the master erred by allowing Merry Land and the other 
adjacent property owners to "intervene in the action" because they did not claim an 
interest in tidelands, their boundary lines would not change as a result of the action, 
and therefore, they had no interest in the outcome. Hoyler maintains that section 
48-39-220 allows the participation of only those parties "claiming a 'right, title[,] or 
interest' below the high-water mark." We disagree with this reasoning. 
Rule 24, SCRCP, states, in pertinent part, 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application 
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction [that] is the subject of the action 
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
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(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or 
(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In 
exercising its discretion[,] the court shall consider whether 
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
(emphases added). 
Here, the master executed a consent order allowing Merry Land to intervene 
in this action. The consent order does not reference Rule 24, and the motion to 
intervene, which was served with Merry Land's answer and counterclaim, is not in 
the record. The order states, in pertinent part, "this [c]ourt was advised that 
[Hoyler] . . . [does] not object to intervention but reserve[s] any claims and defenses 
that [he] may have as to [Merry Land]." Subsequently, Hoyler sought to dismiss 
Merry Land from the action on the ground that it did not have standing. The master 
denied this motion. 
As to the other adjacent property owners, the master, sua sponte, invoked Rule 
20(a) to join them as defendants because they could lose their right of access to the 
Beaufort River upon a declaration that Hoyler held title to the disputed marsh. As 
we previously stated, Rule 20(a), entitled "Permissive Joinder," provides, in 
pertinent part, 
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if 
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out 
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or 
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A 
plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining 
or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment 
may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according 
to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more 
defendants according to their respective liabilities. 
(emphases added). 
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Here, Hoyler's complaint references the dock construction permit obtained by 
one of the adjacent property owners.  The complaint seeks not only a declaration that 
Hoyler owns the disputed marsh but also a declaration that he "possesses all rights 
of a fee simple property owner[,] including the right to exclude dock construction." 
(emphasis added). This language asserts a right to relief arising out of the 
then-existing and possible future dock construction by adjacent property owners. 
Further, the legal question of ownership of the disputed marsh was a question that 
was common to all of the defendants.  Hoyler's complaint called into question not 
only the State's competing claim of ownership but also the rights of adjacent property 
owners to use the marsh to access the Beaufort River and their eligibility to build 
docks originating from their respective lots and extending into the disputed marsh.16 
If the master had granted Hoyler's request for a declaration that he had the right to 
exclude dock construction, the rights of the joined parties to access the river or to 
build in the disputed marsh would have been extinguished. Therefore, the master 
properly joined the adjacent property owners as defendants in this action. 
Turning back to Merry Land's participation in this action, the master was 
authorized to allow intervention under Rule 24(b),17 which states, 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the 
main action have a question of law or fact in common. 
. . . In exercising its discretion[,] the court shall 
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original 
parties. 
(emphases added). This standard is similar to the standard for permissive joinder 
under Rule 20(a), and Merry Land is similarly situated to the other adjacent property 
16 Included in the master's list of thirty-two adjacent property owners is one owner 
who was ineligible to build a dock due to insufficient frontage. Eight neighboring 
owners were listed as eligible for a community dock, and the remaining adjacent 
owners had sufficient frontage for singular docks.  
17 Hoyler argues none of the adjacent property owners could intervene under Rule 
24(a), which governs mandatory intervention.  However, there is nothing in the 
record indicating the master or Merry Land invoked Rule 24(a) in support of 
intervention.  Because the master was authorized to allow permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b), we need not consider Hoyler's arguments concerning Rule 24(a). 
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owners.  Merry Land has already obtained a permit to build a community marina in 
the disputed marsh. Because the permit depends on the State's ownership of the 
disputed marsh, a declaration favoring Hoyler's ownership would extinguish Merry 
Land's right to build the marina or otherwise access the Beaufort River. As a result, 
Merry Land asserted that the doctrines of estoppel and laches barred Hoyler from 
excluding marina construction in the marsh.  Therefore, the legal question of 
ownership of the disputed marsh was common to both Hoyler's action and Merry 
Land's assertions. 
Further, Merry Land's intervention has not caused any undue delay or unfairly 
prejudiced the master's determination of the merits of Hoyler's claim to ownership. 
Hoyler himself unnecessarily delayed the case by seeking review of two 
unappealable interlocutory orders.  Moreover, the master's decision to hold the 
record open for 45 days to allow Merry Land to obtain deposition testimony caused 
only minimal delay. Additionally, the inadequacy of the information in the deed and 
plat provided to Hoyler's predecessor in title would have defeated Hoyler's 
ownership claim even if Merry Land had not intervened in the action. 
Based on the foregoing, the master properly denied Hoyler's motion to dismiss 
Merry Land from the action. 
III. Standing 
Hoyler further argues the master erred by allowing the joined parties to 
continue to participate in the trial because they lacked standing. We disagree. 
"Standing refers to [] '[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial 
enforcement of a duty or right.'" Powell ex rel. Kelley v. Bank of Am., 379 S.C. 437, 
444, 665 S.E.2d 237, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed. 1999)). "Standing is . . . that concept of 
justiciability that is concerned with whether a particular person may raise legal 
arguments or claims." Id. (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 101 (2005)). "It concerns an 
individual's 'sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to warrant 
consideration of [the person's] position by a court.'" Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions § 101 (2005)). 
Standing consists of the following elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'— 
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 
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concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'. Second, there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] 
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court." Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to 
merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a 
favorable decision.' 
Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 
601, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); accord Carnival Corp. v. Historic 
Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 407 S.C. 67, 75, 753 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2014). 
Here, Merry Land's asserted injury-in-fact is its inability to move forward 
with its development plans despite its considerable investment of time and money to 
(1) ensure the property it ultimately purchased could support a mixed-use 
development and marina; (2) obtain government approvals for construction of the 
development; and (3) obtain federal and state permits for marina construction. In 
fact, Merry Land delayed closing its purchase of the property until it obtained the 
permits authorizing marina construction due to its cognizance of the value the real 
estate market places on deep water access. This injury is clearly "concrete and 
particularized" and "actual," rather than "conjectural" or "hypothetical."  See Sea 
Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 (setting forth the first element of standing). 
With title to the disputed marsh brought into doubt by Hoyler's filing of this 
action, Merry Land's development project has remained in limbo, preventing Merry 
Land from realizing any return on its investment. See id. (describing the second 
element of standing as a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of"). A decision favoring Hoyler would effectively void the marina 
permit and result in Merry Land's loss of access over the disputed marsh to the river. 
The State would no longer have the authority to manage these tidelands for public 
use or to permit adjacent property owners to build docks in these tidelands. Further, 
there is no realistic expectation that Hoyler would give Merry Land permission to 
build in the disputed tidelands given his request for a declaration that he can exclude 
dock construction. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-2(I)(4) (2011) (providing that if a 
decision in an action under section 48-39-220 determines that the plaintiff owns the 
disputed tidelands and has a right to exclude others, a critical area permit will not be 
issued unless "the applicant presents the Department with a copy of a deed, lease, or 
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other instrument from the adjudicated critical area landowner that would allow 
construction of the proposed project[] or written permission from such owner to 
carry out the proposal"). 
On the other hand, a decision favoring the State redresses Merry Land's 
injury-in-fact by validating not only the State's title to the disputed marsh but also 
the federal and state permits allowing Merry Land to move forward with its 
development plans. See Sea Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 (setting forth 
the third element of standing:  "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' 
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision'"). 
Similarly, the other adjacent upland property owners were injured by Hoyler's 
action. Those who had not yet built docks were unable to begin that process without 
the risk of losing their financial investment upon having to remove them later. 
Further, those who had already built docks would have had to remove them upon a 
ruling favorable to Hoyler. Moreover, all of the adjacent owners would have lost 
access to the Beaufort River upon a ruling favorable to Hoyler.  These injuries were 
clearly "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent," rather than 
"conjectural" or "hypothetical," and they resulted from Hoyler's filing of this action. 
See id. (setting forth the first element of standing and describing the second element 
of standing as a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of"); cf. Ogburn-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners (Ricefields Subdivision), 332 S.C. 
551, 565, 505 S.E.2d 598, 605 (Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by 
Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 560 S.E.2d 410 (2002) 
(holding the appellant's claim of an individual injury in the adverse effect of a 
certificate of consistency on her use and enjoyment of a wetland adjacent to her 
residence was sufficient to provide standing); S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190, 371 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1988) (holding several 
environmental groups' allegations of an individualized injury in the adverse effect of 
a Coastal Council decision on their members' use and enjoyment of wetlands' fish 
and wildlife were sufficient to show standing). 
In other words, the State would no longer have the authority to manage the 
disputed marsh for public use or to permit adjacent property owners to build in the 
marsh, and Hoyler has explicitly indicated an intent to exclude dock construction 
upon a ruling in his favor.  On the other hand, a decision favoring the State redresses 
the adjacent owners' injuries by validating the existing dock permits and the State's 
authority to grant future dock permits. See Sea Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d 
at 291 (setting forth the third element of standing:  "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to 
merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision'"). 
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Based on the foregoing, Merry Land and the other adjacent property owners 
had a "sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to warrant consideration of 
[their] position by a court." Powell, 379 S.C. at 444, 665 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting 1A 
C.J.S. Actions § 101 (2005)). Therefore, the master properly allowed these 
defendants to participate in this action. 
IV. Additional Testimony 
Hoyler maintains the master erred by granting Merry Land's request to keep 
the record open to allow it to submit the testimony of its surveyor.  Hoyler argues 
the master effectively granted a continuance that was not authorized by Rule 
40(i)(2), SCRCP.  We disagree. 
Rule 40(i), SCRCP, governs continuances and states, 
(1) For Cause. As actions are called, counsel may request 
that the action be continued.  If good and sufficient cause 
for continuance is shown, the continuance may be granted 
by the court.  Ordinarily such continuances shall be only 
until the next term of court.  Each scheduled calendar week 
of circuit court shall constitute a separate term of court. 
(2) For Absence of Witness. No motion for continuance 
of trial shall be granted on account of the absence of a 
witness without the oath of the party, his counsel or agent, 
to the following effect, to wit:  That the testimony of the 
witness is material to the support of the action or defense 
of the party moving; that the motion is not intended for 
delay; but is made solely because the party cannot go 
safely to trial without such testimony; that there has been 
due diligence to procure the testimony of the witness or of 
such other circumstances as will satisfy the court that the 
motion is not intended for delay. . . . A party applying for 
such postponement on account of the absence of a witness 
shall set forth under oath in addition to the foregoing 
matters what fact or facts he believes the witness if present 
would testify to, and the grounds for such belief. 
(emphases added). 
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However, once a trial begins, "[t]he conduct of trial, including the admission 
and rejection of testimony, is largely within the trial judge's sound discretion, the 
exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion 
or the commission of legal error that results in prejudice for the appellant." S.C. 
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Galbreath, 315 S.C. 82, 85, 431 S.E.2d 625, 
628 (Ct. App. 1993). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the judge issuing the 
order was controlled by some error of law or when the order, based upon factual, as 
distinguished from legal conclusions, is without evidentiary support."  Sundown 
Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009). 
Further, "[t]o warrant a reversal based on the admission of evidence, the appellant 
must show both error and resulting prejudice." Conway v. Charleston Lincoln 
Mercury Inc., 363 S.C. 301, 307, 609 S.E.2d 838, 842 (Ct. App. 2005). 
At the November 2015 hearing, Merry Land presented the testimony of 
Gregory Baisch, a civil engineer employed with Ward Edwards Engineering.  Baisch 
testified that he asked the Ward Edwards survey staff to attempt to close the 
boundaries of the 1882 and 1891 plats. However, the master sustained Hoyler's 
objections to Baisch attempting to recount the surveyors' investigation and 
determinations. At the conclusion of Baisch's testimony, Merry Land moved to keep 
the record open after the hearing to allow it to locate the surveyor who worked with 
Baisch, Jim Gardner, and obtain his deposition testimony. The master granted the 
motion, allowing the record to stay open for 45 days and requiring subsequent 
post-trial briefs. 
The master's ruling did not constitute a continuance as contemplated by the 
language of Rule 40. With the exception of Gardner's deposition testimony, the 
master conducted a full bench trial upon remand from Hoyler's unsuccessful, 
years-long, interlocutory appeals. Hoyler has not shown that he was unfairly 
prejudiced by the record staying open for a mere 45 days after trial.  Hoyler 
participated in the deposition and had the opportunity to submit a post-trial brief 
after the deposition. Further, he does not allege in his appellate brief that the slight 
post-trial delay unfairly prejudiced him. 
Based on the foregoing, the master acted within his discretion in allowing the 
record to remain open to allow Merry Land to submit Gardner's testimony. See 
Galbreath, 315 S.C. at 85, 431 S.E.2d at 628 ("The conduct of trial, including the 
admission and rejection of testimony, is largely within the trial judge's sound 
discretion, the exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 
that discretion or the commission of legal error that results in prejudice for the 
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appellant."); Conway, 363 S.C. at 307, 609 S.E.2d at 842 ("To warrant a reversal 
based on the admission of evidence, the appellant must show both error and resulting 
prejudice.").  
V. Post-trial Motions 
Hoyler's final argument is that the master erred by "refusing to hear post-trial 
motions in a timely manner." This issue is unpreserved because Hoyler's supporting 
discussion is conclusory and cites no authority. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Mother ex rel. Minor Child, 375 S.C. 276, 283, 651 S.E.2d 622, 626 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(noting an issue was abandoned because the appellant made a conclusory argument 
without citation of any authority to support her claim). 
In any event, the record does not support Hoyler's assertion that the master 
refused to hear any "post-trial motions." The master gave all parties the opportunity 
to submit post-trial briefs, and they took advantage of this opportunity. See supra 
section IV.  Further, to the extent Hoyler is arguing that the master did not properly 
consider his Rule 59(e) motions, neither Hoyler's e-mail request to "make [his] post 
trial motions for the record" nor his request for "guidance as to Post-Trial Motions" 
communicated a request for a hearing on a motion for reconsideration, especially 
given the fact that the requests pre-dated the master's announcement of his decision. 
Therefore, we reject Hoyler's argument that the master refused to timely consider his 
post-trial motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the master's order. 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and HILL, JJ., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.: Late night verbal altercations at a local club escalated to a 
shootout, resulting in the death of two people, Dante Bailey and Michael Morgan, 
and the injury of two others, Robert Goodwine and Richard Green. Appellant Joseph 
Bowers was convicted for the (1) voluntary manslaughter of Michael Morgan, (2) 
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature of Richard Green, and (3) 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  Bowers argues 
the circuit court erred by instructing the jury on mutual combat and voluntary 
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manslaughter because there is no evidence to support either charge. We reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 21, 2012, Stanley Humphries and Dante Bailey were playing pool at 
the Sand Dollar in St. Helena. After the Sand Dollar closed for the night, the two 
left and went to Bailey's house to pick up some cigarettes before heading to a local 
club, Midnight Soul Patrol. Appellant met Humphries and Bailey at Bailey's house, 
and the group rode in Humphries' car to the club. The group went inside the club 
but was inside for only a few minutes before walking outside to smoke. Arthur 
Chaplin and a group of men approached Bailey, and Bailey and Chaplin started 
arguing. 
Humphries testified the argument was only verbal and ended soon after it 
started. Other witnesses testified similarly.  Mangum Smalls stated he saw Bailey 
and Chaplin arguing and guns were flashed, then Derrick Grant got between the two 
and defused the situation. Joe Pope testified he saw the argument between Bailey 
and a group of men and it was defused quickly. Alvin Wilson, the DJ at the club, 
noticed the crowd was moving outside and when he followed, he saw the altercation. 
As a result, Wilson declared the party over and walked back inside. 
After the altercation was abated, someone suggested leaving, and Humphries, 
Bailey, and Appellant walked back to Humphries' car, attempting to leave. 
Meanwhile, Pope turned to walk into the club and saw a separate altercation between 
Lucas Morgan and Irvin Smalls, unrelated to Bailey and Chaplin's altercation. 
According to Pope, Irvin was trying "to get to Lucas," but Lucas had a gun. At that 
time, Humphries, Appellant, and Bailey had returned to Humphries' car, but Bailey 
was standing outside of the car directing Humphries out of the parking spot to avoid 
hitting nearby obstacles. 
Then the gunshots began, precipitated by Michael Morgan inexplicably firing 
a flare gun.1 Bailey was shot. Humphries and Appellant exited the car and Bailey 
was on the ground, having been hit by a bullet that perforated his heart and a lung. 
Mangum Smalls testified that he saw Appellant trying to help put Bailey inside of a 
1 There was testimony that Lucas Morgan, Michael Morgan, Richard Green and 
Alvin Wilson were all related. 
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car and noticed Appellant was holding Bailey's gun.2 Richard Green, who had his 
back to the club and was outside of the club owner's nearby house, heard the first 
shot and attempted to flee. He was shot in the back and paralyzed from the waist 
down. Robert Goodwine walked outside of the club as the gunshots began and saw 
Green lying on the ground.  Goodwine saw Lucas and Bailey shooting and attempted 
to flee towards the main road when Lucas "came around the corner shooting," hitting 
Goodwine in his left calf. Pope testified that shortly after the shots began, a group 
of four or five men ran towards Michael Morgan shooting while Michael was 
standing over Green with a flare gun. Michael was then hit by a bullet, but no one 
saw who shot Michael.  The bullet struck Michael in his hip, perforated his iliac 
vein, and he died hours later. All of the injuries were the result of "through and 
through" shots, meaning a projectile passed completely through the body. 
Once the shooting stopped, Pope called 911.  Paul Adam, a deputy with the 
Beaufort County Sheriff's Office, was dispatched to the club and arrived thirteen 
minutes later. Deputy Adam collected evidence—including spent shell casings, a 
Glock handgun, and a flare gun—and turned the evidence over to the lead 
investigator, Adam Zsamar. Deputy Adam also told Investigator Zsamar that three 
people had guns—Bailey, Lucas Morgan, and Lewis Johnson. Investigator Zsamar 
processed the scene and located two sets of different brand nine–millimeter shell 
casings, one set clustered near where Lucas Morgan was seen firing and the other 
set clustered near where Appellant and Bailey were placed. The day after the 
shooting, Investigator Zsamar executed a search warrant at Lucas Morgan's 
residence and found the same brand of ammunition that was clustered near where 
witnesses placed Lucas Morgan. Further investigation also revealed that the Glock 
recovered from the scene was registered to Bailey. 
Jeremiah Fraser, an investigator with the Beaufort County Sheriff's Office, 
interviewed Appellant on the day after the shooting. Appellant's version of events 
was similar to Humphries' version. Appellant told investigators that he was at the 
club with Bailey and Bailey got into an argument with someone.  Appellant said he 
pulled Bailey away from the argument and towards the car so they could leave but 
then "shots started ringing out towards them," and that's when Bailey pulled out his 
gun, stepped out from behind the car, and was shot.  Appellant denied shooting a 
2 Mangum Smalls initially testified that he witnessed Appellant with a gun prior to 
when Appellant was trying to help put Bailey inside of the car. However, once 
presented with his previous deposition testimony, Smalls corrected himself and 
testified he did not see Appellant firing a gun and only witnessed Appellant holding 
Bailey's gun after Bailey had been shot.  
132 
gun, and his clothes were collected for gunshot residue testing. Also, Appellant's 
hands were swabbed for gunshot residue, but the swabs were never tested because 
they were collected outside of the six-hour window in which gunshot residue can be 
expected to be found on living tissue, according to expert testimony.  Appellant was 
jailed after the interview, and his shirt and shorts later tested positive only for lead 
particles.3 According to one of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 
(SLED) agents, authorities did not test Michael Morgan or Dante Bailey for gunshot 
residue because they were classified as victims.  After being jailed, Appellant chose 
to speak with investigators again and said that someone else was shooting.  While 
awaiting trial, Appellant had a conversation with his girlfriend on a prison telephone 
that recorded him saying "I ain't killed the boy, I only shot the boy." 
Appellant was tried for the murders of his friend Dante Bailey and Michael 
Morgan, the attempted murders of Robert Goodwine and Richard Green, and 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  However, after 
trial but before jury deliberations began, the State withdrew the murder indictment 
for Bailey and proceeded on the remaining indictments.4 Over Appellant's objection, 
the circuit court instructed the jury on mutual combat and told the jury the doctrine 
applied only to Michael Morgan's murder.  The circuit court also instructed the jury 
on the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and assault and battery of 
a high and aggravated nature.  Appellant objected to the voluntary manslaughter jury 
instruction.  Additionally, Appellant requested a self-defense instruction that was 
also given. 
Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of the voluntary manslaughter of 
Michael Morgan, the assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature of Richard 
Green, and possession of a weapon during commission of a violent crime. This 
appeal followed. 
3 An expert testified that lead is one of three main components of gunshot residue, 
the others being barium and antimony. Unless the test returns positive results for all 
three components, the components found cannot be called gunshot residue. 
4 The court allowed the jury to deliberate on Appellant's indictment for the attempted 
murder of Robert Goodwine, despite Goodwine's testimony that Lucas Morgan shot 
him and the circuit court's instruction that the theory of mutual combat did not apply 
to Goodwine. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the circuit court err by instructing the jury on mutual combat? 
2. Did the circuit court err by instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State 
v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 213, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009).  "In general, the trial 
judge is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina . . . and 
the law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence at trial." State v. 
Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003) (citation omitted). Unless justified 
by the evidence, an instruction should not be given because it can confuse the jury. 
State v. Commander, 384 S.C. 66, 75, 681 S.E.2d 31, 36 (Ct. App. 2009), aff'd as 
modified, 396 S.C. 254, 721 S.E.2d 413 (2011).  But an instruction must be erroneous 
and prejudicial to warrant reversal. Taylor, 356 S.C. at 231, 598 S.E.2d at 3. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Issue Preservation 
As a threshold matter, the State contends the jury instruction issue is not 
preserved for appellate review and Appellant waived his objection by failing to raise 
specific grounds. Specifically, the State argues that after the off-the-record charge 
conference, Appellant "generally objected" to the jury instruction but "did not 
provide any grounds in support of those objections" during the on-the-record charge 
conference. We disagree. 
Issue preservation rules are "meant to enable the lower court to rule properly 
after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments." I'On, L.L.C. v. Town 
of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000).  But issue 
preservation is not a "gotcha" game. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. 
Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012). Instead of being hyper-
technical, we approach preservation with a practical eye. Herron v. Century BMW, 
395 S.C. 461, 470, 719 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2011).  Once a party objects to a jury charge 
and, after opportunity for discussion, is denied on the record, no further action is 
necessary in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 62, 
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64 n.1, 508 S.E.2d 29, 30 n.1 (1998). The failure to raise specific grounds for an 
objection will not prevent the appellate court from addressing an issue when the 
record indicates that the trial court and the State understood the basis for the 
objection.  State v. Hendricks, 408 S.C. 525, 531, 759 S.E.2d 434, 437 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 353, 737 S.E.2d 490, 497 (2013)). 
In Hendricks, the court found the appellant's hearsay objection to a recording 
preserved despite appellant's failure to state specific grounds, i.e., saying "hearsay," 
because the basis for the objection was apparent from the context. Id. The court 
based its ruling on Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE, which requires timely objection to the 
admission of evidence to support a claim of error and specificity in making the 
objection if the ground for the objection is not apparent from the context. Id. After 
the appellant objected, the State responded with hearsay exceptions, arguing the 
recording was admissible as an excited utterance or present sense impression. Id. 
This court held the issue was preserved because "the State and trial court 
immediately understood [the appellant's] objection was based on hearsay." Id. 
Although the Hendricks court's ruling was based on Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE, 
our supreme court in State v. Cain relied, in part, on Hendricks when it found 
preserved an appellant's argument challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence 
of the quantity of a drug because it was clear from the record that the State and trial 
court understood the basis for the appellant's argument.  419 S.C. 24, 35, 795 S.E.2d 
846, 852 (2017).  In Cain, during pre-trial motions, the appellant argued the State 
could not rely on "theoretical yield" to elevate a charge of manufacturing drugs to 
trafficking drugs under section 44-53-375 of the South Carolina Code. Id. at 34, 795 
S.E.2d at 851.  Our supreme court found this argument necessarily focused on the 
State's evidence of the quantity of the drug. Id. The court noted the State "clearly 
understood the argument to relate to quantity." Id. The trial court took the motion 
to dismiss under advisement, and when the appellant later moved for a directed 
verdict based on quantity, the trial court referred back to the previous discussion 
about theoretical yield to deny the motion. Id. at 34–35, 795 S.E.2d at 852.  Because 
the trial court's reference to the previous discussion indicated it understood the 
directed verdict motion was based on "the sufficiency of the State's evidence on the 
element of quantity," the argument was preserved. Id. at 35, 795 S.E.2d at 852 
(citing Hendricks, 408 S.C. at 531, 759 S.E.2d at 437). 
Following Cain's guidance, we find Appellant's argument challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence of mutual combat is preserved because it is clear from 
the record that the circuit court and the State understood the basis for Appellant's 
objection.  At the directed verdict stage, the circuit court was cognizant of the issue 
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with instructing mutual combat when it is unsupported by the evidence.  The court 
stated, "But there's one case that I read this morning, I know you all have read it too, 
and it's Judge Hayes' reversal for submitting a mutual combat. And that -- I need to 
look at that from the standpoint of everybody's protection."  The court was referring 
to State v. Taylor, the case Appellant relies on in his appellate brief. 
Later, after an off-the-record charge conference, the circuit court stated: 
All right.  We've had a charge conference, informally, and 
we've gone through some certain things, and as -- first of 
all, as I understand, the State is requesting that I charge the 
mutual combat. I will include that in my charge, and I 
understand the Defendant objects to that inclusion.  Only 
because I think that there is -- in view of the evidence that 
could suggest mutual combat construed based on the 
testimony. While that testimony was somewhat 
contradictory, it still would be evidence, if the jury 
believes, whatever the jury chooses to believe, would 
support the theory. 
In other words, the trial judge decided to charge the jury on mutual combat 
over Appellant's objection, reasoning there was evidence to support the charge. 
Although the specific ground for Appellant's objection is not expressed on-the-
record after the off-the-record charge conference, the record indicates that the trial 
judge and the State understood Appellant was objecting because he thought there 
was no evidence to support the charge. See Kromah, 401 S.C. at 353, 737 S.E.2d at 
497 (holding the issue was preserved when the trial court immediately appeared to 
understand the objection was a renewal of a previous argument); Hendricks, 408 
S.C. at 531, 759 S.E.2d at 437 (holding an issue was preserved because the trial court 
immediately understood the basis of the objection). Thus, we find that the basis of 
Appellant's objection is apparent from the context of the trial judge's brief synopsis 
of the parties' respective positions following the off-the-record charge conference. 
See Hendricks, 408 S.C. at 531, 759 S.E.2d at 437 ("We find . . . the hearsay basis 
for Hendricks' objection is apparent from the context . . . . Therefore, the objection 
preserved the issue because it is clear from the record that both the State and trial 
court immediately understood Hendricks' objection was based on hearsay."); see 
also Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 203 (3rd ed. 2016) 
("[W]here a contested issue of law has been argued during the course of the trial and 
ruled upon by the trial court, an objection need not be made to that portion of the 
charge dealing with the same issue previously ruled upon by the trial court."); State 
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v. Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 407, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1980) ("A review of the colloquy 
between the judge and counsel convinces us that the position of each was made well 
known prior to the commencement of the charge. We do not think that any further 
objection was required under these facts in order to preserve the rights of the 
defendant."); Johnson, 333 S.C. at 64 n.1, 508 S.E.2d at 30 n.1 (clarifying the long-
standing rule that "where a party requests a jury charge and, after opportunity for 
discussion, the trial judge declines the charge, it is unnecessary, to preserve the point 
on appeal, to renew the request at the conclusion of the court's instruction"). 
Accordingly, we find the issue is preserved and we will address the merits. 
II. History of Mutual Combat 
"The doctrine of mutual combat has existed in South Carolina since at least 
1843, but has fallen out of common use in recent years." Taylor, 356 S.C. at 231, 
589 S.E.2d at 3. "The doctrine [of mutual combat] has most often been applied in 
situations where the defendant and decedent bear a grudge against each other before 
the fight in which one of them is killed occurs." Id. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 4.  Mutual 
combat occurs when there is a mutual intent and willingness to fight. State v. 
Graham, 260 S.C. 449, 450, 196 S.E.2d 495, 495 (1973).  Mutual intent is 
"manifested by the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending 
and leading up to the combat." Id. (citing 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 123). The antiquated 
doctrine was limited in its application by our supreme court in State v. Taylor. In 
Taylor, our supreme court required that the fight arise out of a pre-existing dispute 
and that the combatants be armed with deadly weapons.  356 S.C. at 233–34, 589 
S.E.2d at 4.  Additionally, each party must know the other is armed with a deadly 
weapon. Id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5. Moreover, it is essential that the agreement to 
fight be "entered into prior to the beginning of combat," also described as an 
antecedent agreement to fight. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 206; accord Taylor, 356 S.C. 
at 233, 589 S.E.2d at 4. 
State v. Graham provides the quintessential example of mutual combat in 
South Carolina.  In Graham, Graham and the decedent threatened each other and 
quarreled the day before the shooting.  260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496.  Graham 
armed himself and the two met in town the next day. Id. They became engaged in 
an altercation, which continued until Graham waived his pistol in the face of the 
decedent, who then left town only to return shortly thereafter with his own pistol. 
Id. The decedent parked outside of the barber shop where Graham was waiting, and 
the decedent stepped out of his vehicle, pistol in hand. Id. Graham, seeing the 
decedent armed, left the barber shop and walked into the street, positioning himself 
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for an encounter. Id. As Graham entered the street, both parties fired, and Graham 
fatally wounded the decedent. Id. 
Our supreme court determined "[t]here was ill-will between the parties" and 
it was "inferable that they had armed themselves to settle their differences at gun 
point." Id. at 452, 196 S.E.2d at 496. Accordingly, the question of mutual combat 
was for the jury to decide. Id.; see State v. Mathis, 174 S.C. 344, 348, 177 S.E. 318, 
319 (1934) (finding the law of mutual combat was appropriately instructed to the 
jury because "[t]here was testimony that the appellant and the [decedent] were on 
the lookout for each other; . . . were armed in anticipation of a combat; [and] that 
each drew his pistol and fired upon the other"). 
Similarly, other jurisdictions have found a charge on the law of mutual combat 
appropriate when there is evidence of an antecedent agreement to fight and when 
both parties are armed with dangerous weapons.  See Hughes v. State, 274 S.W. 146, 
147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (emphasizing the importance of there being evidence of 
an antecedent agreement to fight before there can be an issue of mutual combat); 
Lujan v. State, 430 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Green v. State, 809 
S.E.2d 738, 741 (Ga. 2018); State v. Johnson, 733 A.2d 852, 855 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1999). 
On the other hand, State v. Taylor is an example of circumstances that do not 
justify a jury instruction on mutual combat.  In Taylor, the petitioner and the 
decedent got into a physical altercation after the petitioner attempted to stop a fight 
between the decedent and another person.  356 S.C. at 229, 589 S.E.2d at 2.  At the 
suggestion of someone in the house, the petitioner and decedent moved their fight 
outside and, shortly thereafter, the petitioner drew a knife and stabbed the decedent 
fifteen times. Id. at 230, 589 S.E.2d at 2.  Our supreme court determined there was 
no pre-existing ill-will between the parties and no evidence the decedent knew the 
petitioner was armed with a knife. Id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5.  Accordingly, there 
was "insufficient evidence of mutual willingness to fight to submit the issue of 
mutual combat to the jury." Id. 
Although we have a limited number of cases in our jurisprudence on the law 
of mutual combat, that case law unequivocally indicates that it is essential there is 
evidence of a pre-existing ill-will between the parties and that both parties are armed 
with deadly weapons and have knowledge that the other is armed. See id. at 234, 
589 S.E.2d at 4–5 (finding a charge on the law of mutual combat unwarranted when 
there was "no indication that [the victim] knew Petitioner was armed with a knife[] 
and there was no pre-existing ill-will between the parties"); Mathis, 174 S.C. at 348– 
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49, 177 S.E. at 319 (finding mutual combat charge proper where appellant and 
deceased were on the lookout for each other and both parties were armed in 
anticipation of meeting the other); Graham, 260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496 
(finding mutual combat charge proper where appellant and deceased had "quarreled" 
prior to the killing and each knew the other was armed with a pistol). 
A. Mutual Combat Jury Instruction 
In the instant case, Appellant argues the circuit court erred in charging mutual 
combat because there is no evidence to support the charge. We agree and find that 
this case is more similar to the circumstances in Taylor where evidence of one or 
more elements of mutual combat is entirely lacking.  Therefore, a charge on mutual 
combat was improper. 
First, there was no evidence of an antecedent agreement to fight or pre-
existing ill-will between Appellant and Michael Morgan. See Taylor, 356 S.C. at 
233–34, 589 S.E.2d at 4–5. No witness testified that either Appellant or Michael 
Morgan harbored ill-will toward the other. Moreover, no one testified to seeing 
Appellant argue with Michael Morgan or anyone else on the night of the shooting. 
See Graham, 260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496 (finding mutual combat charge 
proper where, amongst other factors, appellant and deceased had quarreled prior to 
the killing); Mathis, 174 S.C. at 348–49, 177 S.E. at 319 (finding mutual combat 
charge proper where, amongst other factors, there was testimony that appellant and 
deceased were on the lookout for each other); State v. Young, 424 S.C. 424, 436–37, 
818 S.E.2d 486, 492 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding there was sufficient evidence to charge 
mutual combat).  
Significantly, several witnesses testified neither argument that occurred that 
night involved Appellant.  Instead, the first argument involved Bailey and Chaplin, 
which was immediately defused. There was testimony that Bailey and his friends 
began to walk away in an effort to leave. The second unrelated argument was 
between Lucas and Irvin—individuals who were not associated with Appellant and 
his friends.  Additionally, there was testimony that Appellant was pulling Bailey 
towards Humphries' vehicle so that they could leave. Furthermore, Humphries 
testified that Appellant was inside of Humphries' vehicle when the shooting began. 
See Graham, 260 S.C. at 450, 196 S.E.2d at 495 ("[Mutual] intent may be manifested 
by the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending and leading 
up to combat." (citing 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 124)); see also Green, 809 S.E.2d at 741 
(holding a jury instruction on mutual combat was not warranted where there was no 
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evidence that victim had an intention to fight Green and, instead, the evidence 
showed victim was feuding with Green's friend). 
Notably, during oral argument, the State maintained that the flashing of guns 
between Bailey and Chaplin was "the assent for mutual combat" as it related to 
Appellant.  However, we disagree, and as our supreme court stated in Taylor, "[I]t 
is only logical that the evidence of agreement to fight be plain . . . ." 356 S.C. at 
234, 589 S.E.2d at 4.  To maintain that an argument that did not involve Appellant 
manifested his assent to engage in mutual combat with Michael Morgan is illogical. 
See id. at 235, 589 S.E.2d at 5 ("The mutual combat doctrine is triggered when both 
parties contribute to the resulting fight."); see also Green, 809 S.E.2d at 741 (holding 
charge on mutual combat was not warranted when there was no evidence that the 
victim had an intention to fight the defendant). Thus, there is no evidence that 
Appellant and Michael Morgan had an antecedent agreement to fight. See Taylor, 
356 S.C. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5 (finding the circuit court erred in charging the law 
on mutual combat when there was no evidence of pre-existing ill-will or a dispute 
between victim and petitioner); see also Lujan, 430 S.W.2d at 514 (holding charge 
on mutual combat was unwarranted when there was no evidence of an antecedent 
agreement); Hughes, 274 S.W. at 147 (finding insufficient evidence of antecedent 
agreement to fight); id. ("In our opinion[,] the evidence in this case did not raise the 
issue of mutual combat. The evidence is utterly lacking in anything indicating any 
prearrangement between the appellant and the deceased to engage in combat. There 
is nothing to suggest any ill feeling between [the defendant and victim] until the very 
moment they began to fight."). 
Finally, there was no evidence that Michael Morgan had reason to believe 
Appellant was armed with a deadly weapon before the shooting started. See Taylor, 
356 S.C. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5. Witnesses testified that they did not see Appellant 
with a gun prior to the shooting. No one testified to seeing Appellant flash a gun. 
In fact, the basis for the State's theory of mutual combat was that Appellant picked 
up Bailey's gun after Bailey was shot. Smalls testified that after Bailey was fatally 
wounded, he saw Appellant trying to help put Bailey inside of Humphries' car. 
Smalls indicated that was when he saw Appellant holding Bailey's gun and he did 
not see Appellant trying to shoot anyone with Bailey's gun.  Smalls further stated 
that he did not see Appellant with a gun prior to the shooting. Additionally, there 
was no conclusive evidence of gun shot residue found on Appellant.5 Moreover, 
5 The evidence presented indicated that there were lead particles found on Appellant; 
however, the other two main components of gunshot residue, barium and antimony, 
were not found. 
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Appellant's recorded statement, "I ain't killed the boy, I only shot the boy," is 
insufficient to support a theory of mutual combat when evidence for one or more 
elements of the doctrine is lacking. Therefore, we find there is "insufficient evidence 
of a mutual willingness to fight" with deadly weapons and the issue of mutual 
combat should not have been submitted to the jury. See id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 5 
(holding there was insufficient evidence of mutual willingness to fight to submit the 
issue of mutual combat to the jury); id. (noting that prior South Carolina cases 
"emphasize[d] that each party knew the other was armed"); see also Stewart v. State, 
356 S.E.2d 515, 517 (Ga. 1987) (holding there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
a charge on mutual combat where "there was no evidence that the victim was armed 
with a deadly weapon at the time of the fight, nor [] was there any evidence that 
[defendant] and the victim mutually agreed to fight with deadly weapons"); Hughes, 
274 S.W. at 147 ("[T]he issue of mutual combat . . . does not arise alone from the 
fact that the parties to the affray are mutually engaged in it, but that the issue arises 
out of an antecedent agreement to fight . . . [and] before there can be the issue of 
mutual combat, the testimony must show that the agreement exists."). 
B. Prejudice 
However, our inquiry does not end because the erroneous charge must also be 
prejudicial to be reversible. Taylor, 356 S.C. at 231, 598 S.E.2d at 3.  We find the 
erroneous charge on mutual combat was prejudicial because the charge effectively 
negated Appellant's self-defense plea. 
The commingling of mutual combat and self-defense jury instructions is 
problematic. See id. at 233, 589 S.E.2d at 4 (noting that, in Georgia, commingling 
charges on mutual combat and self-defense is per se harmful because it places a 
heavier burden on the defendant than is required for self-defense (citing Grant v. 
State, 170 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969))).  Essentially, the no-fault element of 
self-defense requires that the defendant is "without fault in bringing on the 
difficulty," and the State has the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984).  Yet 
mutual combat negates the no-fault element of self-defense because mutual combat 
requires an intent and willingness to fight. Taylor, 356 S.C. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3; 
see id. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 4 ("[M]utual combat acts as a bar to self-defense because 
it requires mutual agreement to fight on equal terms for purposes other than 
protection."). Stated differently, if a person has an intent and willingness to fight, 
manifested by conduct, that person cannot be without fault in bringing on the 
difficulty, and, as a matter of law, the plea of self-defense is unavailable. See State 
v. Porter, 269 S.C. 618, 622, 239 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1977) ("As a general rule, the 
141 
plea of self-defense is not available to one who kills another while engaged in mutual 
combat."). 
To complicate matters further, a defendant may still claim self-defense after 
having engaged in mutual combat if, before the killing, the defendant withdraws and 
"endeavors in good faith to decline further conflict, and[,] either by word or act, 
makes that fact known to his [or her] adversary." Taylor, 356 S.C. at 232 n.2, 589 
S.E.2d at 3 n.2 (quoting Graham, 260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496).  This 
heightened standard directly conflicts with the no-fault element of self-defense and, 
when there is no evidence of mutual combat, has the effect of placing the burden on 
the defendant to prove self-defense.  This is true even when self-defense is properly 
charged, i.e., the jury is instructed that the State must disprove self-defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 235, 589 S.E.2d at 5 (noting the trial court charged self-
defense properly but "that charge was negated by the court's unwarranted charge on 
mutual combat," which limited the petitioner's "ability to claim self-defense" and 
prejudiced the petitioner by requiring him to prove self-defense). 
Here, the court instructed the jury on mutual combat and self-defense as 
follows: 
Now, I want to discuss with you a part of the theory that 
you'll have to consider, and it's known as mutual combat. 
And this law provides that if a [d]efendant voluntarily 
participated in mutual combat for the purpose other than 
protection, the killing of a victim would not be self-
defense.  This is true even if during the combat[,] the 
Defendant feared death or serious bodily injury. 
However, if before the killing is committed the 
[d]efendant withdraws and tried in good faith to avoid 
further conflict, and either by word or act makes that fact 
known to the victim, he would be without fault in bringing 
on the difficulty. 
For mutual combat there must be a mutual intent 
and a willingness to fight.  This intent may be shown by 
the acts and conduct of the parties and circumstances 
surrounding the combat.  In addition, it must . . . be shown 
that both parties were armed with a deadly weapon. 
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The Defendant has raised the defense of self-
defense.  And self-defense would be a complete defense if 
it is established, and you must find the Defendant not 
guilty. The State has the burden of disproving self-defense 
by -- beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you have a reasonable 
doubt of the Defendant's guilt after considering all the 
evidence, including the evidence of self-defense, then you 
must find the Defendant not guilty. 
The jury was then instructed on the four elements of self-defense. 
Additionally, the jury was instructed on the interplay between mutual combat and 
self-defense: "[A]s you know the mutual combat says if he's mutually engaged, then 
self-defense goes out the window, so to speak.  It's not available.  But if [the State] 
failed to prove that then you would consider the self-defense aspect, or again, the 
State had to prove or disprove that self-defense." 
Although the court instructed self-defense properly, we find the self-defense 
instruction was negated by the court's unwarranted instruction on mutual combat, 
which effectively relieved the State of its burden to disprove self-defense and 
imposed on Appellant the burden to prove self-defense.  See Taylor, 356 S.C. at 235, 
589 S.E.2d at 5 (noting the trial court charged self-defense properly but "that charge 
was negated by the court's unwarranted charge on mutual combat," which limited 
the petitioner's "ability to claim self-defense" and prejudiced the petitioner by 
requiring him to prove self-defense). Therefore, we find that Appellant was 
prejudiced by having to prove self-defense, contradicting our state's well-established 
jurisprudence that the State has the burden of disproving self-defense. 
Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial.6 
Because we reverse based on the unwarranted mutual combat jury instruction, we 
need not address Appellant's related argument that the circuit court erred by 
instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Edwards v. State, 372 S.C. 493, 
496–97, 642 S.E.2d 738, 740 (2007) (holding the appellate court need not address 
remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
6 At oral argument, both counsel for the State and Appellant maintained that all of 
Appellant's charges were intertwined and a reversal would apply to all of Appellant's 
convictions. We agree—especially, under these circumstances, where Appellant's 
self-defense plea was negated by the unwarranted jury instruction. See State v. 
Blurton, 352 S.C. 203, 208, 573 S.E.2d 802, 804 (2002) ("If a jury instruction is 
provided to the jury that does not fit the facts of the case, it may confuse the jury."). 
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REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concur. 
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